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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the genesis and evolution of the anti-discrimination 
norm directed at race and ethnicity. The thesis seeks to answer: how is the anti-
discrimination norm linked to race and ethnicity produced and diffused 
transnationally and how is it internalised in domestic institutions and government 
practices? The inquiry mainly assesses the constructivist model of the norm life 
cycle proposed by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. The model presents the 
development of international norms as a process that consists of three stages: 
emergence, cascading and domestic internalisation driven by three different sets of 
actors who employ different mechanisms to bring about normative change. 
 
 
The thesis investigates and ultimately challenges certain assumptions of the 
proposed model by examining the factors that account for the construction and 
domestic institutionalisation of the racial anti-discrimination norm in five contexts – 
the USA (First and Second Reconstruction periods, 1865-1877 and 1954-1975), the 
UK (1960s-1970s), the EU (1990s-2000s), the Czech Republic (1990s- present) and 
Hungary (1990s-present). It uses process tracing to re-consider and problematise the 
model’s claims about the primary agents that drive the production and the 
institutionalisation of the anti-discrimination norm in each of the five cases, their 
motives and the mechanisms they employ to facilitate normative change.  
 
 
 The thesis disputes several of the main assumptions of Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s model. The findings demonstrate that national political elites are a key 
factor that determines the progress of the racial anti-discrimination norm in each 
stage of the norm life cycle model. They also problematise the ideational basis for 
the motives of norm entrepreneurs, which, in fact, consist of a complex mixture of 
ideational and instrumental considerations. The thesis further develops the stages of 
the norm life cycle model. It challenges the overall design of the model and its 
assumed linear progression of norm evolution. 
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Introduction 
 In this thesis I examine the evolution of international norms, the conditions 
under which normative change takes place and the processes through which new 
norms influence state behaviour. I explore the channels and mechanisms through 
which new norms disseminate in states and societies. Using the anti-discrimination 
norm directed at race and ethnicity, also known as the racial equality norm, I analyse 
how and why new norms emerge, are diffused transnationally and become 
incorporated in the social, political and institutional order and practices of 
democratic states. I seek to contribute to the constructivist theory about norm 
evolution by using and critically assessing the constructivist model of the norm life 
cycle proposed by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), which is based on 
a comprehensive review of constructivist scholarship on norms in international 
relations. Constructivist theorists have further analysed the model’s suggested 
mechanisms of normative change and re-assessed and extended its latter phases 
(Risse and Sikkink, 1999, Müller, 2004, Checkel, 2001 and 2005 and Cortell and 
Davis, 2005). However, whereas scholars have devoted significant attention to 
describing the behavioural logics guiding norm entrepreneurs and to understanding 
how norm socialisation occurs, our understanding of the primary agents that create 
normative shifts, their motives and the distinct mechanisms they employ remain 
undertheorized and beckon for a thorough re-examination of the model.  
 This chapter first briefly discusses the constructivist literature on norms to 
which this project makes a contribution before turning to address the key conceptual 
and theoretical issues in the analysis of norm development. It defines the central 
concepts, norms, logic of appropriateness and logic of consequences, and lays out 
the major tenets and stages of the norm life cycle model. It explains why the racial 
equality norm was selected to investigate the validity of Finnemore and Sikkink’s 
theoretical framework concerning norm development and the focus on the life cycle 
model instead of alternative models of norm socialisation.  Using the empirical 
findings, I highlight the main problems with the model and make suggestions how to 
re-formulate it and how to further develop its stages by specifying the actors, their 
motives and the mechanisms they use to facilitate (or challenge) normative change. 
The chapter concludes with some general notes on the chosen methodology and an 
outline of the thesis.  
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Literature: locating the research within the Constructivist project   
In international relations, the role of norms has traditionally been nominal 
and mostly confined to arguments about material interests (Klotz, 1995: 13). Realists 
typically view norms as “rationalizations for self-interest” and refuse them 
explanatory power (ibid). Neorealists and neoliberals also have a narrow view of the 
role ideational factors play in social life. In line with their emphasis on coercion and 
material self-interests, neorealists maintain that norms are usually imposed by a 
hegemon and change in accordance with the great power’s interests and capabilities 
(Krasner, 1985). Neoliberals focus primarily on external incentives arguing that 
norms are generated by actor interactions and often employ bargaining analysis 
within the general discussion of “cooperation under anarchy” (Klotz, 1995: 22 and 
Keohane, 1984). According to the neorealist explanation, norms emerge when a 
hegemonic power exports them. From a neoliberal perspective, norms are created 
through negotiations especially between powerful state actors. Neo-utilitarianism1 
accepts states’ identities and interests as exogenous and given and treats ideas and 
beliefs as individualist in nature omitting discussions about the collective 
intentionality upon which ideas may rest under certain conditions.  
Constructivism with its focus on the role ideational factors play in 
international relations emerged as a separate approach in the 1980s through the work 
of constructivist scholars like Alexander Wendt (1987), Friedrich Kratochwil (1989), 
John Ruggie (1989) and David Dessler (1989). Constructivists, Ruggie explains, 
seek to understand “the full array of systematic roles that ideas play in world politics 
rather than specifying a priori roles based on theoretical presuppositions and then 
testing” for those roles (1998a: 18). The core analytical features of the constructivist 
approach emphasise ideational as well as material factors as the building blocks of 
international reality, the normative and instrumental dimensions of these factors, 
their individual and collective intentionality and the notion that the meaning and 
significance of these factors have to be studied within the time and space in which 
they are manifest (Ruggie, 1998b: 879). Through these central features 
constructivism problematises the identities and interests of state actors by seeking to 
show how they are socially constructed and specifically how they are partly shaped 
through international interactions. Using micro-process tracing, constructivists also 
                                                          
1I borrow the term ‘neo-utilitarianism” from John Ruggie (1998b) who uses it as a joint name for 
neorealism and neoliberalism.  
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attempt to chart the full range of ideational factors that make up actors’ behaviour 
and worldview (i.e., culture, principled beliefs and ideology) by examining the cause 
and effect knowledge of different policy problems. At the level of the international 
polity, constructivists accept international structure as “social” meaning that it is 
comprised of “socially knowledgeable” and “discursively competent” actors who are 
constrained by material and institutional rules (ibid). 
Although constructivists share the belief that global norms are socially 
constructed and norms can both re-structure and re-constitute international 
institutions and state governments and their political behaviour and the laws and 
policies that govern them, there has been a paucity of theoretical work among 
constructivists which explains the conditions under which new norms are created, are 
diffused internationally and are incorporated in the domestic political and social 
order of states. Two models, the aforementioned norm life cycle and the spiral model 
of human rights proposed by Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink (1999), attempt to 
provide overall theoretical frameworks by using an ideational analysis to trace the 
evolution of norms. Other scholars have focused on the interaction between domestic 
and international opportunity structures. Evans, Jacobsen and Putnam (1993) have 
developed the two-level game, an interactive and dynamic explanatory model, which 
gives prominence to the head of government as the main negotiator between 
international and domestic actors. Katheryn Sikkink’s model of the insider-outsider 
coalition is also useful because it provides a typology of the interactions between 
domestic and international opportunity structures based on their openness and 
closure (2005).  
 
This thesis locates itself within the constructivist project and seeks to 
contribute to the literature on the genesis of norms, norm socialisation and norm 
compliance by examining the validity of the norm life cycle model in terms of the 
specified agency, motives and mechanisms that Finnemore and Sikkink claim 
facilitate norm evolution. The analysis aims to widen and deepen the understanding 
about the impact of norms upon international, regional and domestic laws, policies 
and practices by re-evaluating the key assumptions of the model and filling the 
existing gaps in relation to domestic norm compliance. It fills in the existing gaps by 
specifying the conditions under which new norms are (not) likely to be internalised 
at the national and local levels. The thesis mainly engages with Finnemore and 
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Sikkink’s norm life cycle model because this model lays out the stages of norm 
evolution in the most generalised manner, which allows for an evaluation of the 
entire cycle of norm development. The spiral model of human rights, on the other 
hand, limits its scope to human rights norms and to a single stage of their 
development which focuses on the conditions under which these norms are 
implemented domestically and how they shape the politics of human rights at the 
national level (Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 3). The other models on the interactions 
between domestic and international political systems provide important insights on 
the dynamics of complexity of multi-level governance. However, because of their 
focus on domestic-international dynamics of compliance, they contribute primarily 
to theories of norm internalisation only and do not engage directly with questions of 
norm emergence and norm cascade. 
 
Concepts and theoretical issues 
Norms 
The thesis adopts the well-established constructivist definition of norms as 
shared expectations or understandings about appropriate behaviour held by a 
collectivity of actors (Checkel, 1999: 83, Jepperson et al., 1996: 54 and Legro, 1997: 
33). Indeed, without rules based on collective intentionality, constructivists hold, 
there could be no mutually understood conduct in the domestic and international 
realm. These rules can be “thick” or “thin” depending on the particular issue or on 
the influence and respectability of the agents promoting the rule (Ruggie, 1998b: 
879). Constructivists commonly distinguish between two categories of norms: 
regulative and constitutive. Regulative norms order and constrain behaviour while 
constitutive norms create new interests, categories of action or actors (Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 1998: 891). Constitutive norms thus constitute actor identity and 
instrumental calculations are replaced by “logics of appropriateness” derived from 
these social norms (Checkel, 1997: 475). Constitutive rules are also said to 
“prestructure” the realm of action within which regulative rules operate (Ruggie, 
1998b: 879). Although acknowledging the need for this analytical distinction, I hold 
that the same norm can have constraining and constitutive effects depending on the 
cognitive approach of agents to the given norm. In the thesis I also verify two related 
constructivist hypotheses. The findings in the Czech and Hungarian cases confirm 
that if actor behaviour is exclusively governed by means-ends logic, then the impact 
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of the norm is largely regulative and its strength depends on the cost-versus-benefits 
calculations and the degree of coercion applied upon the actor (seeCortell and Davis, 
1996). The evidence in the UK case shows that when actor behaviour is primarily an 
expression of complex learning processes where the actor has been exposed to new 
information and values and consequently has adopted new preferences, the norm has 
a constitutive impact because it alters the actor’s identity (see Finnemore, 1993 and 
Soysal, 1994).  
 
Logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness 
 
 This thesis is guided by the constructivist premise that two cognitive logic 
models guide actor behaviour and the logic that dominates determines whether the 
internalisation of new norms is ‘thin’ or ‘thick’. The logic of consequences underlies 
human agency that manifests itself in the form of instrumental adaptation and 
strategic bargaining. Rationalists imagine that actors select among alternatives by 
“evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective objectives, conscious 
that other actors do likewise” (March and Olsen, 1998: 949). In other words, a 
consequential frame presents political order as the outcome of negotiations among 
rational actors who pursue preferences and interests in a coordinated way through 
bargaining, negotiation, coalition building and exchange (ibid., 950). Strategies of 
norm enterprising agents that primarily “name and shame” norm violators or use 
‘carrot and stick’ approaches to elicit norm compliance are said to result in the 
instrumental adaptation of new norms by domestic political elites and are linked to 
the regulative function of norms.  
 The logic of appropriateness, March and Olsen maintain, is manifested in 
human action that is premised on recognising and exhibiting appropriate behaviour 
rather than on calculating potential incentives from alternative options (1989: 22). 
Actors are seen as following rules that associate particular identities with particular 
situations. The pursuit of their goals is associated with their identities more than with 
their interests and with the selection of rules to which they adhere more than with 
their rational expectations (March and Olsen, 1998: 951). The concept of 
appropriateness, therefore, brings ethical dimensions and aspirations in political 
behaviour. Scholars who embrace the identity position imagine political actors as 
displaying proper behaviour by acting in agreement with rules and practices that are 
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socially constructed and publicly known, expected and accepted (Cerulo, 1997). 
They present an international society as a community of rule followers with 
“distinctive sociocultural ties…intersubjective understandings and senses of 
belonging.” (March and Olsen, 1998: 952). Identities and rules in the community 
both constitute and regulate the actors and are modelled and reinforced by social 
interaction and experience (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986, Wendt and Duvall, 1989 
and Katzenstein, 1996).  
 In sum, a review of the literature suggests two cognitive models that guide 
political behaviour, a logic of consequences and a logic of appropriateness, and, 
related to these are two powerful mechanisms that drive this behaviour. The first is 
derived from rational choice according to which norm development is dependent on 
the interests of political elites (e.g., political survival, re-election) and the pressure 
they face from below (societal pressure) and from above (international pressure). 
The second is an elite learning mechanism also known in the literature on norms as 
norm socialisation which ascribes political actors the ability for deep learning that 
allows for the internalisation of norms and reconstitution of identities without 
obvious material incentives. 
 
The norm ‘life cycle’ 
 
Having sketched the key concepts of constructivism the chapter briefly 
outlines the structure and main premises of the norm life cycle model whose critical 
evaluation is the core objective of the thesis. The conceptual framework as 
articulated by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) comprises of three stages that illustrate 
the imagined progression of the formation and development of new norms: 1) norm 
emergence, 2) norm cascade, and 3) internalisation. In the model change at each 
stage is characterised by different actors, motives, and mechanisms of influence (see 
Appendix A). 
 
Norm emergence 
The norm life cycle model locates the emergence of new global norms at the 
supranational level. According to the authors, two elements appear common in the 
successful formation of international norms: norm entrepreneurs and organisational 
platforms from which they promote their norms. Transnational non-state actors, 
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individuals and non-governmental organisations, are the assumed norm enterprising 
agents at this stage and are said to have strong notions of appropriate behaviour and 
act upon those notions by engaging in moral “proselytizing” (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998: 897-900 and Nadelmann, 1990). They are said to be vital for norm 
emergence because they draw attention or even ‘create’ issues by using language that 
interprets and dramatizes them, a process also known as ‘framing’. Norm emergence 
is seen as a challenging process because new norms never originate in a normative 
vacuum but in a fiercely contested normative space where they must compete with 
other issues, opinions and ideas (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 897). 
Since NGOs are not generally bound by the same diplomacy rules that 
constrain government agents, Finnemore and Sikkink contend that they are the 
primary norm entrepreneurs able to create highly contested and visible agendas 
whose goal is to ultimately re-define appropriate behaviour for state actors in relation 
to the particular norm they promote (1998: 899-900). Networks of NGOs, described 
extensively in Keck and Sikkink’s work on transnational advocacy networks, are 
considered to be an important source of legitimacy due to their ability to gather 
reliable information quickly and based on their reputation as independent agents 
(1998a). The specified main motivational factors for these moral entrepreneurs are 
ideational commitment, altruism and empathy (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 898).  
Finnemore and Sikkink propose that the major mechanism that drives norm 
formation is persuasion (ibid. 900). Persuasion has to do with “cognition and the 
active assessment of the content of a particular message” (Johnston, 2001: 469). It 
can bring changes in minds, opinions and identities in the absence of explicit 
material or mental coercion (ibid). Norm entrepreneurs are expected to actively 
employ persuasion to bring issues to the fore of public agendas by framing them in 
creative and meaningful ways that resonate with other norms already established in 
the public’s broader understanding. Barnett defines a frame as a device employed to 
“fix meanings, organize experience, alert others that their interests and possibly their 
identities are at stake, and propose solutions to ongoing problems” (1999: 25). Since 
norms emerge in a highly contested normative space how well the issue is framed is 
expected to be of critical importance. Norms that are framed by using complex 
means-ends calculations, a device also known as ‘strategic framing’, and through 
distortive communicative processes seeking to unleash material levers are arguably 
less successful than those that enter public space via a process of “communicative 
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rationality”, which presupposes “actors reciprocally challenging one another’s 
validity claims in order to find shared truth” (Payne, 2001: 47). It is hypothesised 
that cognitive frames which resonate with broader public understandings are more 
likely to assert themselves as new ways of conceptualising an issue and hence are 
considered highly effective. The ability of norm entrepreneurs to frame issues 
successfully is particularly challenging because to promote a norm internationally 
they must appeal to belief systems and life stories in many different social contexts 
and cultures (Keck and Sikkink, 1998b: 224).  
Finnemore and Sikkink stipulate that in order for a norm to reach a threshold, 
also known as a tipping point, and advance to the next stage, it usually must become 
accepted and institutionalised in relevant international institutions, agreements and 
rules (1998: 900). Institutionalisation in international law and in the rules of 
international organisations can strongly contribute to the possibility of a norm 
cascade because it clarifies what the norm is and what constitutes its violation. 
Institutionalisation is an important but, according to Finnemore and Sikkink, not 
necessary condition for norm cascade as occasionally it occurs once a norm cascade 
has already been triggered (1998: 900). In some cases, however, it is vital for the 
norm entrepreneur to persuade a critically important international institution to 
embrace the specific norm. This happens when channels between state and norm 
entrepreneurs are blocked and NGOs end up bypassing targeted states and directly 
search out international organizations that are influential in the international realm to 
bring pressure upon norm-violating states. This is described as the “boomerang 
pattern” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a: 12-14). International organisations can be 
powerful allies because they often have fashioned an image of themselves as neutral, 
impartial, and objective, thus defining themselves as representatives of the 
international community against self-serving states (Barnett and Finnemore, 2005: 
173). Once the norm entrepreneur (often through well-established international 
organisations) has persuaded a critical mass of states, estimated to be one third of the 
given community of states, to accept new norms, the norm reaches its tipping point.  
Finally, it is important which states adopt the norm. “Critical states” – those without 
whose support the substantive norm goal is undermined – are crucial in triggering 
the norm cascade (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 901). Chief norm-violating states 
and states that have an established moral stature are among the most important actors 
that norm entrepreneurs must convince (ibid).  
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In sum, norm entrepreneurs need to secure the support of critical actors such 
as influential international organisations and states without whose backing norm 
influence would be greatly diminished (e.g. powerful states able to exercise 
considerable leverage regionally or internationally). Since norm entrepreneurs are 
mostly individual non-governmental organisations or transnational advocacy 
networks of NGOs that join their resources and expertise to advocate for a norm, 
they are hardly ever able to ‘coerce’ norm agreement – they have to persuade 
instead. Once they have persuaded a ‘critical mass’ of states to become norm leaders, 
the norm is said to have reached a threshold or tipping point and enters the second 
stage of norm cascade.   
Norm Cascade 
In the second stage, Finnemore and Sikkink argue, a different dynamic 
begins as more states start to adopt new norms even without domestic demands for 
such change (1998: 902). This is referred to as norm cascading and its dominant 
mechanism is socialisation (ibid). Socialisation refers to the process of induction of 
“actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel, 2005: 804). For 
successful socialisation to occur an agent must adopt community rules by switching 
from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness and to continue 
complying with these rules over time without the presence of incentives or sanctions 
(ibid., see also Finnemore, 1996: 29). Checkel (2005) identifies two types or levels 
of socialisation: Type I occurs when agents comply with a new rule through role 
playing. They learn how to act in accordance with community expectations and 
adopt the role irrespective of whether they like or agree with it. Type II socialisation 
occurs when agents adopt the new rule because they accept it as ‘the right thing to 
do’ and in the process their identity is transformed. Strategic instrumental 
calculations no longer affect rule compliance (2005: 804-805). Socialisation, 
according to Finnemore and Sikkink, works for two reasons: the recognition that 
state identity shapes state behaviour and that state identity itself is shaped by the 
cultural-institutional context in which states operate (1998: 902).  
 
Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that states get on the norm ‘bandwagon’ out 
of a sense of ‘peer pressure’ (1998: 903). They hypothesise that states are motivated 
to join the norm-complying community for the purpose of legitimation, conformity 
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or self-esteem (ibid). The normative legitimacy of a rule refers to the “generalized 
perception...that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” 
(Suchman, 1995: 574, see also Franck, 1990: 24).  Legitimacy, however, hardly 
exists in its pure form in international relations. Legitimacy is often intertwined with 
coercion and self-interest (Hurd, 1999: 389).  Hurd suggested that sometimes 
legitimacy derives from coercion since social agreements on which legitimacy is 
based can be the result of coercive practices (ibid). Legitimacy though operates 
differently than the power relations from which it may have originated. It, as Hurd 
points out, has different costs and consequences and different means of reproduction 
than the structures of coercion and self-interest (ibid). International legitimation is 
important to state leaders because it influences perceptions of legitimacy 
domestically.  
Conformity and esteem are also identified as significant stimulants for rule 
adoption. Conformity involves ‘social’ proof’ and ‘membership’. Social proof refers 
to the actions of others that ‘provide information about what is proper for us” and is 
said to fulfil a “psychological need to be a part of a group” (Axelrod, 1866: 1105). 
Membership in a group (alliance, treaty, intergovernmental organization) also 
enforces conformity because it comes with certain obligations and responsibilities 
while withdrawing carries with itself the risk of disapproval and even isolation. 
Esteem has to do with the desire of individual state leaders to follow appropriate 
norms in order to be viewed positively by others and themselves. In other words, 
state leaders conform to new rules to avoid disapproval and to boost national esteem 
and their own self-esteem (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 904).  
 
Internalisation  
The final stage may take place if norms become so widely and deeply 
accepted by actors that they achieve a ‘taken-for-granted quality’ and are complied 
with almost automatically (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 904).  Internalised norms, 
as Finnemore and Sikkink note, are presented as exceptionally powerful because 
they are not typically questioned and are hard to detect (ibid). Professions and 
bureaucratic mechanisms, within individual states, are assumed to serve as the prime 
agents of norm internalisation. Professional training is portrayed as going beyond 
imparting technical knowledge and is assumed to socialise professionals resulting in 
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the instilment of normative biases that are eventually reflected in policies produced 
by decision-making agencies (Finnemore and Sikiink, 1998: 905). In other words, if 
a norm is sufficiently internalised, it should be reflected in the normative biases of 
professionals in decision-making agencies. Habit can be another important 
mechanism for norm internalisation. Habit-driven actors that have established 
stability and trust among themselves can be motivated to internalise new norms in an 
indirect way. For example, procedural changes can generate new political processes 
that in turn may lead to unintended but significant normative convergence 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 905 and Rosenau, 1986: 861-870).  
 
Problematising the norm life cycle model: the main arguments 
 This project evaluates the norm life cycle model by tracing the evolution of 
the race anti-discrimination norm. The US case study looks into the norm 
entrepreneurs, their motives and the mechanisms that facilitated the emergence of the 
new norm while the UK and EU cases shed light on the agency and processes that 
drive norm internationalisation and cascading. The Hungarian and Czech cases 
assess the development of the new norm from the moment it enters domestic 
political space and specify the factors that determine the (non-) internalisation of the 
norm.  
 The constructivist literature contains a number of excellent empirical studies 
that portray how international norms are able to produce domestic change and 
become embedded in the political order of a state (Finnemore, 1993, Nadelmann, 
1990 and Price, 1995 and Linden, 2002). The problem with the studies lies in their 
focus as they have either mostly examined norms that have not had to displace 
strongly held pre-existing countervailing norms and/or have selected weak and 
developing states that have strong material incentives that drive them to adopt the 
preferred standards of behaviour within the international system. Martha Finnemore 
(1993), for example, argues that international organisations are able to act as 
‘teachers of norms’ by tracing how UNESCO ‘taught’ states to produce innovative 
science policy and to create science bureaucracy to co-ordinate and implement the 
new policy. Ethan Nadelmann (1990) explains how global prohibition regimes are 
created by tracing the international prohibition of piracy, slavery and slave trade and 
the killing of whales and elephants. Richard Price (1995) describes the genealogy of 
the chemical weapons taboo at the international level and Ronald Linden et al. 
18 
 
(2002) examine the impact of international organisations on Central and East 
European states in a wide range of policy areas. The very nature of the chosen norms 
makes it relatively easy to advocate for and establish strong international support for 
these particular norms while the adoption of norms by weaker CEE states with 
limited political options casts doubt about the existence of norm socialising 
processes within a coercive conditionality framework. By contrast, the literature on 
norms has been mostly silent on cases where the construction, diffusion and 
acceptance of a new norm is likely to be very difficult as in states that have strong 
national attachment to opposite norms (Cortell and Davis, 2005: 4). By focusing on 
the race anti-discrimination norm which is also easily linked to citizenship and 
national identity and belonging and which has faced societal and political opposition 
in CEE states, I aim to problematize some of the core assumptions of the norm life 
cycle model and to specify the limits of the constructivist argument concerning the 
importance of norms and their influence on states.  
 In regards to the overall design and framework of the life cycle mode, the 
thesis will demonstrate that the presentation of norm development in three distinct 
stages is, in actuality, more complex: the stages are not as clearly delineated as 
portrayed in the model and each phase contains within itself elements of the other 
stages. Using the empirical findings, the thesis will show that each main stage 
contains a small-scale life cycle within itself. This enhances the model’s dynamism 
and points to the need of a further analysis due to the additional layers in each phase 
of the norm life cycle model. 
 The thesis upholds previous criticisms of the model related to the assumed 
sequential and one-directional presentation of the life of norms (see Appendix B). It 
has been argued that the trajectories of norms are highly dynamic: under the right 
conditions norm construction, diffusion or internalisation can take substantial leaps 
forward but if these conditions cease and the norm is not sufficiently well-
institutionalised into international and/or domestic laws and practices it can stagnate, 
move backward and even undergo erosion (Checkel, 2012 and Jackson-Preece, 
2012). The empirical investigation into the life of the race anti-discrimination norm 
validates these criticisms: this is most clearly manifest in the US and Hungarian 
cases where it will be shown that the norm experiences progress, stagnation and 
destruction and the agents responsible for these changes will be identified. 
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Assessing norm emergence 
 The analysis of the construction of the racial equality norm in the United 
States shows that the analytical distinction Finnemore and Sikkink make between 
domestic and international norms is unsustainable and may limit the research on 
norm emergency and potentially compromise their suggested theoretical framework 
(1998: 893). Despite their acknowledgement that many international norms that seek 
to set certain standards of appropriate state behaviour start out as domestic and 
subsequently became internationalized through the efforts of various norm 
entrepreneurs, Finnemore and Sikkink nevertheless present norm emergence as an 
act that takes place exclusively at the international level (ibid). Imagining the 
ontological beginning of a new norm in a supranational context, I argue, is 
problematic because it omits an essential step in norm development for norms which 
originate in a domestic environment. If this thesis had adhered to Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s proposed framework, I would have been precluded from tracing the 
emergence of the race anti-discrimination norm because the norm was brought to life 
in a national context. The original design of the norm life cycle, I suggest, should be 
expanded to accommodate the examination of domestically emerging norms. 
Otherwise, the theoretical framework will remain incomplete and will continue to 
restrict research into the causal mechanisms and processes that account for the 
emergence of those global norms that start out as domestic norms. 
 In terms of agency the thesis on the race anti-discrimination norm 
demonstrates that national governing elites can act as key actors responsible for the 
creation of those norms that originate domestically. They accomplish this by 
codifying the norm into new laws, creating new and reforming existing institutions 
and practices that uphold the norm and even using military force to suppress 
entrenched opposing norms which, in the US case, are servitude and racial apartheid. 
Agreement for norm support among the leading elites from the executive, legislative 
and judiciary branches, the thesis will show, strongly contributes to quicker norm 
emergence and deeper norm institutionalisation and decreases the chances for norm 
setbacks and reversal. 
 The thesis also contests the assumptions of the model about the motives that 
drive norm entrepreneurs during norm construction. It shows that what motivates 
norm architects is a mixture of ideational and instrumental considerations. I argue 
that when ideas and interests converge, they reinforce the commitment of the norm 
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entrepreneurs and boost their decision-making activity. When they diverge, 
instrumental considerations commonly prevail, which results in norm stagnation or 
erosion. Generally, I claim, that norms which originate domestically especially those 
related to minority populations and equality appear to be justice-driven while 
internationally crafted norms of this nature tend to be security-driven. This, in turn, 
shows that domestic elites can employ the notion of justice more readily and 
convincingly than international norm entrepreneurs because they have an easier time 
constructing linkages between racial equality and national belonging by framing 
racial minorities as a constitutive part of the nation state. International actors, on the 
opposite, have a difficult time constructing similar frames and their arguments tend 
to be less convincing. Ultimately, the findings demonstrate that the level at which a 
norm is constructed matters for its subsequent progress: the US and UK cases 
establish that domestically emerging norms, in this case race antidiscrimination, 
become reasonably firmly and deeply embedded in the laws and institutional 
practices of states even when they clash with staunchly held pre-existing opposing 
norms. The Czech and Hungarian cases demonstrate that when the same norm is 
constructed and promoted by supranational actors, it achieves thin 
institutionalisation, has insufficient domestic legitimacy and is easily undermined. 
 
Assessing norm cascading  
 When it comes to norm cascading, the thesis demonstrates that the process is 
more nuanced and varied than Finnemore and Sikkink suggest (1998: 899). It also 
invalidates their assumption that norm entrepreneurs at the international level are the 
only agents of norm diffusion (ibid). The historical evidence about the transference 
of the notion of race anti-discrimination into UK law, policy and institutional 
practices shows that national elites also can act as norm entrepreneurs at this stage. 
The UK analysis establishes that the national elites from norm violating states are 
capable of starting a process of norm socialisation through the intentional 
arrangement of knowledge exchange with their norm promoting counterparts (in this 
case American legislators, administrators and experts in the anti-discrimination 
field). The subsequent analysis of the EU case, which traces the continued regional 
diffusion of the norm, also suggests that domestic political elites may play a distinct 
role in the facilitation of norm ‘travel’ along with international and regional 
institutions, in this instance the Council of Europe and the European Union.   
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 I also argue that ideational commitment and material considerations continue 
to motivate the norm entrepreneurs during the second stage. I confirm and develop 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s claim that norm socialisation is the main mechanism that 
drives the cascade (1998: 902). The analysis of the UK case demonstrates that norm 
socialisation processes that are initiated by the domestic institutional norm 
entrepreneurs of norm violating states, are very successful in ensuring the 
institutionalisation of the norm in relevant legislation and policy because of their 
domestic position of power and the domination of a justice-driven rationale for norm 
conformity. On the other hand, norm socialisation that is initiated by international 
norm entrepreneurs upon norm violating states has significantly less chance for 
success due to the ‘outsider’ status of the norm entrepreneurs and the fact that the 
imposition of new norms from above upon states almost always includes norm 
socialising efforts and material incentives/punishments for (non-)compliance. The 
new norm then is more likely to be adopted formally and stay nominally on the 
political agenda of norm accepting states but, as the Czech and Hungarian cases 
show, it is unlikely to be permanently internalised.  
 I make two additional claims about the concepts norm violator, norm 
entrepreneur and norm threshold. I argue that the distinction Finnemore and Sikkink 
maintain between the actors they identify as norm entrepreneurs (international 
organisations and norm promoting states) and norm violators (non-conforming 
states) is analytically inaccurate (1998: 902-903). The empirical findings show that 
the boundaries between the two concepts are fluid: the same actors are capable of 
exhibiting norm enterprising and norm violating behaviour. This makes the 
categorisation of actors problematic because it limits the evaluation of the full range 
of behaviour the actors display. The thesis also shows that the norm threshold, or 
tipping point, is not a reliable tool for marking the moment at which a cascade turns 
into a quasi-automatic process which is said to bring norms uncontestably in the 
domestic realm. The findings of the EU case reveal that even when all states in a 
given region agree and become contractually bound to conform to a new norm, in 
this case racial and ethnic anti-discrimination, contestation and refusal to conform to 
the given standard of appropriate behaviour remain a likely possibility especially 
when the new norm seeks to displace strongly held domestic opposing notions. 
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Assessing internalisation  
 The internalisation stage is the most theoretically underdeveloped part of the 
model because the primary concern of the norm life cycle model is norm 
development and diffusion in the international system. The few assumptions 
Finnemore and Sikkink make in the last stage about the main actors, their rationale 
for action and the mechanisms that facilitate internalisation are problematized by the 
empirical evidence in this study, which provides further insight into the 
internalisation process by examining domestic factors that influence the norm 
acceptance process (1998: 904-905). The thesis draws on the wider literature on 
domestic politics of compliance to explain the varying degrees of norm compliance 
in the Czech and Hungarian cases (Simmons, 2005 and Dai, 2005). Throughout the 
norm life cyle model Finnemore and Sikkink follow the dominant constructivist 
approach which in order to demonstrate that international norms influence state 
behaviour locates the causal significance of norms at the level of state interactions 
(Cortell and Davis, 1996: 451). In other words, instead of shifting the level of 
analysis to states’ domestic politics, they suggest that once a tipping point is reached 
domestic political elites and bureaucracies in their aim for international legitimacy 
embrace the new norm through its institutionalisation in laws and state structures 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 902).  Their analysis implies that domestic factors 
are less important in determining whether a norm becomes internalised in a state’s 
order. However, Finnemore and Sikkink provide little compelling theoretical 
justification for paying so little attention to the domestic level. Their model suggests 
that once the new norm has been officially recognised at the supranational level and 
the states in the given system have consented to incorporate the norm in their 
domestic orders, they follow through and implement the agreement (ibid., 902-905).  
 The emerging literature on norm compliance, however, tells a different story. 
External actors, as Beth Simmons notes, can facilitate in part the processes of 
domestic compliance with international norms, “but in principle they are all possible 
without the contributions and interference of outside actors” (2005: 126). The 
growing literature on norm internalisation, which investigates the role domestic 
factors play in norm compliance is an important complement to the approach 
Finnemore, Sikkink and other constructivist scholars adopt which emphasises 
transnational norm entrepreneurs as primary change agents (Simmons, 2005: 126, 
Cortell and Davis, 2005, Checkel, 1997 and Linden et al., 2002).  
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Cortell and Davis (2005) identify two factors, the domestic salience of an 
international norm and domestic structures, which condition the extent to which a 
norm may be incorporated in a state’s political order. Domestic salience refers to the 
degree to which an international norm resonates with pre-existing domestic values, 
interests and practices (Schimmelfennig, 2002: 14). The degree of norm salience is 
said to be indicated by the consistent incorporation of the norm into public discourse, 
policies and state institutions. Of the three indicators, domestic discourse is 
considered the most important because it ideally precedes and guides policy changes. 
Norm salience is presented as a continuous variable with a range that extends from 
limited to high and can be measured by examining a state’s policy agendas and 
institutions. Domestic salience is high when the norm’s objectives and prescriptions 
are mostly uncontested and widely employed to justify specific policy choices and 
the state takes active steps to eliminate alternative practices. Norm salience is 
moderate if state behavour is vague and ambivalent namely if the policy agenda and 
institutions formally incorporate the norm but policies and institutions that allow for 
competing normative claims continue to exist and procedures for monitoring and 
enforcing compliance are either missing or not applied. Salience is considered 
limited when the norm is placed on the policy agenda nominally but most institutions 
promote opposing norms and political elites openly question or even challenge the 
validity of the norm (Cortell and Davis, 2005: 9). 
 Domestic structure refers to the structure of government of the state and its 
institutions. In cases assessing norm internalisation processes domestic structure 
typically acts as an intervening variable. While domestic structure may not matter in 
cases in which the domestic salience of new norms is high, its significance is 
impossible to overlook when the international norm is contested.  
 In her research on the commitment and compliance of national governments 
with international human rights treaties, Beth Simmons identifies three kinds of 
actors – legislative veto players, subnational players, and judicial institutions – 
which play an important role in either constraining or enhancing domestic 
compliance with international law (2005: 68-77). She claims that domestic systems 
with multiple legislative veto plays, as in the case of supermajorities or bicameral 
majority approval, can add hurdles to the ratification of international human rights 
treaties (69). Subnational players especially powerful local governments which enjoy 
relative independence can also resist the ratification efforts of central governments in 
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cases in which new treaties encroach on their prerogatives (69). Finally, she argues 
that several structural features of common law systems make it more difficult than in 
civil law systems for national governments to avoid making the domestic changes 
that the international treaty envisions (75). Of particular importance for Simmons are 
the greater independence of the judiciary from the rest of the national policymakers, 
the power of the courts to review administrative actions and to hold governments 
accountable for violations of constitutional or treaty-based human rights and the role 
of precedent, which allows for the deeper institutionalisation of treaties into domestic 
law (ibid). The thesis applies Simmons’ hypotheses to the cases of norm compliance 
studied here in order to explain the degree of norm acceptance. 
As already mentioned the acceptance of the norm at the supranational level 
and norm cascading do not necessarily always translate into domestic conformity to 
the international norm.  Generally speaking, norm adherence varies largely from 
state to state depending on the degree of legal institutionalization of the norm and the 
decision-making processes through which the norm is constructed at the national 
level. Taking into consideration the existing literature on norm compliance, I make 
several claims that aim to re-devise the internalisation stage by exploring the 
domestic context to glean further insight into the conditions which determine the 
(non-) internalisation of international norms and the degree of norm salience.  
 
I argue that national political elites play an important role in determining 
whether and the extent to which states fulfil their international commitment to norm 
conformity. The Hungarian and Czech cases demonstrate that even when a new 
norm becomes incorporated into regional law that all member states are bound to 
recognise and incorporate in national legislation, the cascading and internalisation 
can be gravely disrupted when national political elites renege their commitment. On 
the other hand, the UK case shows that if domestic elites have sufficient ideational 
commitment to the new norm and consider its internalisation of considerable 
political interest, norm conformity and high norm salience can be achieved with little 
agency of international actors.  
In this stage, Sikkink’s dynamic multi-level governance model is useful in 
assessing the potential degree of norm internalisation (2005). According to Sikkink, 
when norm entrepreneurs face (or perceive that they face) closed opportunity 
structures nationally and internationally, the chances of successful norm 
25 
 
internalisation are greatly diminished (2005: 159). When domestic structures are 
perceived as closed and international structures as open, norm entrepreneurs seek 
international allies to increase the pressure upon their governments to institutionalise 
new norms (161). When both types of structures are relatively open, Sikkink 
hypothesises, norm entrepreneurs tend to privilege their engagement with domestic 
political actors but still keep international structures as complementary to ensure the 
deep institutionalisation of norms into domestic law, policy and practice (164-165). 
Finally, when domestic opportunity structures are seen as open but international ones 
are closed, this results in defensive transnationalism, a situation in which norm 
entrepreneurs work with and lobby their governments to democratise international 
institutions (164).  
The multi-level governance model, in part, explains the prolonged and 
contested internalisation process of the racial antidiscrimination norm. Since the 
domestic opportunity structures in the Czech Republic are seen as closed and the 
European structures as open, the model expects norm entrepreneurs to seek the 
support of European allies to pressure the Czech government to institutionalise the 
racial anti-discrimination norm in national law and practice. The empirical evidence 
shows that norm entrepreneurs have indeed worked with the European Commission, 
the Council of Europe and especially the European Court of Human Rights to force 
the Czech government to initiate normative change. In the Hungarian case (2002-
2008), norm progress can also be understood in terms of open opportunities 
structures at the national and supranational levels. Once the national opportunity 
structures closed (2008-present), the process of norm institutionalisation was 
reversed and the gains undone.   
As already pointed out in the norm emergence phase the nature of the new 
norm and the level at which it is constructed are important determinants of the 
degree of domestic institutionalisation and salience of the new norm. Norms that do 
not have high domestic resonance are more likely to succeed in their internalisation 
if they are promoted by justice-driven national elites. Norms that are exclusively 
promoted by supranational actors are unable to achieve internalisation when the 
national elites’ reasons for norm recognition are primarily instrumental. In such 
cases the elites are expected to ‘talk the talk’ or mimic the language of international 
institutions and to create new formal Potemkin institutions which are required to 
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gain the desired international legitimacy while continuing their old behaviour and 
avoiding the political cost of adaptation (Schimmelfennig, 2002: 12).  
I also argue that an analytical distinction should be made between 
internalisation at the national and local level and further research is needed to 
identify the differences and linkages between the two levels in terms of agency and 
mechanisms. The empirical evidence shows that the government setup of states, 
centralised or decentralised, can interrupt or facilitate norm adherence. In the thesis, 
a centralised government refers to a government in which the legal authority, 
planning and decision-making power rests primarily with the executive branch. A 
decentralised government here should be understood primarily in terms of 
administrative decentralisation.  Administrative decentralisation aims to redistribute 
authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among 
the regional and local levels of government. It refers to the transfer of responsibility 
for the planning, financing and delivery of certain public functions from the central 
government and its agencies to subordinate levels of government headed by semi-
autonomous regional or local public authorities. The thesis does not present 
government centralisation and decentralisation as ‘either – or’ conditions. It uses the 
concepts with the understanding that they do not represent two distinct and absolute 
systems of governance. In fact, the terms should be viewed as one continuous 
variable with values ranging from limited to high depending on the balance between 
the decision-making functions of national, regional and local political elites. 
The analysis of the US and UK cases demonstrates that when key national 
elites act as norm promoters and the governance system is centralised, norm 
conformity at the national and local levels is higher due to the greater political power 
national elites have within the system. The Hungarian case demonstrates that when 
norm supporting national elites govern within a decentralised system, local norm 
adherence is low when local authorities choose to adhere to opposite norms due to 
personal and political considerations. The Hungarian and Czech cases also show that 
the governance framework is largely immaterial in situations when the national and 
local political elites are hostile to the new norm although if national elites govern 
within a centralised system norm erosion tends to be quicker.  
 
The analysis also confirms Beth Simmons’ argument that judicial institutions 
which tend to have more independence influence norm internalisation. In those states 
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like the United States with a common law system due to the legal notion of 
precedent, which establishes a doctrine or rule that extends to and governs 
subsequent legal decisions in similar cases, the judiciary can be a powerful actor able 
to deliver high impact judgments that can in equal measure interrupt or significantly 
augment the progress towards norm adherence. In those states, like the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, which are governed by a civil law system the judiciary is 
limited in its ability to act because civil law does not recognise the doctrine of legal 
precedent which makes the issuance of broadly formulated judgments with high 
national impact impossible to produce. In the Czech Republic and Hungary, the 
courts lack the power to review government actions and particularly in Hungary the 
judiciary has virtually no independence and is closely supervised by the executive 
branch (see Kornai, 2015) 
Ultimately, the thesis demonstrates that the state should not be imagined as a 
rational unitary actor but be seen as encompassing a variety of actors with distinct 
sets of interests, agendas and institutional biases that may lead them to display 
different attitudes to the prospect of norm internalisation. The empirical findings 
suggest that further research is necessary to determine the relationships and power 
dynamics among the three branches of the government to be able to assess the degree 
of norm internalisation. 
 
Methodology, sources and case selection 
 
 The methodology of choice I adopt to assess the stages of norm evolution is 
process tracing. Process tracing examines “whether the intervening variables 
between a hypothesised cause and observed effect move as predicted” or, in other 
words, process tracing looks at the causal mechanisms that are in operation in a case 
(Bennett and George, 2005). Process tracing is a particularly suitable tool for large 
historic case studies because it enables the researcher to draw “descriptive and causal 
inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence … [which are] understood as part of a 
temporal sequence of events or phenomena (Collier, 2011: 824). Students of norms 
who examine complex social processes are frequently faced with the problem of 
equifinality, or the existence of multiple pathways that can lead to the same outcome 
(Checkel, 2012 and Jackson-Preece, 2012). Process tracing aims to alleviate the 
problem by establishing a clear pathway that validates the inferences that are drawn.  
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 In terms of sources, this analysis on norm formation, diffusion and 
conformity uses data derived from secondary literature, and official reports produced 
by national governments, international organisations, monitoring bodies, non-
governmental organisations and international and domestic courts. Interviews and 
discussions with more than thirty representatives of intergovernmental organisations, 
state institutions, national and international NGOs and individual experts and 
activists in the field of anti-discrimination were conducted in order to acquire 
additional information about political decision-making, norm implementation, 
compliance, perceptions about the norm and motivations for championing the norm 
or not. On the international level, the most relevant bodies contacted were the 
Council of Europe, the European Roma Rights Center, the Roma Education Fund, 
the Open Society Foundations and the Roma Decade Secretariat. At the domestic 
level, information and documents were collected from the Office of the Czech 
Ombudsman, the Czech Agency for Social Inclusion, the Czech Ministry of 
Education, the Czech Ministry of Human Rights, the Czech Helsinki Committee, the 
Hungarian Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, the Hungarian 
Secretariat of Social Inclusion, the Hungarian Equal Treatment Authority and Roma 
Versitas. 
  As Peter Vermeersch (2006: 9) points out it is important to note that the 
information obtained from state and non-state representatives and official documents 
should not be taken as unproblematic representations of reality. Both institutional 
and activist reports are likely to contain some bias and government reports often 
offered scant information on the implementation and compliance with norm-related 
policies and legislation. Predictably, non-governmental norm entrepreneurs voiced 
strong criticisms against government policies, their implementation and institutional 
practices that constrain norm adherence. Governments tended to deflect criticism 
either by citing good relationships with civil society actors or by ignoring the levied 
criticisms. The interview accounts then should not be considered as trusted 
descriptions of reality but as useful sources that offer insights into the views, 
understandings and positions of those who play part in determining norm 
(d)evolution.  
 Historical context has largely determined which cases are analysed here. The 
thesis starts out with the politics of race in post-Civil War America because this is 
the context in which the norm of racial equality was initially articulated. The analysis 
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of UK’s race relations politics was necessary because it enabled the assessment of 
the actors and processes that made the transatlantic transfer of the racial anti-
discrimination norm possible. Examining the institutionalisation of the norm into 
European law has allowed me to analyse a regional norm cascade. In regards to 
internalisation, the Czech Republic and Hungary were selected because they are 
democratic states that fit the norm life cycle’s description of countries which are 
highly likely to display strong adherence. The Czech Republic and Hungary strove 
for international legitimacy and displayed determination to ‘return to Europe’ 
throughout the 1990s. Finally, they have a history of discrimination against the 
Romani minority residing within their borders and the application of the racial and 
ethnic anti-discrimination norm to the Roma by the respective governments 
represents a litmus test to its degree of norm internalisation. 
 The thesis focuses on elite learning and behaviour, norm institutionalisation 
and on the domestic and international institutions political elites inhabit. It privileges 
the examination of norm institutionalisation processes in domestic laws and policies. 
Consequently, grassroots norm entrepreneurship and wider societal agency play a 
limited role in the thesis. They help to explain the general social context within 
which political elites operate and construct legal, policy and institutional frameworks 
that either constrain or promote normative change. 
Overview of the research 
This thesis consists of an introduction and six chapters. Chapter One analyses 
the emergence of the racial anti-discrimination norm, which was first articulated 
within the US federal government in post-Civil War America. The chapter traces 
relevant political developments during the First and Second Reconstruction periods, 
1865-1877 and 1954-1975 respectively, which highlight the role national political 
elites play in norm-building, and assesses the motives of these norm entrepreneurs 
vis-à-vis the assumptions of the norm life cycle model. It examines the relationship 
between the three government branches and the impact the structure of the state has 
upon norm development.  
Chapter Two continues to examine the evolution of the racial anti-
discrimination norm by focusing on the agents and mechanisms that drive its 
internationalisation, or diffusion, from the US to the UK context. It shows that when 
it comes to cascading national elites can drive norm diffusion on their own and they 
tend to be highly successful in their endeavour. The chapter confirms that norm 
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socialisation is the main mechanism that ensures long-term norm institutionalisation 
by examining the elite learning processes that occurred between UK and US elites 
through knowledge exchange in the 1960s and the 1970s. 
Chapter Three continues tracing the regional cascading of the norm in Europe 
by analysing the making of the EU Race Equality Directive and jurisprudence 
developments at the European Court of Human Rights from the late 1990s to the 
present. It proposes that even at this level the codification of the norm into EU law 
was in part made possible by the agency of a transnational advocacy network that 
had domestic roots because it was composed of national government officials and 
experts. The empirics also problematise the concepts of norm entrepreneur, norm 
violator and question the usefulness of the notion of norm threshold.  
Chapter Four continues to trace the journey of the racial anti-discrimination 
norm by using the Czech case (1990s to present) to specify the conditions that 
determine the degree of domestic norm internalisation. The developments 
surrounding the transposition of the Race Equality Directive and the implementation 
problems of the 2007 landmark case D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic illustrate 
that controversial norms which are imposed by supranational actors are unable to 
achieve internalisation if the national elites are predominantly driven by instrumental 
concerns. When ideational commitment is absent, the institutionalisation of the new 
norm is thin. The norm is superficially codified into domestic law but is not properly 
implemented and ends up being exposed to contestation in the practices of state 
institutions and the mainstream domestic political discourse. 
Chapter Five which focuses on norm internalisation in Hungary (1990s to 
present) continues to validate the main argument running through the thesis about the 
key role of domestic political elites in norm development. The analysis confirms the 
hypothesis that a state’s governance framework acts as an intervening variable that 
constrains or facilitates the actions of political elites. It shows that the considerable 
efforts of norm-supporting political elites to ensure norm adherence failed due to the 
decentralised and fragmented governance system which bestowed significant powers 
upon norm-defiant local officials. The subsequent centralisation of the system has 
worsened the situation because the new governing elites are hostile to the notion of 
racial equality. 
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The final chapter summarises the theoretical contributions the thesis makes to 
the literature of norm evolution and the implications of the findings for future 
research.  
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Chapter One 
The genesis of the racial anti-discrimination norm: The United States 
context 
 This chapter examines the construction of the racial anti-discrimination norm, 
first designed by norm entrepreneurs within the US Congress in post-Civil War 
America, by tracing relevant political and jurisprudential developments during the 
First and Second Reconstruction periods. The goal of the historical analysis is to 
highlight the role national political elites played in the norm creation, the 
relationship between ideational and instrumental concerns that motivated the elites’ 
support for a new political and social order and the role the government system plays 
in the institutionalisation of new norms.  
The norm life cycle model and its subsequent variations present norm 
emergence as a process that is driven by transnational norm entrepreneurs, usually 
international NGOs and influential individuals, who seek to secure the support of 
state actors and influential intergovernmental organisations to endorse the new norm 
and incorporate it into their norm socialisation agenda (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1998: 896-901). The examination of the genesis of the of the racial equality norm, 
however, suggests that national political elites also can play an important role in this 
phase and determine the degree of prominence and subsequent institutionalisation of 
the new norm into law, policy and institutional practice when the norm is initially 
constructed in a domestic context. Their support for the new norm through 
legislative, judiciary and military means was crucial for the brief flourishing of the 
racial equality norm during the First Reconstruction, 1865-1877, and its permanent 
institutionalisation during the Second Reconstruction, 1954-1975. The empirical 
evidence from the First Reconstruction also suggests that should national elites 
withdraw their norm commitment, the new norm inevitably undergoes a civic ‘death’ 
and does not re-emerge until a new set of political elites embraces the norm again. 
For the purposes of this analysis civic death is defined as the disappearance of a 
norm from political discourse and societal practices and conventions, its un-
embedding from national and local laws, policies and institutional practices and its 
replacement with opposing norms. The Czech and Hungarian cases which are 
examined in chapters 4 and 5 uphold the hypothesis of the elites’ importance to norm 
emergence and internalisation into a state’s political order.  
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Besides presenting national political elites as causal mechanisms of norm 
emergence, the chapter re-examines the elites’ motivations that drive their agency. 
To recapitulate, Finnemore and Sikkink hypothesise that in the initial phase norm 
entrepreneurs are motivated by altruism, a sense empathy and ideational 
commitment (1998: 898). Here they are correct in part. The thesis confirms that US 
elites who promoted the racial anti-discrimination norm were largely justice-driven 
but it also argues that their ideational motives were entwined with pragmatic 
concerns related to party-building, electoral outcomes and foreign policy objectives. 
In fact, the findings suggest that in the US case ideational and instrumental 
considerations were inextricably entwined: for example, the enfranchisement of the 
newly freed male population in the 1860s was perceived by Republican reformers in 
Washington as both a matter of justice and an essential part of African American 
political inclusion as well as a political necessity to keep the Republican party in 
power. While the African American vote was needed to ensure Republican electoral 
victory, the freedpersons also needed the party to ensure their citizenship rights. In 
other words, ideas and instrumentality should not necessarily be conceptualised in 
opposition but depending on context they can act as motivational forces that 
reinforce the normative commitment of political elites and intensify their agentiality.  
 Two further claims are made in this chapter. The setup of a state’s 
government system acts as an intervening variable that facilitates or inhibits the 
creation and internalisation of new norms. The chapter reveals that the brief periods 
when the southern states were under the direct control of the federal government, 
which was mostly achieved through military means, were characterised by a rapid 
advancement of the social and political inclusion of African Americans despite the 
widespread opposition and hostility of the ex-rebel ethnic majority. On the other 
hand, when political elites who display norm commitment act within a decentralised 
governance system and the local authorities support opposing ideas and practices, 
norm conformity especially at the local level decreases. My research affirms Beth 
Simmons’ claim about the significance of federal political systems with their 
influential subnational players in constraining norm institutionalisation (2009:69) US 
federalism can largely explain why the racial anti-discrimination norm is well-
institutionalised and accepted at the national level but frequently challenged by 
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officials and private individuals at state and local levels in the southern United 
States.  
Finally, I argue that the distinction Finnemore and Sikkink make between 
international and domestic norms is analytically unsustainable. Many international 
norms, as the authors themselves admit, begin as domestic norms and eventually 
become internationalised (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 893). Still they treat 
domestic norms as separate and in their model they place the ontological beginning 
of new norms at a point at which the new norm is at the supranational level 
regardless of whether the norm was first formulated in a domestic or international 
context (ibid., 893 – 894 and 899). For international norms whose formation does 
not begin at the regional or international level, it means that the norm life cycle 
model skips a critical step in their creation and precludes researchers from examining 
their domestic origins and the driving mechanisms that facilitate norm-building and 
internationalisation. This research shows that starting at the national level is essential 
for understanding how and why new norms that originate in a domestic context are 
created and why they succeed in being institutionalised in the domestic order and 
subsequently ‘exported’ to other states or why they fail to do so.  
 In this thesis I seek to verify the mechanisms and processes which my 
assessment of constructivist theoretical approaches cues me to look. Consequently, 
only relevant aspects of political history are treated in this chapter despite the vast 
monographic literature the two reconstructions have generated. The US analysis 
begins by tracing the political and jurisprudence building processes during the First 
Reconstruction. It attributes the swift ascendance of the racial equality norm to the 
actions of a core group of congressional Republicans who placed the former slave-
holding states under direct control of the federal government, enshrined racial 
equality in the constitution, bolstered the norm through further legislation, and used 
the military as a norm protector and enforcer. The subsequent civic death of the 
norm is explained by the withdrawal of norm support including the military, by these 
same elites. As the Republican government became entangled in a number of 
scandals towards the end of the Frist Reconstruction, political priorities shifted and 
the African American vote was no longer deemed as crucial for Republican electoral 
victory. The actions of another set of elites, the Supreme Court judges, accounts for 
the re-emergence of de jure racial discrimination and segregation and the re-
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surfacing of state and local institutions and practices in the southern states that 
upheld the pre-Reconstruction countervailing norms of ethnic inferiority and 
separation of the races.  
 The chapter presents the re-emergence and successful institutionalisation of 
the racial anti-discrimination norm during the Second Reconstruction as the outcome 
of a complex interaction between advocacy groups, national political elites and the 
Supreme Court judges. While the judiciary is considered instrumental in formally de-
legitimising racial inequality, the re-employment of the same tools used during the 
First Reconstruction by the ruling elites – federal supervision of southern states and 
mobilisation of the military – is considered decisive in bringing forth normative 
change. The irreversibility of the process is again explained by the emerging 
consensus about the sustained support for the norm’s institutionalisation between 
key norm entrepreneurs within the executive, legislative and judiciary braches of the 
federal government.  
The First Reconstruction (1865-1877) 
Political processes 
 Norms, the constructivist literature has shown, emerge in a fiercely contested 
environment and the genesis of the racial anti-discrimination norm is no exception. 
In the aftermath of the Civil War Lincoln’s successor, Andrew Johnson, emerged as 
a ‘remarkably active president’ whose ambition to develop a ‘Restauration policy’ in 
the post-bellum southern states that featured racially conservative reconciliation 
elements locked him in a political battle with the Thirty-ninth Congress (1865-1867). 
Thirty-ninth Congress at the time was dominated by a core of politicians known as 
the Radical Republicans who were to become the architects of an astounding racial 
restructuring of the American political order (Valelly, 2004: 26, McPherson, 1988: 
699-703, Trefousse, 1989: 196-197).  Stepping into office, President Johnson sought 
to reverse the two Republican reconstruction policies aiming at land redistribution 
and prevention of office holding by former Confederates. He attacked the 
Freedman’s Bureau which was charged with land redistribution by forcing the return 
of the land former slaves had been given to work to their former masters (Trefousse, 
1999). 
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Johnson also challenged the Ironclad Test Oath initiative. The latter was a 
piece of Congressional legislation dealing with elective and appointive office, which 
excluded those who “had borne arms against the United States”, aided anyone who 
did so, held an office in a government hostile to the United States and “yielded a 
voluntary support to any pretended government” from the US Congress and from 
federal court positions (Ironclad Test Oath, 1866 and Hyman, 1954). Johnson, 
however, issued two proclamations: the first was to grant amnesty to participants in 
the rebellion and the second established provisional governments in key rebel states 
staffed by ex-rebels (Richardson, 1908: 310-332). These policies triggered the 
restauration of white supremacy. Shortly after its restauration, the Mississippi state 
legislature passed a series of statutes establishing African American labour peonage, 
a form of re-enslavement, which were quickly copied by other southern state 
governments. To make matters more alarming for those in favour of African 
American empowerment, the labour peonage codes coincided with the formal 
abolition of slavery through the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, which had 
immense consequences for political parties. In the antebellum period, male slaves 
had counted as three fifths of a person in appointment and in the Electoral College 
but with the change of their political weight increased. Yet, the new peonage statutes 
and the lack of voting and office holding rights by the freedmen effectively 
strengthened the political representation of their former masters who found 
themselves in stronger political position than before (Vallelly, 2004: 28). 
 The situation presented two issues before the Republican-controlled Thirty-
ninth Congress. The first was the issue of African American civil rights and the 
second southern political representation.  Historical records reveal that these issues 
triggered a swift Congressional response which was led by the Radical Republican 
faction. In his well-known speech before Congress on 18 December 1865, the key 
Republican leader, Thaddeus Stevens, called for a long and harsh Reconstruction 
whose key feature was the federal protection of the political, economic and social 
rights of former slaves, which he argued could be ensured only by the continued 
political dominance of his party (Harold, 2008: 193-199). If the ex-rebels were 
allowed to participate in the national government, their increased representation 
would “always give them a majority in Congress and the Electoral College” and 
therefore possession of the White House and Congress (ibid., 197).  Stevens believed 
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that the Republican Party and the ideals it embraced faced an existential threat, 
“They [Southern Democrats] will at the very first election take possession of the 
White House and the Halls of Congress. I need not depict the ruin that would 
follow…The oppression of the freedmen; the re-amendment of their State 
constitutions, and the re-establishment of slavery would be the inevitable result” 
(ibid). To prevent this, he proposed a two-pronged approach: the constitutional 
protection of African American suffrage and the relegation of ex-rebel states to 
“conquered provinces…” subject to the absolute disposal of Congress” (ibid., 194). 
He reasoned that these states “severed their original contacts” once they raised arms 
against the Union and justified Congressional takeover of state matters by invoking 
Article 4 of the Constitution, which places the power of the admittance of new states 
into the Union with Congress (ibid). 
 The ideational motives of the Radical Republicans also figure prominently in 
Thaddeus Stevens’s speech. In it Stevens argued for the responsibility of the federal 
government to protect the new citizens of the United States, 
We have turned, or are about to turn, loose four million slaves without a hut 
to shelter them or a cent in their pockets. The infernal laws of slavery have 
prevented them from acquiring an education, understanding the common laws of 
contract, or of managing the ordinary business of life. This Congress is bound to 
provide for them until they can take care of themselves. If we do not furnish them 
with homesteads, and hedge them around with protective laws; if we leave them to 
the legislation of their late masters, we had better have left them in bondage. If we 
fail in this great duty now, when we have the power, we shall deserve and receive 
the execration of history and of all future ages (Harold, 2008: 197).  
 The speech suggests that the Radical Republicans perceived the legal 
protection of African Americans as a paramount political goal and had a strong sense 
of responsibility towards ensuring the former slaves’ social and political equality. 
His speech sums up the motives of the Republican political elites for re-structuring 
the social and political order of the southern states. On the one hand, they were 
motivated by the novel idea of racial equality. On the other, the Republicans had 
their pragmatic considerations which had to do with future Republican electability. 
 The First Reconstruction narrative has shown so far that the norm of racial 
equality was the product of a ‘revolution from above’ triggered by an elite group of 
national political actors who rejected the notion of the ‘white man’s Government’.  
The First Reconstruction case does show that the agents of normative change are 
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more varied than the norm life cycle model assumes. The historical evidence reveals 
that national political elites should also be credited with norm creation in addition to 
transnational advocacy organisations and the networks they form (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998: 899). In regards to motives, as the model suggests these elites were 
clearly driven by a sense of justice and ideational commitment evident in their 
acknowledgement that equal rights must be innate in every human being regardless 
of colour (ibid., 898). However, their actions to cordon off confederate access to 
political power also shows that instrumental concerns figured prominently, were 
intrinsically connected with the Republican justice-driven agenda and heightened the 
normative commitment of Republican elites.   
 The enshrinement of the racial equality norm in the Constitution through 
constitutional amendments was seen as the most reliable way to ensure political 
success and compliance with the new norm. The Congressional Republicans quickly 
formed the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, which soon drafted a civil rights bill, 
whose purpose was to serve as a corrective to the emerging local and state Black 
codes. The bill was approved without amendments in both the House and the Senate 
on 2 February and 13 March 1866 respectively showing unprecedented Republican 
support for the Reconstruction project (Palmer and Ochoa, 1998 and Trefousse, 
2005). The president vetoed the bill on 27 March that same year citing the exclusion 
of southern politicians from the government and the threat the bill presented to 
established ‘racial custom’ in the South and federalism as the reasons for its 
denouncement. Congress’ remarkable override less than a month later and its 
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment on 9 July 1868 signalled an irreversible split 
between Johnson and Congress (Cox and Cox, 1961). 
 The Fourteenth Amendment, the pillar of Congressional Reconstruction, was 
designed to provide federal protection for the equality of the former slaves before the 
law (Sections 1 and 5), to disenfranchise southern white males who had participated 
in the Civil War (Section 2), and to exclude ex-rebels from public office holding 
(Section 3). The legislation, however, intensified the crisis between the president and 
the Radical Republicans. Johnson and the Democratic leadership openly encouraged 
the southern states not to ratify the amendment, to exclude the former slaves from 
suffrage, to liberally pardon former rebels and to validate the newly formed state 
governments with their Black Codes (Belz, 1969: 306). Strengthened by voters’ 
39 
 
approvals of the civil rights measures evident in the impressive Republican gains in 
the 1866 elections, Congress put a stop on Johnson’s subterfuge by rolling out a 
programme of immediate compliance with the amendment in the former Confederate 
states to be implemented under the direction of the US army.  
 Acting highly entrepreneurially, the Congressional Republicans passed 
several more detailed pieces of legislation over President Johnson’s veto, which 
specified the key tenets of military reconstruction. The 1967 Military Reconstruction 
Act established five military districts in the southern states under the control of the 
US army that were to remain in existence until new governments were formed. The 
military was tasked with registering eligible African American voters and ensuring 
that no ex-rebels had access to the ballot box. The 1867 Tenure of Office Act and the 
1867 Command of the Army Act ensured Congressional control over the Army 
while the Supplementary Reconstruction Act enacted that same year supplied the 
mechanisms for the new political processes in the occupied territories (Sefton, 1967). 
To guarantee the irreversibility of African American suffrage, on 30 March 1870 
Congress also passed the Fifteenth Amendment that explicitly banned the state and 
federal government from denying and obstructing the right to vote on account of 
race, colour, or previous condition of servitude (Section 1). Of particular note is also 
the 1975 Civil Rights Act, a piece of visionary legislation produced by Congress and 
President Grant’s administration, that established equal access to public facilities for 
African American citizens and prohibited the exclusion of freedpersons from jury 
service (see U.S. Statute 18, 1875: 335-37). Now African American citizens were 
explicitly guaranteed full participation in the social life of their communities (save 
integrated schooling which was discussed but excised from the final version) and 
afforded a say in judiciary matters. 
 The historical research suggests that the centralisation of the government in 
the ex-slave owning states was crucial in establishing an environment that would 
allow for the implementation of the newly passed legislation. Tasking the military 
with the execution of the Reconstruction Acts allowed for the unprecedented albeit 
brief compliance with the new norm of racial equality at the local level. The military 
enforced the Ironclad Test Oath and provided critical protection to southern African 
Americans by protecting public assemblies for the purposes of voter registration, 
election, state constitutional convention and the ratification of state constitutions 
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(Selfton, 1967: 137). Estimates show that over 700,000 African American men were 
registered to vote compared to 627,000 white men and 162 African American men 
had positions in state and federal government during the military reconstruction 
period suggesting that the political inclusion of the former male slaves was highly 
successful (Woodward, 1957: 235-6 and Kousser, 1992: 135-140). Military 
protection contributed to the general feeling of emancipation which allowed 
freedpeople to claim the rights to education and free movement besides voting. At 
the height of the First Reconstruction in the mid-1870s, forty percent of African 
American children were enrolled in school, three times more than just five years 
before (Miller, 1999: xxviii). 
 The story of the First Reconstruction is a story about the design and 
execution of an unprecedented experiment in racial equality. The political 
developments support the main argument made at the beginning of the chapter about 
the centrality of national political elites in norm production. The case demonstrates 
that Congressional Radical Republicans were the architects of a new racially 
inclusive political order who institutionalised the racial equality norm in the law of 
the land and in the governing federal and state institutions and bureaucracy. The 
prominent role of national political elites in norm creation and diffusion is not an 
isolated occurrence limited to the First Reconstruction. Their agency, the chapter 
shows, continued to be instrumental in the norm’s re-establishment during the 
Second Reconstruction, and as chapters 2 and 3 will demonstrate, in the norm’s 
transference in the UK context and the norm’s codification at the EU level.  
 The research also confirms that the ideational motives of norm entrepreneurs 
are linked with and reinforced by instrumental concerns that shape the strategies 
norm entrepreneurs design to transform their normative commitment into policy. The 
extensive constitutional and policy reforms the Republican-controlled Congress 
undertook were both driven by genuine concerns for the social well-being, political 
empowerment and protection of former slaves and by considerations involving 
Republican electability and stay in power. Furthermore, norm enterprising political 
elites are more likely to succeed in accomplishing their agenda when the government 
structures and governance mechanisms are centralised. In this case, constitutional 
provisions allowed the Radical Republicans in power to temporarily bring the norm-
violating southern states under the control of the federal government and to re-
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structure entrenched lilywhite electorates and modes of governance based on white 
supremacy and black intimidation. 
The civic death of the racial equality norm 
This section examines the causes of the decline and eventual erosion of the 
racial equality norm. Several explanations have been put forward by scholars: white 
racism and the corollary absence of any moderate tendency by southern whites 
(Cook, 2003: 255), class divisions between southern rural and urban African 
Americans (Fitzgerald, 2002) and the failure of land reform and economic 
independence of African American citizens (Mandle, 1978 and Billings Jr., 1979).  
This thesis, however, takes on an institutional perspective that investigates the role of 
jurisprudence building and the political and institutional support available at the time 
to advance the new norm. It proposes that the norm’s civic death was the outcome of 
its incomplete institutionalisation, exemplified by the Supreme Court decisions 
which invalidated most of the Reconstruction legislation and the inability of the 
Radical Republican elite to generate sustained political support for the 
Reconstruction project within the wider Republican Party. Violent politics 
orchestrated by Southern Democrats, which breached the norm of democratic 
participation in electoral processes, played a substantial part in the collapse of the 
newly formed institutions and policies that affirmed African American political and 
social equality. The narrative underscores the importance of governing elites for 
norm enforcement and the consequences of reversing political goals and norm 
commitment that came at an immense personal cost for African Americans. Related 
to this, it shows that institutional norm entrepreneurs in one branch of the 
government cannot enforce institutionalisation and compliance on their own. The 
norm’s success depends on the support of key norm promoters in legislature, 
executive and judiciary. 
Political developments  
 The institutionalisation of the racial equality norm ended up flawed and 
incomplete. The decision to link re-admission of individual states to Congress was 
based on the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although reluctantly done 
by state-level politicians, the ratification guaranteed a swift return to civil 
government in much of the former Confederacy. Once federal protection was 
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withdrawn, however, southern Republicans were left to compete for office with their 
long established Democrat rivals. African American Republicans were left 
particularly vulnerable as white on black violence re-surged throughout the region 
fueled by the Ku Klux Klan and Klan-like groupings comprised of ordinary 
professionals like paper editors, lawyers, doctors, county sheriffs and postal workers 
to name a few (Hurst, 1993: 4, Taylor, 1974: 161-64). The militarisation of electoral 
politics, Valelly observes, put much pressure on the Republican Party and its new 
African American coalition partners (2005: 92). Political violence shattered 
communities and sapling African American associations stunting the development of 
robust associationalism that could aid the institutionalisation of the new norm.  
 Just as detrimental to the Reconstruction project was the intense factionalism 
within the Republican Party (Perman, 1984). Continued military intervention in the 
Southern United States was at odds with moderate white Republicans and divided 
President Grant’s Republican cabinet on the usefulness of affording continued 
federal protection to southern African American citizens. Moderate Republicans 
considered partnerships with ex-Confederates necessary for stabilizing the region 
and solidifying electoral success, a position that alienated African American 
Republicans. Other intra-party sources of division on state and local levels included 
competition for public positions between native southern African Americans and 
often highly educated African Americans from the North and between whites from 
the North (Carpetbeggars) and southern white Republican supporters (scalawags). 
Particularly damaging was the politics of racial symbolism manifested in the 
tendency of pro-Republican whites to relegate black office holders to junior 
positions in government while using the latter to deliver the electoral base (Vallely, 
2005: 90-91). 
 The Long Depression, an economic recession that lasted from 1873 until 
1879 and corruption charges against Republican government authorities at the 
national, state and local levels shifted the political priorities and notably lessened 
northern support for further political, military and financial investment in the 
Reconstruction project. The disenchantment with the continued Reconstruction 
efforts of the Grant administration and more significantly with corruption charges 
and the economic downturn were evident in the 1874 Congressional elections when 
Democrats for the first time in the post-bellum period controlled the House of 
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Representatives. Facing the possibility of surrendering their governing power 
entirely in the intensely disputed 1876 presidential election, Republican elites 
officially finalised their abandonment of the racial equality norm. Much of the 
Republicans’ narrow win rested on their promise to limit the role of the federal 
government in promoting civil rights. This informal promise known as the 
Compromise of 1877 put a Republican in the White House in exchange for economic 
aid to the South and the withdrawal of the last federal troops from the southern 
states. 
 These political developments show that central control is crucial in 
maintaining new policies that uphold the racial equality norm. They also point to the 
difficult task institutional norm entrepreneurs have in ensuring the continuous 
support of their wider political base for new norms. Racial equality, as noted above, 
proved hard to achieve even under the best of conditions as its white enforcers subtly 
arranged for lesser governing power for African American office holders at the local 
level, suggesting inconsistencies in understanding and applying the racial equality 
norm between the national and local levels. The brief episode also highlights the 
triumph of instrumental over ideational concerns. When material and ideational 
priorities diverge, material considerations tend to prevail.  
Jurisprudence building 
 Republican constitutionalism, the nationalist view that the constitution was 
“not a set of limits on government but a source of sovereign, positive, regulatory 
government able to establish and enforce national [civil] rights” soon faced the 
scrutiny of the judiciary (Valelly, 2005: 105). The Supreme Court, including the 
moderate Republican judges, were not persuaded by the basic premises of the new 
constitutional amendments and Reconstruction Acts, which they viewed as a threat 
to the foundational notion of federalism. Valelly argues that the Republican-led civil 
rights revolution frightened the Court and the judges saw themselves as the power 
able to restore the balance between federal and state power (ibid., 119). In its effort 
to preserve existing federal governing arrangements, the Supreme Court substantially 
damaged the racial equality project. 
 The 1872 Slaughterhouse Cases represented the first full test of the new 
laws. Ruling for the state of Louisiana, the Supreme Court judges held that the 
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“privileges and immunities” of the citizens of the United States and their equal 
protection under the law do not extend to economic rights (Slaughterhouse Cases, 
1872). Although the Court did not question the validity of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it significantly weakened the regulatory power of the national 
government over state matters by distinguishing between two citizenships, state and 
national, and by suggesting that the power to protect the fundamental rights of 
citizens rests primarily with the state (ibid). Such a reading of the law, 
Reconstructionists feared, would empower white supremacists as it essentially 
contested the legitimacy of the federal government to protect constitutional rights 
and sought to decentralise its power. As the African American leader Frederick 
Douglass remarked, “Two citizenships…mean no citizenship…The nation affirms, 
the State denies, and there is no progress. The true doctrine is one nation, one 
country, one citizenship, and one law for all the people” (quoted in Wang, 1997: 
124). 
The judges’ rationale in US vs. Cruikshank (1875) and US vs. Reese (1876) 
cases further crumbled the institutionalisation of the new norm. In these cases, the 
majority of justices confirmed that the protection of individual civil rights was the 
duty of the state confining the scope and purpose of the Reconstructionist agenda. 
Only if a state official could be proven to discriminate on the ground of race, was the 
US government allowed to intervene and take control. The direct invalidation of the 
Reconstruction ideals became evident in the Civil Rights Cases (1883) verdict, in 
which the overwhelming majority of judges agreed that the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 
which prohibited racial discrimination in places open to the public, was 
unconstitutional. In this way, the Supreme Court tacitly approved segregation in the 
private sector and severely limited the scope of the “equal protection” clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by claiming that discrimination by private individuals was 
not protected under the constitutional provisions.  
The final nail in the coffin of the racial equality norm came some thirteen 
years later in Plessy vs. Ferguson (1896). In Plessy, the justices reasoned that the 
‘separate but equal’ principle, which had already diffused across statues in the 
majority of southern states, did not violate the ‘equal protection’ clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment sanctioned de jure segregation and 
institutionalised the emerging system of domestic apartheid. Justice Harlan, the sole 
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dissenter argued that Plessy created a two-tier system of citizenship according to 
which the dominant white race assumed “to regulate the enjoyment of civil rights, 
common to all citizens, upon the basis of race” (Dissenting opinion of Justice 
Harlan, 1896). Justice Harlan also echoed the fears of Reconstructionist supporters 
that Plessy defeated the purpose of the recently adopted Reconstruction legislation 
and stripped federal protection from African American citizens making them 
helpless before the escalating violence.  
 The jurisprudential developments show that Congressional Republicans were 
unable to persuade the justices to support the new exercise in bi-racial democracy 
based on the regulatory power of the national government. Although the initial 
Supreme Court’s decisions did not invalidate the new laws outright, they were not 
favourable either. The Court’s lack of support and subsequent invalidation of the 
core ideas in the new laws presented a serious political problem for the 
Reconstructionists and lifted off the pressure from the norm’s opponents to comply 
with the new constitutional mandate. Ultimately, the narrative shows that 
diminishing political will, shifting priorities and increased factionalism in the 
Republican Party, the norm contestation by the judiciary and the decentralisation of 
governing power led to a complete reversal of the norm institutionalisation 
processes. The findings confirm the claims at the beginning of the chapter about the 
key role national elites have in norm construction and institutionalisation and about 
the need for norm support by influential norm entrepreneurs from the three branches 
of the government in order for the norm to achieve long-term institutionalisation. 
Without such support, as the First Reconstruction experiment demonstrates, new 
controversial norms tend to be short-lived.  
The Second Reconstruction (1954-1975) 
 This section traces the causal mechanisms that revived the process of re-
institutionalisation of the racial equality norm. Here I argue that similarly to the First 
Reconstruction national elites were the key drivers in the norm’s institutionalisation 
during the Second Reconstruction although this time they did not do so entirely by 
their own volition but under the pressure exercised upon them by another set of norm 
entrepreneurs, non-state Civil Rights activists. For their part, national elites re-
asserted central control over state matters and deployed the military to secure the 
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compliance of southern states with the new laws which were used as tools to re-grant 
full citizenship to African Americans. I also argue that unlike the First 
Reconstruction, the Second is irreversible because influential institutional norm 
entrepreneurs from all branches of the federal government displayed sustained 
support for the norm while domestic grassroots pressure and foreign policy 
considerations ensured that backing out of their commitment to norm enforcement 
would not be politically viable.  
Political developments and jurisprudence-building  
The political and social exclusion of African Americans throughout the 
redeemed South was accomplished in two ways both of which were legal.  Southern 
legislators passed new laws in the late 1880s which were written in a colour-blind 
language but effectively disenfranchised African American citizens. These statutes 
included residence requirements, poll taxes, literacy tests and clauses pertaining to 
“good character” and absence of crimes related to “moral turpitude” (Pauley, 2007: 
31-32). African Americans were excluded socially through a series of segregationist 
statutes allowed under the Supreme Court’s ‘separate but equal’ doctrine which 
constructed an elaborate apartheid system that regulated every aspect of one’s public 
life including education, public transport, accommodation and public facilities.  
The battle for racial equality therefore required judiciary action that would 
revoke the ‘separate but equal’ legal doctrine and invalidate de jure segregation in 
the public sphere. Access to the ballot and political representation necessitated 
Congressional action to fashion legislation to enforce the fundamentals of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by nullifying the myriad of state and local voting statutes 
that denied African Americans access to the ballot. The successful political and 
social inclusion of African Americans, I claim, depended on the political will of 
national elites and their ability to forge a consensus that would generate the passage 
of strong and centrally enforced policies that would dismantle state and local 
institutional structures and practices which embodied countervailing norms.   
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Civil Rights 
The first sign of the norm’s revival came from the Supreme Court, which in 
its 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education decision overturned the segregation norm 
albeit only in the field of education. The astounding outcome in Brown was a 
combined effort of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
a well-established norm enterprising entity with presence at the grassroots, state and 
national level, and a Supreme Court with an activist judicial agenda. Brown came 
about after considerable discussions within the NAACP. NAACP’s Thurgood 
Marshall and like-minded lawyers understood that the Supreme Court at that 
moment was the most ‘liberal-thinking assembly’ up until that time due to President 
Roosevelt’s efforts to appoint liberal-minded judges, an approach which continued 
during President Truman’s administration (Finch, 1981: 171). After much 
deliberation during a two-day meeting, the NAACP staff and volunteers coming 
from local, state and national levels chose “to attempt a bold, frontal attack upon 
educational segregation” which aimed at overturning the constitutional validity of 
Plessy (Hughes, 1964: 138).  
The NAACP through its legal arm, the Legal Defense Fund, readily launched 
suits against school boards in Virginia, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Kansas 
and South Carolina, which eventually were grouped together as Brown for their 
presentation before the Supreme Court. Besides using their most capable lawyers, 
the NAACP also mobilized over 200 scholars and lawyers to assist during the cases’ 
presentation of the facts and legal arguments for educational desegregation. The 
association also benefitted from the support of the US Attorney General who filed a 
brief on behalf of the United States against segregation in education. The unexpected 
death of Chief Justice Vinson and his replacement with California’s Governor 
Warren significantly influenced the final outcome as Vinson was “most certainly 
opposed to overturning Plessy” while Warren not only supported desegregation but 
skillfully ensured the unanimity of the verdict for the plaintiffs (Jonas, 2005: 64). 
The ruling essentially declared segregation in education solely based on race 
unconstitutional because, the Court held, it deprived the children of minority groups 
of equal educational opportunities even when facilities and other tangible factors 
were equal (Brown, 1954).  
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The above developments show that unlike the norm’s creation in the First 
Reconstruction, which was wholly dependent on the activism of national political 
elites, the re-emergence of the race anti-discrimination norm this time was the 
outcome of non-state norm entrepreneurs and state elites sympathetic to their cause.  
Although the events in 1954 conform in part to the norm creation phase of the norm 
life cycle model, significant differences remain the main one being the nature of the 
agents involved in norm construction. As already mentioned, the way in which the 
model is constructed presents norm emergence as a process that is entirely driven by 
non-state transnational norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 896-900). 
However, I have argued that a complementary approach which examines the 
entrepreneurship of national elites is useful for understanding norm-building 
processes for norms that first originate in a domestic context. 
In terms of norm institutionalisation, the verdict in Brown would have meant 
little if unenforced. In the South, reaction to Brown was quick and negative. 
Virginia’s Senator, Harry Byrd (1956), for example, issued the Southern Manifesto 
that called for ‘massive resistance’ to integration and decried “the Supreme Court’s 
encroachment on rights reserved to the states and to the people”.  The ‘massive 
resistance’ strategy was swiftly adopted by states’ governments and school boards in 
the region which devised a variety of measures to prevent integration as extreme and 
expansive as the deliberate closures of entire schools. Although tracing the process 
of school desegregation in its entirety is not the goal here, two integration cases 
merit discussion because they highlight the co-operation between national elites and 
the importance of central control over state and local governments without which as 
proposed earlier norm compliance would have been unattainable.  
The 1957 integration of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas is a 
remarkable example of the effectiveness of elite collaboration and exertion of central 
control to bring about norm conformity in an exceptionally volatile and violent 
environment. After nine African American students organised by the NAACP 
attempted to enrol, Governor Orval Faubus with the overwhelming support of the 
White Citizens Council and the local community ordered the state’s National Guard 
to prevent the students from entering the school’s premises. The Governor further 
refused to obey a subsequent federal court ruling that in accord with Brown ordered 
the students’ admittance. By doing this he openly defied central authority and placed 
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the burden of enforcing the court’s order on the executive. After negotiations in 
which Faubus refused to back down, President Eisenhower placed the Arkansas 
National Guard under federal orders and as the violence escalated within days sent 
further one thousand soldiers to carry out the judicial orders (Huckaby, 1980 and 
Burk, 1984). 
In the other infamous Stand in the Schoolhouse Door case of 1963, the 
Governor of Alabama, George Wallace literally backed his "segregation now, 
segregation forever" vision for the state by personally blocking the door of an 
auditorium in the University of Alabama to prevent African American students from 
registering. Defying court orders he only backed down after the Guard General of the 
urgently federalised Alabama National Guard commanded Wallace to step aside on 
President Kennedy’s orders (Alabama Archives, 1963). 
These snapshots of some of the most well-known moments of the battle for 
educational desegregation emphasise the essential role national elites play in norm 
implementation processes. The incidents in Arkansas and Alabama also confirm the 
hypothesis that the setup of the government system matters. In essence, the battle 
between the governors and the presidents was as much about racial segregation as it 
was about central versus state control over state affairs which since the Redemption 
of the South from 1877 onwards had been left up to the authority of the states. In his 
School House Door speech, Governor Wallace challenged the power of the federal 
judiciary and the executive by calling the federalisation of the Guard “illegal 
usurpation of power by the Central Government” and the presence of military force 
to protect the African American students a “frightful example of the oppression of 
the rights, privileges and sovereignty of this State by officers of the Federal 
Government” (Alabama Archives, 1963). Faced with direct defiance, the presidents 
enforced compliance by using the constitutional provision that gives them control 
over the military in matters considered to be of national emergency.  
As of motives, although the federal protection of African America students 
was presented as wholly justice-driven, President Eisenhower could hardly be seen 
as a champion of racial equality and John F. Kennedy’s short presidency was pre-
occupied with rising Cold War tensions. Their actions can be understood as 
motivated by both a logic of appropriateness and by political urgency to ascertain 
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central control and to ward off undesired foreign policy ramifications. Both 
presidents were keenly aware that discrimination against African American citizens 
damaged the country’s image and criticisms by international bodies like the United 
Nations and much of the foreign press served as a “source of constant 
embarrassment to …[the] Government in the day-to-day conduct of its foreign 
relations (quoted in Lester, 2004: 458). The presidents’ pragmatic concerns 
substantially shaped the direction of their agency indicating again the interlinking 
and interdependency of ideas and material concerns.  
These claims confirm the hypothesis of Critical Race scholar, Derrick Bell, 
who in his 1980 article on Brown v. Board of Education argued that the Supreme 
Court’s verdict could not be understood simply as a decision “of those concerned 
about the immorality of racial inequality” but as a convergence of black and white 
interests (524-525). Civil rights advances for African American lawyers seemed to 
coincide with the changing economic and foreign policy objectives of those in power 
(Delgado and Stefancic, 2012: 22). 
Both justice-related and instrumental concerns are necessary to motivate 
national elites. Justice-related motives, as I show more clearly in the section below, 
ensure that the measures political elites take to institutionalise and enforce new 
norms are strong and effective in the long-term and instrumental motives expedite 
the elites’ agentiality. This argument will be revisited in the Czech and post-2010 
Hungarian cases where I argue that the extremely limited presence of justice-related 
concerns and an overwhelmingly instrumentally-driven modus operandi of political 
elites has resulted in weak, sporadic and short-lived institutionalisation and 
enforcement of the racial equality norm. 
The norm institutionalisation account would be incomplete without 
examining the passage and the nature of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a major piece 
of legislation that signaled the domestic cascading phase and the establishment of the 
desegregation norm with regards to African Americans as the national legal as the 
political standard. The genesis of the Civil Rights Act is found in President 
Kennedy’s response to Governor Wallace’s defiant and bombastic rhetoric in the 
Stand in the Schoolhouse Door speech. In his response, President Kennedy for the 
first time addressed unequivocally the issue of equality and exhorted Congress to 
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work together for the drafting of an effective Civil Rights bill, the first such 
legislation since the Frist Reconstruction almost a century before. In his national 
address in 1963, Kennedy framed the state of race relations as a matter of justice and 
resolutely presented African Americans as full citizens of “this [American] Nation” 
(Kennedy, 1963). Rebuffing Wallace’s remarks on the constitutional rights of the 
states, Kennedy declared, 
“This Nation was founded by men of many nations and backgrounds. It was 
founded on the principle that all men are created equal, and that the rights of every 
man are diminished when the rights of one man are threatened…We are confronted 
primarily with a moral issue. It is as old as the scriptures and is as clear as the 
American Constitution. The heart of the question is whether all Americans are to be 
afforded equal rights and equal opportunities, whether we are going to treat our 
fellow Americans as we want to be treated…This is one country. It has become one 
country because all of us and all the people who came here had an equal chance to 
develop their talents. We cannot say to 10 percent of the population that you can't 
have that right; that your children can't have the chance to develop whatever talents 
they have… I think we owe them and we owe ourselves a better country than that. 
Therefore, I am asking for your help in making it easier for us to move ahead and to 
provide the kind of equality of treatment which we would want ourselves (ibid).” 
The address refers to the moral imperative to act to ensure racial equality and 
citizenship rights to all. When taken in its entirety, however, the address also shows 
the pragmatic reasons for Kennedy’s demand of “the Congress of the United States 
to act, to make commitment it has not fully made in this century to the proposition 
that race has no place in American life or law” (ibid). Black church burnings and 
bombings, public disturbances and police brutality, business interests in the South’s 
development threatened by the systemic violence, and a foreign policy to win the 
hearts and minds in non-aligned nations at the height of the Cold War were also put 
forward as arguments to spring Congress into action (ibid).  
Just a week after Kennedy’s speech the Justice Department sent a draft of the 
proposed legislation to Congress. Despite Kennedy’s passionate speech the original 
bill was rather weak as it did not endow the federal institutions with sufficient power 
to protect African American citizens from the police and other local and state 
authorities. The House Judiciary Sub-committee revised the presidential draft 
correcting the omissions and presented a substantially stronger bill for consideration. 
The president’s assassination temporarily halted the process but President Lyndon 
Johnson’s swift mobilisation of political support and pressure on both Republicans 
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and Democrats brought the bill back into focus. After 70 days of public hearings, 
close to 300 witnesses and 5, 800 pages of public testimony the House passed the 
bill with an overwhelming majority and sent it to the Senate (Loevy, 1995).  
Even with this positive development it was clear that the real battle would be 
in the Senate. Although the bill needed only a simple majority of 51 votes to pass 
under Senate rules, Senators could filibuster to prevent voting by literally talking the 
bill to death. The only way to end a filibuster was with a cloture vote, which required 
a two-thirds majority (67 votes), or a substantially higher number of senators 
sympathetic to the racial equality norm. The 22 senators from the old Confederacy 
states, the Southern Bloc, were staunch supporters of segregation and 12 were from 
border states where segregation practices were still prevalent. Securing the swing 
votes for cloture required a massive publicity and lobbying campaign including 
petitions and constituent and religious leaders’ meetings. President Johnson launched 
his own lobbying campaign employing a combination of persuasion and arm-
twisting practices. Using a variety of procedural mechanics, the bill supporters put 
the bill up for debate and eventual vote. Good on their word, the Southern bloc 
launched a filibuster threatening to “resist to the bitter end any measure or any 
movement which would…bring about social equality and intermingling and 
amalgamation of the races in our [southern] states” (quoted in McKinstry and 
George, 2011: 193). Fantastical propositions circled the Senate during the 72-day 
filibuster including the forceful relocation of African American citizens from 
southern states to “inflict on… [non – southern] cities the same conditions proposed 
to be inflicted by this bill on the people [of the South]” (quoted in Andrews, 2006: 
246). As the political battle in the Senate dragged on neither side was willing to 
compromise. With violence raging throughout the South and public pressure for the 
bill mounting, the pro-civil rights senators agreed on non-crucial bill amendments to 
secure the swing votes of the undecided. In a historic cloture vote pro-civil rights 
senators stopped the longest speech of the longest filibuster in US history and on 2 
July 1964 passed the bill, which was to have profound implications for the emerging 
new social order (Risen, 2015). Or as Senator Everett Dirksen, who had played a 
crucial part in the bill’s passage, declared, "Stronger than all the armies is an idea 
whose time has come. The time has come for equality of opportunity in sharing in 
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government, in education, and in employment. It will not be stayed or denied. It is 
here!"  (US Senate, 1964, my emphasis).  
The story of the 1964 Civil Rights Act reveals that its passage codified a 
huge victory for institutional and non-institutional norm entrepreneurs. It also shows 
that a decade after Brown the codification of the racial anti-discrimination norm was 
far from certain despite consistent desegregation federal courts judgments and (at 
times ambivalent) presidential support of the Civil Rights movement cause. The 
developments indicate that once a new norm is formally recognised, as the Brown 
judgment did, its institutional diffusion or cascading is not a guaranteed quasi-
automatic process. The evidence suggests that the institutional diffusion of new 
norms is contested and challenging and depends on committed and justice-driven 
norm entrepreneurs within and without the given institution. The dramatic passage 
also confirms the earlier claim that the acceptance of new norms depends on the 
ability of national elites within Congress, the Office of the President and the federal 
court system to forge a consensus on the recognition and enforcement of new norms. 
The 1964 Civil Rights Act has played a vital part in fundamentally altering 
the lives of African Americans in the South in so far as segregation and overt 
discrimination are concerned. The Act extended the Brown decision to all key areas 
of public life. It invalidated local segregation laws and outlawed discrimination in 
public accommodations (Title II), barred segregation or discrimination in 
government-owned or operated facilities like hospitals, libraries and parks and 
allowed the federal government to file lawsuits on behalf of the victims to enforce 
the law (Title III), and sought to outlaw employment discrimination (Title VII). 
Equally importantly, the codification of the norm in these fields served as the 
springboard from which institutional and non-institutional norm entrepreneurs 
launched further policies and lawsuits to stem forms and areas of discrimination the 
Act does not prohibit explicitly.  
For example, President Johnson exerted substantial influence to incorporate 
Title VIII in the 1968 version of the Act, which introduced federal enforcement 
mechanisms to combat housing discrimination. The NAACP legal team continued to 
demand court action to prevent subtler forms of discrimination. In Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co. (1971), the landmark case in which the Supreme Court recognised and 
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prohibited indirect discrimination on the basis of race, the NAACP argued that the 
new intelligence and education tests imposed by the company after the enactment of 
Title VII limited advancement opportunities for African American workers at 
significantly higher rate than for white workers and did not have ‘predictive validity’ 
related to how well an employee could do the job in question (Greenberg, 1970). In 
its decision the Court acknowledged that such practices “neutral on their face, and 
even if neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to “freeze” the 
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices” which the plant had 
employed in the past (Griggs, 1971: 401). This was the first time the judiciary had 
identified discriminatory practices in terms of their effect and had referred to the 
wider context of systemic discrimination. The developments in the aftermath of the 
Civil Rights Act’s passage confirm the domestic cascading of the norm is not a 
taken-for-granted process. The process requires the continual agentiality of 
institutional and non-institutional norm entrepreneurs whose actions expand the 
areas of public life to which the norm applies and concomitantly deepen the norm’s 
institutionalisation by ensuring that notwithstanding shifting priorities and parties in 
power the national policy continues to affirm the norm and to ensure the vitality of 
its enforcement mechanisms.  
Political Rights 
 To understand fully the breadth and complexity of the institutionalisation of 
the racial equality norm, it is also necessary to look at the processes of political 
inclusion of African Americans during the Second Reconstruction. In some ways, 
the battle for racial equality in the area of political participation was more 
challenging because determining voter eligibility and registration criteria, 
historically, had been left to the states. Moreover, since poll taxes, literacy tests and 
other similar statutes were written in a colour-blind language, technically they did 
not breach the Fourteenth Amendment. This presented norm entrepreneurs within the 
federal government with a conundrum of how to construct effective legislation while 
venturing in an unchartered legal territory fraught with political and legal risks. The 
story of the 1965 passage of the Voting Rights Act is very similar to that of the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act a year earlier. It provides further evidence in support 
of the argument about the nature of the causal mechanisms that effect normative 
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change and the importance of centralised government for successful norm 
institutionalisation nationally and locally.   
 So far as the Johnson administration was concerned, voting rights were not 
on the immediate agenda especially after the considerable political capital spent on 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Unable to persuade President Johnson to propose a voting 
rights bill, Martin Luther King Jr. with the support of the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference and the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee 
chapters launched the Selma voting rights campaign against the unlawful court 
injunction that prevented African American voters from assembling and discussing 
civil and voting rights issues. As the non-violent marchers were brutally attacked on 
7 March 1965 by state troopers and private citizens, a tragic event which became 
known as ‘Bloody Sunday’, public outrage and solidarity demonstrations took place 
across the country with demands for federal action on voting rights. Norm 
entrepreneurs in Congress and the Johnson administration quickly if reluctantly 
agreed to the need for immediate voting rights legislation.  Despite the hesitancy of 
interfering with state rights, the drafters agreed to incorporate the suspension of 
literacy tests and to provide for federal supervision in localities that systemically 
denied voting rights on the basis of race. The initial developments that placed voting 
rights at the top of the nation’s political agenda reveal a complex interaction between 
non-government and government norm entrepreneurs. To reiterate, at this stage of 
institutional norm diffusion, the norm life cycle model expects a relatively prompt 
and uncontroversial institutionalisation especially because at this point key national 
elites have already recognised the new norm and launched its codification 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 902). Yet, the Voting Rights Act passage 
demonstrates that despite their normative commitment, a significant number of 
national elites had to be persuaded and pressured for further action, which in turn 
suggests that if a new norm is particularly controversial, the agency of non-
government norm entrepreneurs can still be necessary during the norm 
institutionalisation process.  
In a televised address to the nation delivered on 5 March 1965, President 
Johnson submitted the draft to a joint session of Congress. Often cited as the most 
important speech on voting rights, Johnson’s address built upon the ideas of justice, 
racial equality and national citizenship for all. “There is no Negro problem. There is 
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no Southern problem. There is no Northern problem. There is only an American 
problem. And we are met here tonight as Americans – not as Democrats or 
Republicans – we are met here as Americans to solve that problem...Extend the 
rights of citizenship to every citizen of this land” (Johnson, 1965). Adopting the 
activists’ signature phrase “We shall overcome”, he identified himself and the Office 
of the President with the victims astonishing Congress and the 70 million listeners. 
The Senate’s passage of the bill on 6 August that same year followed a 
pattern similar to that of the earlier Civil Rights Act. The bill was filibustered by 
Southern Democrats who argued it represented unconstitutional intrusion on the 
rights of states. Nevertheless, the standstill in the Senate ended up with a successful 
cloture vote arranged by the same group of norm entrepreneurs who orchestrated the 
earlier civil rights victory. In the House, the elimination of the poll tax presented 
itself as a contentious issue. With the House at an impasse, President Johnson again 
used his political influence to forge a compromise by leaving the poll tax in the bill 
but adding a declaration that such a tax abridges the right to vote, a provision 
ordering the Attorney General to immediately file lawsuits in federal court, and 
instructions that the courts are to hear the cases at "the earliest practical dates" 
(Voting Rights Act Sec. 10, 1965). The judiciary did not disappoint and a year later 
in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections (1966) ruled poll taxes unconstitutional.  
The historical evidence suggests that the re-enfranchisement of the African 
American minority was the outcome of national elites’ continued reinforcement of 
the idea about inclusive national citizenship, a notion that implicitly undermined the 
concept of state citizenship, and of the masterful collaboration of national elites 
within the three branches of the federal government. Taking into consideration the 
empirical findings I also claim that the exceptional support for the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act by key norm entrepreneurs within the three branches of the federal 
government established the Act as a mechanism that ensured the permanent 
inclusion of African Americans in the political life of the country. I argue that the 
Act’s provisions have contributed greatly to the irreversibility of the racial anti-
discrimination norm and its general compliance at state and local level. Besides the 
abolition of state and local tests and other discriminatory requirements, the 
exceptional strength of the Voting Rights Act lies in its pre-clearance provisions that 
give “the executive branch extraordinary monitoring and enforcement powers” upon 
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southern state legislatures demonstrating yet again the importance of central control 
for the legal enforcement and compliance with the norm at the sub-national level 
(Davidson and Grofman, 1994: 380). 
Internalisation 
At what point, if at all, does a norm become ‘taken-for-granted’ in the 
political and social life of a particular state? I propose that in the case of African 
Americans, the racial equality norm has been reasonably well-internalised at the 
national level while its internalisation at state and local levels in the old Confederate 
states is partial at best.   
By the late 1970s it seemed that the internalisation of the racial equality norm 
was succeeding. Jim Crow signs were removed from public view, radicalism and 
militancy in the South were defeated and federally sponsored affirmative action 
programs gave African Americans access to middle class jobs in the public and 
private sectors. Jimmy Carter’s election as president opened the door to middle and 
upper level political positions. African Americans were employed in federal, state 
and municipal administrations across the US and the total number of African 
Americans in the Congressional Black Caucus had doubled (Marable, 2007: 146-
147). The provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 continued to be subsequently 
expanded and the legislation has remained uncontested regardless of political power 
shifts.  
At the same time, racial equality has been only partly fulfilled politically and 
socially at the local level. Working class and low-income African Americans remain 
marginalised and confined to inner-city neighbourhoods, which essentially became 
segregated after the ‘white flight’ and ‘black élite flight’ to the suburbs. The targeted 
if occasional bombing and burning of African American churches in the southern 
states suggests that racial tensions are anything but distant memories (Green, 2015). 
Although there is insufficient evidence to claim that institutional discrimination at 
county level across the South is systemic, it does occur and individual county cases 
reveal a well-coordinated set of practices between predominantly white local law 
enforcement and municipal courts that are explicitly premised on discriminatory 
intent and racial bias (US Department of Justice, 2015). The developments since the 
Second Reconstruction suggest that although the anti-discrimination norm with 
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regard to African Americans has become a standard within the federal government, 
the “extension of democratic principles from the political system into the structures 
of the economy…social order” and local politics have not been fully realised and 
social inequality continues to perpetuate the de facto segregation of the majority of 
African Americans due to their lack of educational and residential mobility 
(Marable, 2007: 215). This in turn puts into question the efficacy of national 
institutional norm-building processes to ensure long-term and robust normative 
change.  
 The reasons for the difficulty of embedding the racial anti-discrimination 
norm in state and local institutions, political processes and practices to the same 
degree as on the national level has largely to do with American federalism or 
decentralisation and the historic opposition of conservative white male-dominated 
southern governments to federally imposed norms that challenge historic narratives 
that glorify Confederate resistance and disrupt hierarchical social and political 
structures constructed upon racial distinctions. The federal system makes compliance 
with the extensive civil and political rights legislation difficult and the continuous 
struggle of southern state governments to diminish federal oversight over voting 
rules has resulted in the stripping of key provisions of the Voting Rights Act that 
ensure equality at the ballot vote (Shelby County vs. Holder, 2013). The landmark 
case of Shelby County vs. Holder (2013) in which the conservative leaning Supreme 
Court at the time ruled for the government of Shelby County, Alabama has resulted 
in the dismantling of central federal oversight provisions of the Voting Rights Act 
(ibid). In practice, the judgment permitted southern state governments to pass new 
laws that regulate the voting process without first receiving approval from the federal 
government. This again opens the door for laws that disproportionately disadvantage 
poorer African Americans. To sum up, the opposition of local and state government 
authorities to the racial equality norm and the fact that they govern within a rather 
decentralised system have obstructed the embedding of the racial equality norm in 
local and state institutions and their political processes. The Central European case 
studies, especially the Hungarian one, show similar developments and confirm the 
hypothesis that if norm-promoting national elites govern within a largely 
decentralised system and the local authorities have historically upheld opposite 
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norms, compliance with and embeddedness of new norms at the local level are 
diminished.  
Conclusion  
 This chapter has traced the origins of the racial equality norm by examining 
the domestic context within which the norm was constructed. I have argued for the 
need to develop a complementary approach to Finnemore and Sikkink’s model about 
transnational actors as primary change actors. Using the historical evidence, I 
emphasised the merit of presenting national political elites as norm entrepreneurs 
who are capable of constructing new norms both single-handedly and in conjunction 
with non-state norm entrepreneurs in order to understand better norm emergence 
(1998: 896-900). The story of the First Reconstruction indicates that a small group of 
national political elites in key positions in Congress designed and implemented 
measures that led to the recognition and brief and forced compliance with the racial 
equality norm. The story of the Second Reconstruction reveals that the cautious but 
steady cooperation between non-governmental and governmental norm 
entrepreneurs was instrumental in reviving the racial anti-discrimination norm and 
elevating it to a top national priority. Consequently, the agency of national elites in 
norm construction needs to be acknowledged as a causal mechanism that can drive 
both norm emergence and subsequent norm institutionalisation. The chapter also 
suggests that new norms which are backed up simultaneously by politically powerful 
norm entrepreneurs within the three branches of the government are more likely to 
become institutionalised long-term, are rarely contested and are unlikely to be 
reversed. The institutionalisation of norms that lack such comprehensive support, as 
the Hungarian and Czech cases will demonstrate, tends to be weaker and prone to 
reversal. 
The chapter has also re-examined the elites’ motives that drive their agency. 
It confirms Finnemore and Sikkink’s hypothesis that national norm entrepreneurs are 
driven by ideals a sense of justice but it also argues that their ideational motives are 
entwined with instrumental reasons (1998: 898). It builds upon the claims of critical 
race scholars by demonstrating that when instrumental and ideational motives 
converge, the design and institutionalisation of new norms are prompt and effective. 
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When ideal and material concerns diverge, instrumental reasoning commonly 
prevails leading to the decline of new norms. 
The legal system of common law the United States follows plays an 
important role in the evolution or devolution of new norms because of the power the 
doctrine of legal precedent gives the Supreme Court to interpret the constitutionality 
of new laws and to deliver high impact judgments which themselves become the law 
of the land. This chapter has demonstrated that the doctrine of legal precedent in the 
hands of conservative-minded judges decisively contributed to the civic death of the 
racial equality norm and signalled the end of the First Reconstruction. The activist 
Supreme Court in the 1950s and 1960s had an equally important part in the 
dismantling of the racial apartheid doctrine during the Second Reconstruction and in 
further embedding the racial equality norm in its jurisprudence throughout the 1970s.  
 The government arrangements of a state are an important variable that 
contributes to or impedes the norm-institutionalising actions of national elites. Here I 
argued that the national elites’ savvy interpretation of the constitution temporarily 
allowed for central control over state matters during the two Reconstructions. This 
ensured the implementation and monitoring of laws and policies that upheld the 
racial equality norm. In the subsequent chapters, I shall demonstrate that 
decentralised governance systems substantially constrain the norm 
institutionalisation attempts of sympathetic national elites and that the state of the 
government system is not a significant intervening factor when national elites are 
indifferent or hostile to the new norm.  
On the whole, the investigation into the origin of the racial anti-
discrimination norm points to the unsuitability of the norm life cycle model to 
explain the development of norms that originate in a domestic context. The model 
needs to be re-conceptualised to accommodate the research of such norms by 
allowing for two norm emergence pathways depending on the environment in which 
the new norm is created. 
 The chapter makes one further claim here, which will be developed more 
fully as the thesis progresses. Norms that are constructed by domestic national elites 
are more likely to be institutionalised successfully and long-term while norms that 
originate in an international or regional context have a lesser chance of becoming an 
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integral part of a state’s order. In other words, the level at which the norm is 
constructed matters. The US national elites who were involved in the construction of 
the racial anti-discrimination norm had a deep personal commitment to the norm’s 
realisation and tended to be more successful in persuading fellow actors to support 
the norm. In the Hungarian and Czech cases, I shall argue, the norm has been 
imposed from above through the EU Race Equality Directive and the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights. Consequently, it has found little resonance 
with political elites in both states which institutionalised the norm for 
overwhelmingly instrumental reasons (EU conditionality and/or compliance with EU 
law). Institutional norm acceptance under such conditions is superficial and easily 
eroded. 
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Chapter Two 
Norm diffusion: race relations in the United Kingdom 
 This chapter continues to examine the norm life cycle model and here it 
concentrates on the process of norm diffusion or the manner in which norms ‘travel’ 
to new states and become recognised and institutionalised in their political and social 
order. To begin, the empirical evidence examined in this chapter confirms the 
existence of norm diffusion. Norm transference can and does take place although the 
evidence shows that it does not necessarily take place in the manner the norm life 
cycle model suggests. In terms of agency, the model concentrates on transnational 
organisations and the networks they form as well as influential states that are said to 
employ norm socialisation approaches to make norm-violating states recognise and 
accept a new norm (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 898). Using the British example, 
I propose that the pathways of norm transmission internationally are more varied 
than the norm life cycle model suggests and that the UK case supports my call for 
developing a complementary approach to the life cycle model in which international 
actors are the ones responsible for norm diffusion (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 
902). I use the historical evidence about the formation of the race relations policy 
framework in the UK to substantiate my arguments that 1) national elites can be the 
driving force in the interstate transmission of new norms and 2) they can 
successfully manage the process of norm diffusion.  
In terms of motivation, legitimacy, reputation and esteem are not the only 
motives why states decide to adopt a new norm (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 898). 
Similarly to US national elites, UK institutional norm entrepreneurs were motivated 
by a mixture of ideational, justice-driven concerns and instrumental concerns like the 
prevention of domestic racially motivated disturbances and the mitigation of the 
impact produced by increasingly restrictive immigration controls. When it comes to 
the mechanisms that norm entrepreneurs employ to facilitate norm diffusion, the 
findings confirm the model’s assumption. The evidence supports Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s claim that socialisation, demonstration and institutionalisation account for 
the international diffusion of norms (ibid).  
63 
 
The chapter begins with a brief introduction of the political and social context 
in which the race relations legislation, which enshrined the racial equality norm in 
UK law, was developed. The chapter then turns to tracing the development and 
passage of race relations legislation between 1965 and 1976, a period known as the 
“liberal hour” in British race relations (Saggar, 1991: 25ff). Concentrating on 
relevant historical aspects, it maps out the policy framework in relation to race that 
was constructed and legitimised through the efforts of the reforming Home Secretary 
Roy Jenkins and other “liberal hour” norm enthusiasts who were a part of or had 
close ties to the ruling political elite. The first goal is to demonstrate that the new 
legislation which codified racial anti-discrimination into UK law was heavily 
influenced by existing US race anti-discrimination laws at the federal and state level. 
The second objective is to show that the transference of the new norm into UK law 
was a domestic affair, almost entirely driven by “liberal hour” reformers within the 
Labour Party. The analysis examines the British government elites’ actions in 
constructing UK race anti-discrimination legislation, which reveal substantial 
knowledge of US race anti-discrimination law obtained through research and direct 
knowledge exchange with US law makers and administrators. It aims to show that 
British political elites engaged in norm socialisation processes with their US 
counterparts, which led to the direct transference and the modified appropriation of 
key legal principles and monitoring mechanisms from the US context. I also hold 
that the success of the norm’s diffusion was largely due to the emerging consensus at 
the time between the two main parties on the removal of the race issue from party 
competition and the already mentioned approach of elite learning adopted by the 
British liberally minded political elites (Saggar, 1991: 33-40). 
The UK political context    
Racism, Stuart Hall observes, is always historically specific and although it 
may draw upon cultural and ideological notions from past historical phases, it always 
assumes specific forms which arise out of present...conditions and organisation of 
society" (1978: 23, see also Solomos, 1989: 2). The particular racism that emerged in 
post-war Britain has often been described as ‘racism at home', which significantly 
differed in its manifestation and effect from the racism at the zenith of colonialism 
(Hall, 1978: 23). The need for anti-discrimination legislation in the UK can only be 
examined within the larger context of increasing non-white migration from 
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Commonwealth countries to the UK and the ensuing emergence of progressively 
stricter immigration controls and the gradual narrowing of the definition of British 
citizenship.  
 The context in which the race relations legislation was drafted is important 
because it highlights the close alignment of race and integration issues with those 
relating to non-white immigration. The dualism that links race with immigration, as 
Shamit Saggar denotes, ran strongly throughout the “liberal hour” of the 1960s and 
served to structure the political environment within which immigration and race 
relations policies were debated and drafted in the 1970s and the 1980s (1991: 26). 
Although in the early 1950s political discourses on race revolved largely around the 
issue of immigration controls, the state of race relations in British society began to 
emerge as an underlying concern. In the decade preceding official state intervention 
in the area of racial discrimination, there was wide awareness that the arrival of 
black migrants would lead to problems in the areas of employment, housing and 
social services (Patterson, 1969 and Freeman, 1979). The first main problem the 
government viewed in need of urgent address had to do with the negative response of 
the majority white population to non-white immigration and the competition it was 
perceived to create in employment and housing (Solomos, 1989: 71). The second 
problem concerned the frustration of black immigrants who felt excluded from equal 
participation in the British society by the development of a colour bar in these fields 
(ibid). It is unsurprising that progressive national elites were able to move towards 
integrative measures after the institutionalisation of firm controls at the point of 
entry. Evidently, each piece of race relations legislation was conditioned upon the 
passage of restrictive immigration legislation and served politically as a balancing 
act to mitigate the impact of immigration controls reflecting the ideational and 
instrumental motives of its originators.  
The role of the media 
 In her research on the impact of the struggle for racial equality in the US on 
British racialised relations, Nuala Sanderson argues that the period between 1958 
and 1968 was characterised by a high level of interest in Britain in American news 
and an increasing sense of concern in press reports “that Britain was heading for an 
American style racial conflict” (1999: 2). Her findings show that thanks to the media 
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the British public and the government were kept well-informed about the 
developments related to the Civil Rights movement in the United States. The elites 
on both sides of the political spectrum drew upon information from the media reports 
on US news to construct arguments whether to control entry or attempt integration 
(ibid., 43). Although this chapter does not examine in detail the media reports a brief 
overview of the media coverage throughout the 1960s is necessary because the news 
coverage of the struggle for racial equality in the US influenced substantially the 
parliamentary debates on the institutionalisation of the racial anti-discrimination 
norm in British law and contributed to the triggering of a transatlantic cascade.  
 The media reports in the early 1960s influenced the political debate in two 
ways. Those that demonstrated sympathy for the African American cause gave 
ammunition to the progressive national elites in favour of integration and anti-
discrimination legislation in the UK. Those reports that focused on racial violence in 
the southern United States, the growing movement for Black Power and made 
parallels with race riots in the UK were used by politicians advancing the argument 
for restrictive immigration controls. 
 Several examples showcase the role of the media in promoting good practices 
of race relations from the US. In 1962 The Times ran a positive article about the 
work of the Kennedy Administration in ensuring fair housing in federally-assisted 
accommodations (1962: 12 quoted in Sanderson, 1999: 44). The same year The 
Spectator published the report “Racial Equality by Law- The American Example” in 
which it analysed the workings of anti-discrimination laws in various states (1962, 
460 quoted in Sanderson, 1999: 44). It argued that “the United States has exploded 
the myth that legislation was ineffective and that this was “one of the most striking 
reforms of modern social history”” while suggesting that the UK was lagging behind 
despite its worsening race relations (ibid). These reports demonstrate that the British 
public was well-informed about the American developments in regards to race and 
used them to reflect upon the state of British race relations affairs. 
 The breadth and depth of the Civil Rights Movement coverage in the UK is 
evident in the 28 reports run by The Guardian and the 10 leaders published by The 
Times between May and August 1963 which focused on the racial violence in 
Birmingham, Alabama and the March on Washington (Sanderson, 1999: 44). The 
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Guardian explicitly linked the situation in the US with the race relations situation at 
home. The Guardian claimed that the need for British anti-discrimination legislation 
was evident by arguing that “If the Americans have a moral responsibility for the 
descendants of Negro slaves…Britain has an equal responsibility for the descendants 
of slaves of the British West Indies (17 February, 1964: 8, quoted in Sanderson, 
1999: 44). The passage of key Civil Rights legislation like the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
was also prominently featured in the British press with liberal newspapers calling for 
its emulation at home (ibid). 
 On the other hand, the coverage of the race riots across the United States also 
fueled fears that similar events could transpire in the UK and triggered public 
debates as to whether entry controls were effective measures to prevent potential 
violence. For example, during the 1965 Los Angeles riots, the UK press was replete 
with reports about “arrests, looting, violence and the use of troops” and many of the 
articles attributed the violence to African Americans and their frustration with the 
denial of equal opportunities making parallels with the situation in the UK.2 Similar 
comments ran through the media coverage of other race riots in 1968 in Baltimore, 
Chicago, Detroit, Washington DC and New York City in the aftermath of Dr. King’s 
assassination. These news reports combined with commentaries about the emergence 
of Black separatism increased the negative British impression about the presence of a 
black minority within a white society. 
 To re-state, the British extensive and continuous coverage of the struggle for 
civil rights in the US and the frequent parallels it made between the political contexts 
in America and at home significantly contributed to raising awareness amongst the 
British public and government about the existence and effects of racial 
discrimination. The media reports also influenced the political debates about 
immigration controls and the recognition of the need for race anti-discrimination 
legislation.    
Towards anti-discrimination legislation: the1965 Race Relations Act 
 This section examines the creation of the first two major pieces of anti-
discrimination legislation in the UK. I argue that the norm entrepreneurs responsible 
                                                          
2 See Daily Telegraph, 7 August, 1965: 1 and 14 August 1965: 1 and Daily Express, 17 August. 1965: 6.  
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for the drafting actively sought to learn from the racial anti-discrimination law 
already developed by their North American counterparts, a norm socialising 
experience that shaped the discussions and the contents of the actual race relations 
acts. The analysis demonstrates that although norm socialisation took place, as the 
life cycle model predicts, the codification of the racial anti-discrimination into UK 
law was done without external pressure (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1989: 898). No 
international norm entrepreneurs participated in the norm diffusion process. The 
cascade was domestically driven almost exclusively by progressive Labour 
politicians in influential positions within the government who were helped by legal 
experts.  
 The recognition of the need for racial anti-discrimination laws within the 
Labour party can be traced back at least to 1952 when the leadership requested 
advice about possible anti-discrimination legislation from several experts including 
Dr. Kenneth Little. Little was able to demonstrate the need for such laws and to 
suggest machinery similar to that of the US Fair Employment Practices Commission 
which was based on the premise of 'conciliation' instead of criminal sanctions 
(Patterson, 1969: 82-83). The appointment of two committees comprised of Labour 
politicians and lawyers to look into the drafting of race anti-discrimination 
legislation suggests that the newly elected Labour Government saw the issue as a 
political priority and reflects the commitment to racial equality of a strong 
ideological wing within the party who viewed discrimination as morally wrong and 
needing to be outlawed by the government (Kushnick, 1971: 238). The first 
committee, which became known as the Soskice Committee, adopted a rather 
restrictive approach to race relations law. It proposed a limited coverage of the anti-
discrimination bill, applicable to public accommodations only. The work of the 
second committee, which comprised primarily of members of the Society of Labour 
Lawyers (SLL) is of special interest to the case study because the historical evidence 
shows that the committee’s recommendations were influenced by the American 
experience during the Second Reconstruction and the committee’s recommendations, 
in turn, influenced the content of the first UK Race Relations Act which was passed 
in 1965. The legal specialists in the Martin Committee, as the second Labour 
committee became known after its chair Andrew Martin, designed their proposal for 
a new bill based on a certain amount of legal knowledge that had been accumulated 
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from the adoption of anti-discrimination laws in the US up to the mid-1960 (Saggar, 
1992: 80). The most progressive norm entrepreneurs within the Martin Committee, 
influenced by the US Civil Rights Act of 1964 and fair housing legislation at state 
level in the US, argued for an extended scope for the bill that would cover all major 
areas of discrimination (Patterson, 1969: 84).  
 Another distinct group from outside the Labour Party, the Campaign Against 
Racial Discrimination (CARD), a multiracial organisation supported by various 
immigrant associations, also lobbied for the creation of the 1965 Race Relations Act. 
It is important to note that CARD’s legislative proposals were drafted by Anthony 
Lester, a barrister who was well acquainted with the US developments on the issue 
and was also a member of the SLL (Kushnick, 1971: 240 and Patterson, 1969: 84). 
In sum, the legislative recommendations of the Martin Committee and CARD were 
very similar reflecting the crossover of many of their norm enterprising actors and 
their knowledge of American race anti-discrimination laws (Kushnick, 240-241 and 
Lester and Bindman, 1972: 110-112). The two proposals widened the scope of the 
suggested legislation by tackling the main problems of racial discrimination in 
employment, housing and commercial services. Based on US legislation at state and 
national level, the proposals called for a statutory body whose role would be to 
investigate complaints and to have the power to issue legally enforceable orders 
against norm violators. Both groups acknowledged that North American evidence 
suggested that anti-discrimination laws would be more effectively enforced by 
administrative means rather than by lawsuits in criminal courts because legal 
prosecution took too long, was often prohibitively expensive, and it was difficult to 
prove beyond reasonable doubt that discrimination occurred (ibid).  
The tracing of the origins of the first race relations law shows that the process 
of bill drafting was the product of “liberal hour” norm entrepreneurs within the 
Labour government and legal non-governmental experts closely affiliated with the 
government. The account also reveals that these political elites and legal experts 
were not only thoroughly familiar with the existing and evolving scope and 
enforcement mechanisms within the US Civil Rights legislation but were determined 
to translate the principles and mechanics of US law into the British context, 
suggesting that the norm socialisation process was underway. The debates 
surrounding the race relations bill’s passage also suggest that the unlike in the US 
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where southern opposition to the codification of the racial anti-discrimination norm 
into federal law remained vigorous and violent, the Conservative leadership did not 
oppose the bill which initiating a two-party consensus to depoliticize the race issue 
(Katzenelson, 1973: 126). More importantly, the House of Commons discussions 
surrounding the bill show that evidence form the American experience was used 
widely by both parties. Recounting the debate Anthony Lester and Geoffrey 
Bindman noted that Labour Members referred to the CARD proposals and the North 
American experience, especially when it came to choosing the type of monitoring 
and enforcement mechanism for the race relations law (1972: 115). Supporting the 
SLL and CARD proposals, the Conservatives’ leader Peter Thorneycroft argued that: 
“We have rather a good test case here, because some of the States have applied the criminal 
solution and others have adopted the conciliation method. Where they have adopted 
conciliation, it has on the whole, worked not too badly; where they have tried the criminal 
approach, it has not worked at all, or practically not at all.” (House of Commons, 1965: 990) 
 The Conservatives’ push for a mediation and conciliation body, in fact, is 
largely responsible for the Government’s acceptance of the SLL/CARD proposals, 
redrafting the bill and replacing the criminal provisions with a conciliation 
mechanism and civil law enforcement (Hampshire, 2006: 320). Taken more broadly, 
the debates indicate that although the political elites involved in the shaping of the 
first race anti-discrimination law were exposed to norm socialising through the 
findings the SLL and CARD presented in the bill recommendations, the first act was 
of limited scope and significance. The actual Race Relations Act of 1965 did not 
cover the crucial areas of housing and employment recommended in the CARD 
proposal, and had a weak enforcement mechanism. The compliance body established 
by the Act became known as the Race Relations Board and was modelled, as 
mentioned earlier, upon state conciliation agencies in the US. Unfortunately, the 
Board’s enforcement powers were weak because the race equality body was not 
granted powers of subpoena, which meant that respondents could refuse to appear 
before the Board. Furthermore, the Board was not granted power to bring civil 
proceedings in a court of law, which made the Attorney-General the only one who 
could initiate such actions against unlawful discrimination (Kushnick, 1971: 248-
249). Certainly, the SLL and CARD lobbying efforts were largely unsuccessful 
because many of the Labour MPs whom the architects of the bill won over were 
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‘backbenchers’ who lacked the influence to shape the bill. The end result was the 
product of the government’s minimalist expectations and its unwillingness to take 
full advantage of the existing legislation in the US.  This can be explained by the 
limited awareness of many MPs about the extent and pervasiveness of racial 
discrimination at home the since at the time there was no major research available on 
the matter in the UK.   
Given these limitations, it is unsurprising that the law drew harsh criticisms 
from the left-leaning members of the Labour Party and liberals in general who 
considered the legislation “toothless and a sop” (Pimlott, 1992: 510). Regardless of 
the liberal sentiment, to present the 1965 Race Relations Act as devoid of value 
would be inaccurate. Despite its considerable shortcomings, as Hampshire argues, 
the Act broached the principle of race anti-discrimination, which meant it would be 
increasingly difficult for any government in the future “to justify inaction if evidence 
of racism in employment or housing were forthcoming” (2006: 321). More to the 
point of this study, the Act’s institutional framework – the administrative agency and 
civil law punishments adopted from the American context – “have formed the basis 
for Britain’s race relations policy to present day” as the basic structure of the 
monitoring body has remained the same (ibid).  
Cedric Thornberry’s prophetic comment from that time also shows that to 
view the race relations measure as “a piece of window-dressing would be too harsh 
of a judgment” (Thornberry, 1965:12, quoted in Patterson, 1969: 86). Perceptively, 
Thornberry outlined the steps the Government would adopt in the following few 
years, which would deepen and expand the norm socialisation process, which it had 
initiated. Thornberry argued: 
“Its [the Act’s] value, as has been stressed, would lie in its dramatic effect [and] should be 
regarded as a first step only. The way prepared, the Government should initiate a programme of 
research to determine how far…imported legal techniques could begin to assist in the diminution of 
practices which are an affront to any conception of an integrated society. There is much experience in 
the United States and Canada to be drawn upon” (ibid). 
It is clear that Thornberry’s sentiment was shared by the institutional norm 
entrepreneurs who advocated for comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation and 
strong enforcement powers for its Board. As I claim in the next section, the norm 
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socialisation process progressed rapidly between 1965 and 1976 because the Labour 
Party stayed in power and the political elites of its progressive wing who had keen 
interest in further transference of principles and mechanisms related to race anti-
discrimination ended up occupying key government posts that allowed them to shape 
and influence the crafting and passage of future race relations acts. 
I argue that when it comes to motives similarly to US national elites, UK 
norm entrepreneurs were motivated by the uneasy combination of principled and 
pragmatic reasoning (Hampshire, 2006: 318). The belief in the intrinsic goodness of 
the norm was joined with the strategic objective of the party leadership to prevent 
social disorder and racial tensions as had been seen the US. These fears of a ‘new 
Harlem’ had been particularly prominent in the aftermath of the Notting Hill and 
Nottingham riots in 1958 in which white youth attacked West Indian immigrants, an 
act that exposed the myth of British tolerance (Steel, 1969: 32). Linked with this was 
the progressive norm entrepreneurs’ aim to remove race from the sphere of electoral 
competition through a two-party consensus that aimed to diminish the impact of the 
'racialisation' of non-white immigration under the preceding Conservative 
Governments, which had presented non-white immigration as the source of insoluble 
social problems precisely because their origin was qualified as 'racial' instead of 
'social' (Carter, Harris and Joshi, 1987: 16). These stereotypes constructed non-white 
immigrants as a threat to 'British way of life' and reinforced a racialised presentation 
of 'Britishness' which included or excluded people on the basis of their colour 
(Carter, Harris and Joshi, 1987: 16, Solomos, 1989: 47, Foot, 1965: Ch. 7). The 
Labour Party leadership saw the legislation as a way to detract from and undermine 
the extremist anti-immigration views of Conservative backbenchers who enjoyed 
large public support and are well summed up in the comments of Sir Cyril Osborne, 
the Conservative MP for Louth. Osborne argued that a failure to stem colonial 
immigration ‘would be "sowing the seeds of another Little Rock", a comment that 
played on fears engendered by the American example’ (Sanderson, 1991: 36). He 
inflamed public anti-immigrant sentiments by drawing on dramatic metaphors that 
equated immigration from the former colonies to a pending racial holocaust and by 
referring regularly to bloody African American protests in the United States which 
he claimed would soon become a part of the British experience (ibid., 63 and 93). 
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This rhetoric compelled the Labour government to act more quickly to counter its 
impact by strengthening the existing race relations legislation.  
There is a wide consensus amongst commentators of the period that these 
principled objectives may have not been sufficient to bring about the codification of 
the race anti-discrimination norm had they not been a part of a broader policy 
package underpinned by instrumental concerns. Arguably, the most obvious 
pragmatic motive behind the legislation was the desire to ‘balance’ the Labour 
Party’s approach to immigration. The approach built upon the Conservative record 
by strengthening the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act by placing further 
restrictions upon non-white immigration (Favell, 2001: 110-22 and Hansen, 2000: 
128-9). The passage of the Race Relations Act, it was expected, would serve as a 
compensatory measure for the additional immigration controls and would make the 
maintenance and extension of immigration restrictions more acceptable (Skidelsky, 
1981: 516). As James Hampshire convincingly argues the limitation-integration 
equation can be understood a political strategy designed “to appease anti-
immigration sentiment by restrictive immigration controls, and placate liberal and 
left-wing progressives with race relations legislation” (2006: 309). Although the 
motives of the SLL and CARD norm entrepreneurs engaged in the crafting of the 
1965 Race Relations Act were undeniably justice-driven, the broader approach to 
race of the Labour Government which allowed the Act’s passage was clearly 
underpinned by instrumental reasoning. 
Tracing norm diffusion (I): The 1968 Race Relations Act 
 This section continues to advance the argument about the primacy of 
domestic institutional norm entrepreneurs in the deepening of the norm’s 
institutionalisation and the widening of its scope. Here I also claim that the tracing of 
the second legislation-making process shows evidence of deepening norm 
socialisation through regular knowledge exchange between US and UK public 
authorities, which influenced the contents of the new act.  
Eliot Rose et al. point out that after the 1966 election it was considered 
unlikely that the Labour Government would re-visit race relations as the anti-
discrimination measures were not popular with the electorate, organised labour was 
wary of regulation of employment and elements of the Labour Party were 
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unenthusiastic to make the issue a priority (1969: 535). Yet within two years a 
second Race Relations Act was passed widening the fields in which discrimination 
on the basis of race became illegal and strengthening the monitoring and compliance 
mechanism. Two interrelated factors account for keeping race relations on the 
Labour Government’s agenda. First, a group of progressives, the legal experts and 
political elites who advocated for the earlier act and the newly formed race relations 
bodies, lobbied for follow up legislation. More significantly, they found a powerful 
ally in the Cabinet, in the figure of the newly appointed Home Secretary, Roy 
Jenkins, who displayed consistent personal commitment to anti-discrimination and 
launched several ambitious research projects in the field. Second, as the new body of 
evidence commissioned by Jenkins revealed the extent of discriminatory practices in 
the UK and proposed viable solutions based on best practices from North America, 
those sceptical of and hostile to a subsequent act found it difficult to justify their 
opposition (Lester and Bindman, 1972:112).   
The appointment of Roy Jenkins as Home Secretary was of decisive 
importance to the making of the subsequent Race Relations Acts in 1968 and 1976. 
A charismatic figure, Jenkins used much of his political capital to reach out to 
immigrant organisations and the general public to promote his vision for integration 
which he defined not in assimilationist terms but as “equal opportunity, accompanied 
by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (Patterson, 1969: 112-
113). The tactics he employed from the onset of his appointment consisted of several 
carefully timed speeches in which he committed himself and his staff to the creation 
of a new race relations act. He also strategically appointed Mark Carter, another 
firmly committed norm entrepreneur to the chairmanship of the Race Relations 
Board. More importantly, Jenkins launched and subsidised a two-pronged research 
agenda that would first, provide evidence of the extent of discrimination in areas not 
covered by the 1965 law and second, would offer updated recommendations about 
the contents of the future law based on developments in the North American race 
anti-discrimination legislation (Lester and Bindman, 1972: 122-123).  The actions of 
the Home Secretary and his associates, highlight the central role the highly agential 
political elites play in norm diffusion when they are justice-driven. The historical 
evidence, as it will be elaborated below, also shows that degree of knowledge and 
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expertise of political norm entrepreneurs contributes to the overall success of the 
norm socialisation process.   
Two major reports, the Political and Economic Planning Report and the 
Street Report, played pivotal role in the design and passage of the 1986 race relations 
legislation because they supplied the evidence Jenkins and the rest of the progressive 
norm entrepreneurs needed to push the bill through Parliament. Jenkins was behind 
the initiative to commission a study on the extent of discrimination in employment, 
housing and the financial services, the areas were not covered by the existing law. 
The findings of the Political and Economic Planning Report, the PEP Report in brief, 
which represented the first systematic attempt to assess the extent of discrimination, 
established that racial discrimination in the UK was qualified as varying from the 
massive to the substantial. Contemporary commentators observed that,  
“The findings show that the groups who were most physically distinct in colour and racial 
features from the English experienced the greatest discrimination, and that the group [of non-
white immigrants] who were culturally most like the English, and who sought integration 
were most likely to experience rejection…The Report illustrated how the process of racial 
discrimination tended to push or keep [non-white] immigrants in poorer housing and lower 
status jobs, reinforcing the stereotype and preventing integration.” (Rose et al, 1969: 414) 
The findings generated much public attention and garnered calls for urgent 
corrective action (Banton, 1985: 72). The data, combined with statistics from the 
Race Relations Board Report, according to which over half of the complaints 
received dealt with areas not covered by the law, gave Jenkins the much needed 
ammunition for a new piece of legislation. 
The Street Report which is especially relevant for this thesis was also 
commissioned at Jenkins's personal instigation by the Race Relations Board and the 
National Committee for Commonwealth Immigration with the objective to gather 
and evaluate overseas experience in the field of race anti-discrimination legislation. 
Prior to the actual writing, each of the three legal experts observed a US state anti-
discrimination commission in practice and met with a wide range of American 
antidiscrimination experts (Hepple, 1968: 312). This is important because it confirms 
the norm life cycle model’s hypothesis that socialisation and demonstration serve as 
the dominant mechanisms for norm diffusion. The account given by one of the Street 
Committee members of the experience illustrates the considerable impact of the visit 
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upon the British norm entrepreneurs, " [We were] impressed by the method of 
enforcement adopted in the United States…, where special administrative agencies 
use education, persuasion and conciliation, and, only in the last resort, make legally 
enforceable orders…[and] took the view that similar techniques…were appropriate 
for Britain" (Lester and Bindman, 1972: 99). The comment confirms the desire of the 
British norm architects to engage in knowledge exchange and their decision to 
incorporate American legal transplants into the recommendations for the new race 
relations bill.  
I consider the Street Report to have been the critical instrument that Jenkins 
and his allies employed in arguing for broadening the scope of the race relations law. 
Basing their arguments on the Street Committee findings, Jenkins and allied policy 
makers and experts argued that US (and to a lesser extent Canadian) experience 
demonstrated that problems in employment, housing and access to insurance and 
credit services “remain unsolved unless the aid of the law is sought” (Street, Howe, 
Bindman, 1976: 73). Citing the report’s findings, they stressed the need for 
extending the scope of the existing act and argued that it ought to cover 
discrimination in critical areas like employment, especially in practices of 
recruitment, training, promotion, redundancies, membership in trade unions, and 
conditions of work, housing, particularly in selling or letting private and local 
authority property, and in commercial and social facilities and services (Kushnick, 
1971: 255). The detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of US laws and 
compliance mechanisms and the suggested ways in which they could be 
strengthened and adapted within the framework of UK law was one of the most 
important resources the architects of the new law used to formulate their bill 
proposals. Arguably, the key American invention experts and political elites 
committed to the race anti-discrimination norm were eager to incorporate in the new 
bill was a “typical American administrative body – the regulatory agency”, an 
administrative body that can also exercise judiciary powers like holding hearings, 
making enforceable orders and compelling witnesses to attend the proceedings 
((Lester and Bindman, 1972: 101). In their own accounts, the norm entrepreneurs 
who actively lobbied for giving the Race Relations Board direct legal powers show 
they understood that their proposals were novel and radical within the context of 
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English law as no existing agency in the country possessed the new powers the 
Street Committee claimed were necessary to secure equality of opportunity.  
These findings validate the arguments laid out in the chapter. The agency of 
domestic institutional norm entrepreneurs, political elites and experts, was the 
driving factor that ensured the cascading of the race anti-discrimination norm. These 
elites employed norm socialisation through knowledge exchanges and demonstration 
visits to the US, as the dominant mechanism to fulfil their aim of a more 
comprehensive understanding and wider coverage of the anti-discrimination 
principle and an effective compliance mechanism that was to be transplanted from 
the US administrative machinery. The success of the norm socialisation process and 
the institutionalisation of US race anti-discrimination principles and machinery 
clearly depended on the expertise and skills of these norm entrepreneurs who were 
helped by the cross party perception enhanced by the media that US policy makers 
possessed the historical knowledge and competence in the field of racial 
antidiscrimination the UK needed.  
The actual passage of the bill faced little opposition under the inter-party 
consensus on the de-politicisation of race, which had been reinforced by Jenkins’s 
success in carrying the support of his governing party leadership, the Opposition and 
a large section of elite opinion with him (Saggar, 1991:33). The final 1968 RRA 
extended the scope of the earlier legislation making it unlawful to discriminate on 
the grounds of colour, race, national or ethnic origin in the areas of employment, 
housing, education, and credit and insurance services. The size and enforcement 
powers of the Race Relations Board were expanded but not as significantly as the 
reformists who wanted the bill to be as close to the Street report recommendations 
hoped. The Board was empowered to initiate investigations and to take 
discrimination cases to court if conciliation proceedings had failed (Kushnick, 1971: 
264). The partial success of the Act can be explained by Jenkins’s replacement as 
Home Secretary by James Callahan, who did not have the personal commitment and 
had played no role in persuading the government to take up the bill (Lester and 
Bindman, 1972: 130-1). The limited definition of what constituted discrimination 
which did not include the notion of indirect forms of discrimination and required the 
proof of discriminatory intent, meant that many discriminatory practices went 
undetected and made discrimination complaints increasingly hard to prove. (ibid., 
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148). Still, the second Act was a marked improvement over the earlier legislation 
because it institutionalised the anti-discrimination norm in new areas of UK law and 
established a frame of reference for the 1976 Race Relations Act.  
In terms of motives, the historical record is clear that the immediate “liberal 
hour” enthusiasts were driven by a sense of justice and the conviction that 
unfavourable treatment because of skin colour was morally wrong. The broader 
political context, however, suggests that the wider cross-party consensus on race and 
the passage of the act were heavily rooted in pragmatic reasoning namely the 
attempts to balance the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act which had been 
adopted earlier that year and to supress Enoch Powell’s populist anti-immigration 
agenda. The 1968 CIA was a hurriedly passed piece of legislation, which effectively 
withdrew the rights of Kenyan Asians to enter the UK at the time of their intense 
targeting by the Kenyan Government. 3 Estimates show that approximately 200,000 
people holding British citizenship were turned away and rendered stateless as a result 
of the newly imposed immigration restrictions (Hansen, 2000: Ch. 7). The Bill 
provoked a huge outcry from the liberal segments of society but seems to have 
satisfied the public opinion. Some saw it as “the most shameful piece of legislation” 
to be enacted and as “the ultimate appeasement of racist hysteria” while others 
interpreted it as a decisive and appropriate action in the face of ‘immense pressure’ 
(ibid., 153). The second Race Relations Act therefore should be understood as both 
an integrative measure and the Labour Government’s way to appease the sentiments 
to the left of the Labour Party. 
The swift passage of the 1968 RRA can also be interpreted as the inter-party 
response to Enoch Powell’s inflammatory speeches the most notable of which is the 
so called ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech which he delivered to a meeting of the 
Conservative Association in Birmingham on 20 April 1968. In it he attacked the 
proposal for the second RRA calling the legislation replete with ’divisive’ and 
‘dangerous’ elements. Powell presented the immigrant communities as consolidating 
                                                          
3The Kenyan Asians ‘scare’ of 1968 was the result of the mildly termed ‘Africanization’ policies of the 
Kenyan Government designed to restrict and drive out Asians of key positions in the economic and 
political life of the country. Once their stay in Kenya became precarious, more and more Kenyan 
Asians opted to flee to the UK, the only country that granted them citizenship and unrestricted 
access because their passports were issued under the authority of the UK Government rather than 
that of the colonial government (Hansen, 2000: Ch. 7). 
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and unifying entities plotting “to agitate and campaign against their fellow citizens” 
and ready to manipulate the law in order to “dominate with the legal weapons which 
the ignorant and ill-informed have provided” them (1991: 373-379 and Foot, 1969). 
He not only proposed continuous and more restrictive immigration measures but also 
spoke of repatriation as an ultimate solution to the ‘problem’ of the new minorities. 
He denied the existence of institutional and societal discrimination on racial grounds 
and instead held that if any such disadvantages existed they emerged not from 
inadequacies in the existing law and public policy but from personal circumstances. 
Powell spoke against integrationist measures which he viewed as a “dangerous 
illusion” and presented his concluding remarks in a prophetic form alluding to 
“River Tiber foaming with much blood” and hinting that the civil disturbances in the 
USA, which at the time was experiencing the height of the Civil Rights Movement 
protests, would soon come on British soil (ibid). The 1968 Race Relations Act, 
therefore, can be seen as the ultimate political opportunity for the conservative party 
leadership to distance itself from Powell and for the Labour Government to detract 
from and stall Powell’s political momentum.  
The tracing of the institutionalisation of the race anti-discrimination norm in 
the UK reflects Philip Sooben’s claim that “United States law had made a major 
contribution to the British approach in 1965 and 1968…Above all, it had shown that 
the law could be used effectively to tackle a social as well as individual wrong” 
(1990: 55-6).  The chapter has shown that UK reformists underwent a norm 
socialising experience at their own initiative, which involved knowledge exchanges 
with US counterparts and demonstrations of the workings of US race anti-
discrimination law. In it I have demonstrated that this norm socialising resulted in 
the incorporation and adaptation of US race anti-discrimination approaches and 
monitoring mechanisms into UK race relations legislation and compliance bodies. I 
have attributed the success of the norm diffusion to the agency of the “liberal hour” 
norm entrepreneurs led and supported by Home Secretary Jenkins. I have suggested 
that the embedding of the norm into UK law was made more likely because 1) the 
political elites did not face outside pressure and instead were motivated by their own 
quest for justice and 2) they possessed the necessary expertise and competency to 
draw upon the American experience and incorporate legal notions and mechanisms 
that could function into a UK context.  In terms of motives, we see a curious mix of 
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instrumental and ideational reasons for the crafting of the race relations acts: the 
architects of the legislation displayed a genuine commitment to the principle of anti-
discrimination while the wider Labour Party leadership and the Opposition 
supported the initiative out of pragmatic reasons. 
Tracing norm diffusion (II): the 1976 Race Relations Act  
 This section goes on to consider the role that the developing model of anti-
discrimination legislation in the United States played in Britain. Above all, I 
demonstrate that two developments in the American approach to race anti-
discrimination – the evolution of understanding discrimination as structural, 
systemic and indirect and the principle of positive discrimination – strongly 
impacted Home Secretary Jenkins and were enshrined in the 1976 legislation under 
his explicit order. This analysis provides the most direct evidence of norm diffusion 
and norm socialisation of political elites at the highest government level.  
  Roy Jenkins’s return to the Home Secretary post in 1974 ushered in a period 
of ‘restrained liberalism’. It also coincided with important developments across the 
Atlantic where an increasing awareness had emerged of the weakness of a system 
that relied almost exclusively on individual complaints and viewed anti-
discrimination as unconnected individual wrongs (Sooben, 1990: 37). At the time, 
British race relations experts were starting to take an interest in the US change of 
approach to race as one, which was becoming more complex and sophisticated in its 
emphasis on institutional and structural reasons for exclusion in addition to 
‘prejudiced discrimination’ (McCrudden, 1982: 306). By the early 1970s British 
legal experts in the field of anti-discrimination had developed a body of literature, 
which re-examined the interrelationships between race, employment, housing and 
poverty by taking into consideration the structures and institutions of the labour 
market (Hepple, 1971 and Dummett, 1973: 131). Concerns that the noticeably 
unequal position of first and second generation immigrants especially in the labour 
market could not be explained solely by ‘prejudiced’, direct discrimination 
contributed to the re-examination of the existing British race relations legislation and 
stimulated comparative studies with the new American approach. In Britain as in the 
US, institutional racism became a term associated with inequalities arising out of 
past and present discrimination of the type that led minority groups to not even apply 
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for housing or work at specific places (Select Committee on Race, 1969, quoted in 
McCrudden, 1982: 311).   
Philip Sooben considers the US seminal case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co in 
1971 as the event that began to shift the approach of British commentators to race 
antidiscrimination and impact their analyses of the existing race relations law 
(1990:37).4 The prevailing expert view prior to the drafting of the third Race 
Relations Act was that legislative efforts should address systems and practices that 
have a disparate impact upon, or in other words, result in disadvantage to members 
of minorities rather than on individual acts of discrimination. Experts also 
acknowledged that class action lawsuits of the Griggs kind were incompatible with 
the British legal system. In order to re-orient British jurisprudence in the direction of 
systems of discrimination and effects upon minority groups rather than intentional 
individual wrongs, any future legislation would need to do that by altering the 
purpose and powers of the enforcement agency. The agency, these norm 
entrepreneurs argued, would need the powers to obtain information about relevant 
systems and practices and, more generally, most of its resources would be channelled 
away from individual complaints investigations towards a broader strategic function. 
Most critically the definition of discrimination would need to be extended to 
incorporate the notion of indirect discrimination first articulated in Griggs into UK 
law. The new definition would circumvent the problem of proving intentional 
discrimination as it would go beyond the notion’s individualised nature and would 
provide the legal basis for intervening against the “effects of past and other types of 
institutional discrimination” (ibid). The keen interest British experts displayed in the 
changes across the Atlantic points to a continuing norm socialising process amongst 
the left leaning groups of Labour political elites and specialists in the field. This also 
demonstrates that the US influence on British race relations was both long-term and, 
as the crafting of the 1976 law will show, shaped the core of UK’s present-day race 
anti-discrimination law both in terms of norm institutionalisation and its 
enforcement. 
Despite the shifting view amongst law academics and practitioners in the 
field of race relations, the changes they suggested were not initially taken into 
                                                          
4 This section draws heavily on Philip Sooben’s research of the origin of the 1976 Race Relations Act. 
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consideration by the chief architect of the legislation, Home Secretary Jenkins. 
Jenkins did not originally plan to expand the definition of discrimination but a visit 
to the US convinced him and his advisors of the need to re-draft the race relations 
bill in order to widen the scope of the term.  Anthony Lester, Jenkins’s long-term 
advisor, recounts the experience in the following way: 
“...we were mainly inspired by the ideas from the Atlantic. Indeed, the key concept of 
indirect discrimination...was hastily included in the Sex [and Race] Discrimination Bill, on 
the eve of its publication. The omission was made good as a result of a visit with the Home 
Secretary to the United States. We discovered, during the visit, that we had defined the 
concept of what discrimination means too narrowly...The technical and crabbed language...of 
the legislation was Parliamentary Counsel’s version of the landmark judgment of the 
American Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. , no doubt faithfully reflecting the 
Home Office instructions, if not my own hopes and expectations.”(Lester, 1994: 225).  
Lester’s account provides a convincing proof of the deepening of norm 
socialising processes of high ranking political elites. It is apparent that the first-hand 
knowledge obtained during the visit convinced Jenkins that a law based on the 
earlier narrow definition of discrimination was insufficient and the new anti-
discrimination legislation would flounder if it failed to address institutional practices 
and patterns. These circumstances made the cascading of the indirect discrimination 
notion and its enshrinement in statute a quick and mostly uncontested undertaking. 
Jenkins understood that the disadvantages that women and ethnic minorities 
encountered emerged most commonly from institutional practices rather than from 
the purposeful actions of prejudiced persons.  
Conceptually, British thinking relied heavily on America’s example not only 
in the area of indirect discrimination but also on the issue of positive discrimination. 
Again, the US trip was instrumental in shifting Jenkins’s position just enough to 
allow a modest measure of positive action (Sooben, 1990: 38). Admittedly, Jenkins 
did not go as far as to embrace to the same extent the concept as he did the principle 
of indirect discrimination. The positive action that ended up in the 1976 Race 
Relations Act was of limited non-compulsory nature. Nonetheless, the sheer 
codification of the term into UK race legislation opened the possibility for positive 
action schemes in those areas of employment with under-represented minorities.  
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To sum up, the architects of the 1976 Race Relations Act led by Roy Jenkins 
were heavily influenced by ongoing developments in the civil rights legislation in 
the USA and the provisions in the Act reflected that. The most important innovation 
in the law was the introduction of the concept of indirect discrimination modelled 
after the language of the US Supreme Court judges in Griggs which sought to depart 
from the individualised nature of previous definitions in order to permit interventions 
against the disparate effects of institutional discrimination. The notion of the US 
concept of affirmative action was modified into ‘positive action’ and stripped from 
its compulsory character. The equality body was given new objectives and powers 
that embodied these changes the most significant of which was the ability to conduct 
investigations into organisations where it had the cause to believe unlawful 
discrimination was taking place. The equality body was tasked with issuing codes of 
practice about the elimination of institutional discrimination in employment and the 
promotion of equality of opportunity (Solomos, 1989: 78). 
As far as motives are concerned, this was the first race anti-discrimination 
legislation where instrumental concerns did not feature prominently and where there 
was little Conservative opposition to the Act (Lane, 1987: 15). The 1976 Act was 
also the first race relations legislation that was not preceded by immigration 
restrictions and thus cannot be viewed as a balancing act. The passage of the act 
faced little contestation largely because it was preceded by the Sex Discrimination 
Act pushed through Parliament by Jenkins a year earlier. It would have been difficult 
for Parliament, Jenkins rightly reasoned, to oppose the Race Relations Act because it 
would have been unable to justify denying new minorities the protections already 
granted to women.  (Sooben, 1990: 25). The circumstances suggest that the reasons 
behind the act’s drafting and passage were largely justice-driven although they did 
require much strategic thinking on behalf of the main norm entrepreneurs to ensure 
the Act’s passage and its closest resemblance to the original draft. 
Conclusion 
 The analysis of the internationalisation, or diffusion, of the race anti-
discrimination norm demonstrates that the agency which drives the process is not 
limited to norm entrepreneurs located at the supranational level. It shows that 
constructivist models that examine the agency of international organisations, norm 
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promoting states and the networks they form should be supplemented by an 
approach that focuses on understanding the agency of domestic political elites in 
norm diffusion. Since norm diffusion and norm institutionalisation in domestic laws, 
policy and practices are linked together, this further necessitates the study of national 
elites, who as the thesis has shown thus far, have a determinate role in the process of 
norm institutionalisation. The UK case study, therefore, calls for the re-
conceptualisation of the role and place of domestic national elites in models of norm 
diffusion. Its findings suggest that the processes of norm diffusion and domestic 
institutionalisation tend to be less prone to reversal when they are led by domestic 
norm entrepreneurs. 
The ideational commitment of these domestic agents to the new norm is the 
essential element which accounts for successful norm transference. It explains the 
professional investment of the political elites in the norm institutionalisation process, 
their purposeful search for norm socialising opportunities in pursuit of an effective 
framework for race anti-discrimination legislation and their unrelenting lobbying for 
progressively stronger and more effective race relations acts. The historical evidence 
shows that British norm entrepreneurs were deeply and personally vested in the 
transference and codification of the race anti-discrimination norm and elevated the 
issue as a priority for the Government. In comparison, the Czech and Hungarian 
cases which will be analysed in Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate that the attitudes of the 
majority of national elites responsible for the institutionalisation of the norm into 
their respective legislative context ranged from moderately vested to openly hostile. 
These elites’ often presented the norm as ‘foreign’ and ‘incompatible’ with domestic 
customs and practices and as forced upon society by supranational agents perceived 
as unfamiliar with the national context. The behaviour of Czech and Hungarian 
political elites suggests that norm diffusion initiated ‘from above’ is more 
problematic and norm institutionalisation in domestic law and institutional practices 
can be superficial compared to norm cascading processes driven by domestic actors. 
Put another way, British norm entrepreneurs followed a logic of appropriateness 
while their Czech and Hungarian counterparts have embraced a logic of 
consequences approach resulting in two differential outcomes when it comes to norm 
diffusion and institutionalisation. 
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The incorporation of the race anti-discrimination norm into UK law was an 
impressive achievement at the time. Most other European states and the European 
Community were trailing behind as they lacked protection from discrimination 
except in the areas of nationality and gender. The need for similar legislation at the 
European level, as Anthony Lester observes, was overdue as “the problems of racial 
discrimination and ethnic hatred are very serious and increasing problems across 
Europe” and “the continuing denial of the equal protection of the law to ethnic and 
religious minorities in Europe”, he warned, would have “extremely grave potential 
consequences” (1994: 6). The increasing awareness that the denial of equal 
protection to minorities could potentially have serious social and political 
implications for the enlargement and integrative ambitions of the EU served as a 
starting point for the gradual gathering of political support for anti-discriminatory 
legislation, a process which I examine in the next chapter in order to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of the norm cascading processes at the European level. 
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Chapter Three 
Norm diffusion at the European level 
The regional diffusion of the racial anti-discrimination norm has been made 
possible through the institutionalisation of the norm in European law. The chapter 
traces the institutionalisation processes by analysing the making of the European 
Union Race Equality Directive and jurisprudence developments at the European 
Court of Human Rights related to the prohibition of discrimination found in Article 
14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In terms of agential factors, the 
norm cascading process, if studied narrowly, partly conforms to the hypothesis of the 
norm life cycle model which suggests that international organisations and the 
networks they form drive norm cascading (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 898). After 
all the immediate passage of the Race Equality Directive and norm 
institutionalisation in the ECtHR case law were the outcome of decisions made by 
political and judiciary elites within their respective intergovernmental organisations.  
However, a closer examination of the norm cascading processes reveals a 
causal link between European level norm diffusion and domestic actors. In the 
chapter I argue that the broader formation and formulation of the EU race anti-
discrimination legislation were largely driven by a transnational advocacy network, 
which had its roots in domestic elites as it comprised mainly (ex-) government 
officials and experts from quasi-governmental bodies from the UK and other west 
European states with well-developed anti-discrimination legislation. The aim of the 
advocacy network was to codify into law protection measures for racial minorities 
across all EU member states. The European developments also counter Finnemore 
and Sikkink’s assumption about the distinction between norm entrepreneurs and 
norm violators and their categorisation of international organisations as norm 
enterprising actors (1998: 902). The findings challenge the assumption by 
demonstrating that the distinction between the two analytical categories is 
empirically unsustainable and that the members of international organisations do not 
always behave as norm entrepreneurs. The investigation of the ECtHR jurisprudence 
building processes shows that a significant number of judges did not behave the way 
the model expects them to, which placed them in direct opposition to the norm 
enterprising actions of other Council of Europe bodies.  
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In addition to agential factors, I expand on the role of the enabling conditions 
that contributed to the passage of the Race Equality Directive namely the existing 
gender anti-discrimination legislation and procedural mechanics that facilitated the 
codification of the norm into Union law. The gender anti-discrimination norm, which 
was already codified in EU law served as a blueprint for the new legislation creating 
a norm resonance effect. This norm resonance enabled the incorporation of 
protective measures into the new race directive without substantial opposition while 
the option of ‘fast-tracking’ allowed its passage quickly bypassing the scrutiny of 
national governments.  
The chapter also finds that despite the successful codification of the racial 
anti-discrimination norm into regional law, the subsequent norm cascading and 
acceptance at state level have been weakened as a result of the manner in which the 
norm was institutionalised in European law and the enforcement mechanisms 
available at the European level. The ‘fast tracking’ of the passage of the Racial 
Equality Directive meant that most national representatives who voted for the bill 
were rather unfamiliar with the nature of the law while a substantial number of 
ECtHR judges disagreed profoundly with the findings of systemic discrimination on 
the basis of ethnicity in the 2007 landmark case of D.H. v. The Czech Republic. In 
other words, the regional cascading of the norm faced considerable challenges and 
direct opposition coming from actors within the very European institutions that 
according to the norm life cycle model should have acted as cohesive norm 
promoters. The norm contestation and its hurried codification at the supranational 
level, I argue in the subsequent chapters on norm internalisation in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, have contributed to varying degrees of norm defying 
behaviour by the political elites in both states. The evidence shows that when 
international organisations do not behave as consistent norm entrepreneurs the 
cascade is not as rapid and “contagion” – like as presented in the model (Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 1989: 902).  
More generally, the analysis suggests that norm thresholds also known as 
tipping points are not reliable signifiers for the quasi-automatic diffusion of new 
norms as the norm life cycle model predicts (see Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 901). 
The empirical evidence shows that when the norm reaches its threshold, the cascade 
and domestic internalisation processes do not necessarily run uncontested. The 
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European case demonstrates that once the tipping point of the norm was achieved 
with the passage of the Race Equality Directive, which contractually bound all 
member states to reconginse and institutionalise the racial antidiscrimination norm 
into domestic law, the norm diffusion continued to be fraught with challenges raised 
by the very domestic actors who had voted to incorporate the norm into the political 
and social order of their states. 
The chapter begins by briefly sketching the early EU anti-discrimination 
developments on nationality and gender before turning to the more recently adopted 
race anti-discrimination measures that can be more readily applied to ethnic 
minorities. The analysis of the race anti-discrimination measures highlights the 
essential role domestic norm entrepreneurs, now united in a transnational network of 
experts, played in the institutionalisation of the race anti-discrimination norm into 
EU law. Here I draw attention to the linkages of the EU Race Directive with the 
British race relations measures and argue that a knowledge transfer took place. The 
knowledge transfer, however, was a markedly different affair than the US-UK norm 
cascading. It relied almost entirely on the ‘push’ factor, the agency of committed 
domestic antidiscrimination experts, and lacked a pull factor namely the ideational 
commitment and norm enterprising behaviour of EU decision-makers,5 which stands 
in stark contrast to the enthusiastic behaviour of the ‘liberal hour’ elites in the UK 
case. 
The second half of the chapter examines the ECtHR jurisprudence arguing 
that although juridically significant, the first case on ethnic anti-discrimination, D.H. 
and Others v. Czech Republic (2007), in which the Strasbourg court recognised 
violation of Article 14 of the ECHR (prohibition of discrimination) falls short of a 
Brown v. Board of Education moment for the Roma minority. The shortcomings lie 
in the formulation of the judgment and the compliance mechanism which relies on 
the political goodwill of national elites. This weakens the norm and reduces its 
chances for successful domestic internalisation.  
 
                                                          
5 The notable exception here is the European Parliament, which endorsed the idea of race anti-
discrimination legislation. The European Parliament at the time, however, was an inconsequential 
actor with little leverage to advance the institutionalisation of the norm within EU law. 
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Early anti-discrimination legislation: nationality and gender 
The original impetus for EU anti-discrimination legislation in the areas of 
gender and nationality is located within the market integration paradigm and came 
into being specifically out of concern over discrimination in employment practices 
and pay (Bell, 2002: 32, 82). The race anti-discrimination initiative, on the oth other 
hand, displays characteristics of a social dimension of EU citizenship (ibid). Early 
on, the founders of the European Communities realised that a common market with 
free movement of people as a fundamental pillar would be virtually impossible 
without provisions prohibiting internal discrimination on grounds of nationality. 
Many of the early treaties ensured non-discrimination between suppliers and 
consumers but also included references to workers. Article 69 of the ECSC Treaty 
referred to the prohibition of inequality in the wages and working conditions of 
migrant EC workers.  
At the time of the drafting of the 1957 EEC Treaty, the adoption of anti-
discrimination measures directed at nationality became a high priority because three 
quarters of all migrants were EC nationals living in another member state (Shanks, 
1977: 31). Articles 12 and 39(2) of the EEC Treaty prohibited "any discrimination 
on grounds of nationality" particularly within the employment context. Since none of 
the treaties provides a definition of 'nationality discrimination', the Court of Justice 
of the European Union has played an important role in the interpretation of the 
legislation. The CJEU has consistently held that the prohibition of discrimination on 
the ground of nationality covers both its direct and indirect forms.6 
Besides nationality, the EEC Treaty included a provision concerning gender 
equality in the workplace. The solitary provision in Article 119 required equal pay 
for men and women and its inclusion was mostly inserted to appease France, which 
already had national laws guaranteeing equal pay between the sexes and feared that 
its laws could put the country at a disadvantage compared to the rest of the member 
states (Meehan, 1885: 85). However, it was not until the 1970s that Article 119 was 
transformed into active law after a series of political and judicial interventions (Bell, 
2002: 43). The need for increased popular legitimacy for further European 
integration, especially after Norway's citizens rejected to accede to the EC in 1972, 
                                                          
6See Case 15/69 Sudmilch v. Ugliola (1969) and Case C-278/94 Commission v. Belgium (1996). 
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and the liberalisation of laws regarding equality of opportunity between men and 
women, especially in the UK and France, made gender equality a priority. However, 
the scope of the successive legislation remained within the confines of employment 
due to the reluctance of member states to venture into sensitive areas like 
reproductive rights and sex-related violence even though such issues could easily be 
linked to work opportunities. Similarly to the 1976 Race Relations Act in the UK, 
the 1976 Equal Treatment Directive incorporated the concept of indirect 
discrimination related to gender and extended protection from discrimination to all 
aspects of employment. Since the Equal Treatment Directive did not contain a 
definition of indirect discrimination, the CJEU was instrumental in filling the gap by 
clarifying the criteria of what constituted an indirectly discriminatory practice. These 
nationality and gender measures led to the firm establishment of the anti-
discrimination norm within the competence of the EU and their existence gave norm 
entrepreneurs concerned with race discrimination a powerful argument and an 
existing framework within which they could frame their demands for similar 
legislation with respect to race.  
Towards race anti-discrimination legislation  
The 1990s, the decade preceding the adoption of the 2000 Race Equality 
Directive, were characterised by growing concern about racist and xenophobic 
attitudes across Europe, the increasing visibility of extremist parties (e.g., Le Pen's 
National Front in France and Vlaams Blok in Belgium) and the exploitation of the 
lack of uniform legislation by racist groups (Bell, 2002: 54-55 and Rex, 2007: 91). 
On the European level, the notion of Fortress Europe was gaining prominence 
evidenced in tightened border security along the periphery. In this context a coalition 
of organisations and individuals convened in 1991 to create a strategy for uniform 
race anti-discrimination legislation across the EU. The alliance, the Starting Line 
Group, spearheaded a strategy to persuade the EU institutions of the need to address 
the legislative gap concerning the prohibition of racial and ethnic discrimination 
across member states (Amiraux and Guiraudon, 2010, Bell, 2008a: 72-73; Case and 
Givens, 2010; Niessen, 2000; Niessen and Chopin, 2004; Geddes and Guiraudon, 
2004 and Guiraudon, 2009). The alliance was led by Britain's Commission for Racial 
Equality, the quasi-governmental organisation charged with implementing the 
provisions of the 1976 Race Relations Act, the Dutch National Bureau against 
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Racism and the Migration Policy Group. These lead actors joined by lawyers, 
government advisers and civil servants from the EU member states conducted a 
series of meetings in Brussels and ultimately produced a draft directive, 'The Starting 
Line', which was endorsed by approximately 400 NGOs within the EU and the 
European Parliament.  
The draft, as two of the leading drafters note in their account, proposed the 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race, colour, descent, nationality, or 
national or ethnic origin in a diverse range of fields from housing and education to 
health and social security (Niessen and Chopin, 2004: 100). The goal of these norm 
architects was to use the 'Starting Line' proposal as an initial point for discussing and 
lobbying the European Commission and Council for a comprehensive anti-
discrimination directive (Case and Givens, 2010: 229-230). Since the UK CRE 
played a major role in the drafting of the initial and subsequent legislation proposals, 
the British anti-discrimination model influenced significantly the construction of the 
EU Race Equality Directive, the specifics of which will be expanded upon later in 
the chapter. 
The first version of the ‘Starting Line' proposal was officially launched in 
1992 and received the explicit backing of the European Parliament. Through a series 
of anti-racism resolutions, the European Parliament appealed to the Commission to 
“use the proposal for a Directive as the basis for discussions…and to take inspiration 
from the Starting Line for the drafting of its own proposal” (Chopin, 1999: 3). The 
initial lobbying failed to initiate a large-scale discussion in the Commission and the 
Council. The Council chose to ignore the proposal because the member states at the 
time preferred, if at all, to address the issue through intergovernmental cooperation 
due to the sensitive nature of the issue and fears over further limits on national 
sovereignty on social issues. Officially, the Commission also justified its inaction by 
claiming that the EC Treaty did not provide it with the necessary competence to 
enact such legislation (Niessen, 2000: 497).  
The initial efforts at regional norm diffusion suggest that the majority of 
driving agents were domestic experts from states with well-institutionalised race 
anti-discrimination provisions. The empirics suggest an alternative to the norm life 
cycle model’s assumption according to which transnational norm entrepreneurs are 
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responsible for driving norm cascading early on (up to the so called tipping point) 
and are eventually superseded by international organisations in the post-threshold 
period of cascading (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 898-902). In the European case, 
we continue to see pronounced domestic norm entrepreneurship and little support 
from the regional institution, which should have served as the major norm diffusing 
actor.  
The differences in the UK and European cases of norm diffusion are striking. 
In the UK case, the ruling political elites were eager to transpose and institutionalise 
the race anti-discrimination norm in order to speed up the integration process of non-
white immigrants. In the European case, the EU institutional actors were reluctant to 
broach the issue precisely because of concerns and fears among member states that 
possible European anti-discrimination policy could have substantial implications for 
and could impinge upon one of the most sensitive areas of national policy, 
immigration, should non-discrimination based on nationality be added to the race 
and ethnicity criteria (Ruzza, 2004: 89). In the EU case, national governments in the 
European Council largely lacked norm entrepreneurial figures and so did the EU 
political elite, which was unwilling to take up the issue and advocate for it before the 
national representatives.  More broadly, the initial lack of regional norm cascading 
demonstrates that norm diffusion processes are not faits accomplis but can be 
interrupted and even moved backwards at this intermediate phase. What is even 
more interesting and unexpected in the particular case, as it will be illustrated next, is 
the ability of domestic agents to push the norm cascade forward despite the 
disinclination of the regional actor best positioned to advance the process to do so. 
This again suggests that domestic elites are vital for the successful advancement of 
the new norm between each of the three stages, which contrasts with the passive role 
of the agreeable norm implementer that the norm life cycle model assigns them.    
In light of the lack of progress, the Starting Line Group stepped up its 
campaign by focusing its efforts on lobbying for an insertion of an anti-
discrimination clause into the EC Treaty, which would give the Commission the 
clear competence to introduce specific anti-discrimination legislation. The 1997 
Inter-Governmental Conference provided the right opportunity for the introduction 
of such a clause.  The Starting Line Group drafted a text of a newly proposed 
amendment, the Starting Point, and lobbied continuously at national and European 
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level organising seminars to raise awareness and conducting consultations with state 
and EU officials to introduce them to the proposal and to persuade them of its need 
(Niessen, 2000: 102). The SLG modified its arguments for the extension of non-
discrimination provisions to race and ethnicity by linking the notion to pre-existing 
frames that resonated with Council officials. The SLG highlighted the relation of 
race equal treatment provisions with the operation of the single market reasoning that 
their absence most likely impeded free movement as certain persons of minority 
origin might fear exercising their EU rights to move to another member state which 
lacked protective measures with respect to race. The SLG also related its demand for 
an anti-discrimination clause to the existing articles that ban sex and nationality 
discrimination.  The alliance held that the proposal "was a logical extension of these 
measures and an integral element of the EU's 'social dimension' accompanying 
economic integration" (Guiraudon, 2009: 531).  
The framing of the new norm in such a way as to resonate because of 
ideational affinity with an already accepted normative framework contributed to the 
decision of relevant EU actors to place the issue on their agenda for discussions on 
the EC Treaty. This corroborates earlier research on norm resonance by 
constructivists (e.g., Keck and Sikkink, 1998, and Lumsdaine, 1993) by empirically 
demonstrating that forging links between emerging ideas and already embedded 
norms can be an effective tool especially in circumstances where the norm 
entrepreneurs are not in possession of significant material levers.  
As it became more evident that the European institutions were open to 
considering anti-discrimination legislation, the SLG began engaging more 
stakeholders in the process paying special attention to employers' organiastions 
which along with trade unions are influential in Brussels and could potentially 
oppose such legislation for fear of affirmative action clauses (Niessen, 2000: 498). 
These concerns prompted a careful study of North American anti-discrimination 
legislation and the organisation of a Transatlantic Dialogue in an attempt to clarify 
US policies for the European private sector (Lindburg, 1998 quoted in Niessen, 
2000: 498). 
Framing the anti-discrimination norm in a manner that resonated with already 
familiar frames of reference proved to be effective judging by the wording of Article 
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13, which borrowed the language and content of the Starting Point proposal 
(Amiraux and Guiraudon, 2010: 1697). The SLG efforts coincided with the coming 
to power of a new British centre-left government in 1997, which was eager to 
display more commitment to the European integration process and thus removed the 
last remaining obstacle to unanimous decision in the Council. The Council then 
agreed with the recommendations for treaty reform, to extend the anti-discrimination 
principle to race and ethnic origin along with religion, age, disability and sexual 
orientation (Reflection Group, 1995). The newly adopted Article 13 of the EC Treaty 
enabled the Commission to propose a directive to combat anti-discrimination on the 
aforementioned grounds.  
The making of Article 13 of the EC Treaty demonstrates the capability of 
organised domestic norm entrepreneurs from European states with a high degree of 
internalisation of the race anti-discrimination norm to influence the making of viable 
legislation at the European level, which was intended to liberalise national legislative 
orders and legal structures (Case and Givens, 2010: 230). The research on the work 
of the Starting Line Group also shows that it mattered significantly that the norm 
entrepreneurs were a part of the domestic political and legal elite. These norm 
entrepreneurs were seen as possessing technical knowledge and expertise in anti-
discrimination law and spoke the language of the EU institutions, which in turn 
helped them to establish interpersonal relations with members within the European 
policy-making bodies and to gain access to knowledge of emerging internal agendas 
they could use to create space for their own policy ideas (Geddes and Guiraudon, 
2004).  
The importance of political elites is particularly evident when comparing the 
work of the SLG with that of the EU Migrant's Forum, the other significant network 
of norm entrepreneurs who sought to advance EU anti-discrimination law. The 
EUMF in contrast failed to achieve its goals because it sought to extend the principle 
of non-discrimination to non-EU nationals, a matter the EU and national 
governments preferred to address through a separate policy framework (Guiraudon, 
2009: 531). The chosen issues and their framing met with strong resistance from the 
member states because of their sensitivity, lack of popularity among national 
constituencies, and the absence of pre-existing legislation that could justify the 
adoption of such measures.  The national immigrant organisations, which comprised 
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the EUMF also lacked the communication and policy drafting skills to advance the 
norm cascade.  
To summarise, besides stating that domestic norm entrepreneurs are able to 
further regional norm diffusion, it is imperative to note that who the domestic norm 
entrepreneurs are is just as important because not all domestic norm entrepreneurs 
possess the ability to move the norm forward. Political and legal elites unlike other 
domestic actors are successful in advancing their normative goals because they have 
the necessary experience, training and technical expertise to communicate with and 
insert their agenda in the workings of relevant regional institutions.  
From this analysis it also becomes clear that the demand for race legislation 
on the European level originated from concerns for the equal treatment of EU 
nationals with a special concern for the civil rights of first and second generation 
non-white immigrants who were already citizens. The realisation that such measures 
could benefit EU minorities, and the Roma in particular, came several years after the 
adoption of the Race Equality Directive in the context of the eastward enlargement 
and the familiarisation of the EU institutions with the depth and extensiveness of the 
social and political exclusion of the Roma. 
The Race Equality Directive 
 This section examines the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the first 
race anti-discrimination measures in EU law and the contents of the legislation. I 
argue that the expedited manner in which the directive was passed limited the 
required discussions about the nature of the law, which meant that the national 
governments of the member, states save the few which already had similar 
legislation, were largely unaware of the principles of the law that they were 
committing to incorporate into their national legislative systems. This, as will be 
demonstrated in the subsequent chapters, has contributed to turning the norm 
transposition into a controversial and contested process especially in those member 
and candidate states where anti-discrimination legislation did not exist previously. 
The section also highlights the similarities between UK and EU anti-discrimination 
law as further evidence of the cascading process, in particular the influence of British 
anti-discrimination legislation on the Race Equality Directive.  
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In light of the changes that came with Article 13, the SLG unveiled a second 
proposal in 1998, the new Starting Line Directive, the blueprint for the Race 
Equality Directive, which was adopted shortly after the SLG presented the draft to 
the European Council. The uncharacteristically quick adoption of the directive 
cannot be explained solely by SLG's lobbying efforts. According to Mark Bell, as in 
the British case legislators felt that the restrictive trend of EU immigration policies 
had to be legitimised and counter-balanced by the promotion of anti-racist 
integrationist measures (2002: 66-67). The most often cited event that served as the 
immediate trigger for RED's adoption was the forming of an Austrian coalition 
government in February 2000 in which the extreme-right Freedom Party of Jorg 
Haïder claimed the majority of ministerial posts (Amiraux and Guiraudon, 2010: 
1697).  
The other factor that hastened its adoption was the determination of the 
Portuguese Presidency to complete the negotiations by June 2000 combined with the 
relative insulation of the process from business interests, partisan politics and public 
scrutiny (Geddes and Guiraudon, 2004: 349-351). The process of adoption was 
expedited by the fast-track methods of the Portuguese Presidency, most importantly 
by the agreement of the member states to circumvent the three-week long process of 
translating and sending the proposals to relevant national institutions for 
examination. This method minimised the potential opposition to and stalling of the 
negotiations by national administrations. The expedition of the discussions caught 
business interest groups by surprise and by the time these groups realised that the 
proposed directive contained burden of proof provisions that could have serious 
implications for future litigation against employers, they had mostly missed the 
“negotiation train” (ibid). At the same time, the European Parliament despite its 
consultative role played a greater role since its opinion had to be conveyed to the 
Council before the formal passage of the bill. The Parliament promised a timely 
delivery of its opinion in exchange for a guarantee that some of its recommendations 
for amendment would be taken into account. Since the Parliament was a proponent 
of the SLG draft, it was able to reintroduce some of the SLG provisions left out of 
the Commission version (ibid., 349). 
Unlike in the US and British cases where the government records related to 
the passage of race anti-discrimination measures reveal extensive consultations, 
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hearings and public debates, the adoption of the Race Directive was deliberately 
conducted in a manner designed to bring discussions to a minimum and to further 
limit these to experts thus excluding the very political elites in charge of 
implementing the directive domestically. The developments demonstrate that EU 
bureaucrats were aware of the substantial risk of rejection the proposal could face. 
This shows that the norm may not have reached its threshold of having a sufficient 
number of states and international actors advocate for its acceptance or, as I suggest, 
that norm thresholds are not reliable signifiers meaning that norm diffusion is hardly 
ever a quasi- automatic process that leads to domestic norm internalisation once a 
given number of states commit to norm conformity. Here I subscribe to the second 
hypothesis because following developments demonstrate that even after the norm 
was enshrined into EU law, its transposition was fraught with difficulties coming 
from national governments which either contested their obligation to incorporate the 
norm into national law or subsequently undid the very laws they had already passed 
to institutionalise the norm. In other words, even after all EU member states 
contracted to transpose the directive, which would have meant that the norm 
threshold was unequivocally reached, the norm did not diffuse across the region 
quasi-automatically as the norm life cycle model predicts, which suggests that the 
norm threshold is not a reliable marker that signals the ensuing of a non-reversible 
and non-challenged norm cascade (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 901-902). 
Yet, a cascade did ensue although not in the manner the life norm cycle 
model predicts. As already stated, domestic experts amongst whom norm 
entrepreneurs with the British Commission for Racial Equality were very active, not 
international organisations per se were responsible for the drafting of the Race 
Directive and the content of the document reflects their experiences and knowledge. 
The wording in the directive proposal, as those involved in the process observe, was 
much closer to the existing Community legislation against gender discrimination, in 
particular with regards to the principles of direct and indirect discrimination and the 
sharing of the burden of proof, than the original Starting Line (Niessen and Chopin, 
2004: 103). By borrowing extensively from the sex discrimination legislation the 
SLG, as one of the key drafters noted, tried "to avoid pointless discussions about 
terminology" and to put pressure on the member states with the argument that they 
"cannot...backtrack by reneging on these principles which have already been agreed, 
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refusing victims of racism the protection accorded to women (Chopin, 1999: 4). For 
example, SLG's definition of indirect discrimination was drawn from Article 2 of the 
1997 Directive on the Burden of Proof while the provision for the shift of the burden 
of proof was influenced by Article 4 of the same directive (ibid., 5).The approach 
adopted by the SLG with respect to the arguments they employed to justify and 
promote their proposal highlights the power of strategic framing in persuading and 
even pressuring the EU institutions to adopt a version similar to the SLG draft into 
European law.  
Direct influences from the UK legislation can also be detected. The directive 
recognises positive action with a view to ensuring equality in practice but just like 
UK law makes such measures voluntary (RED, 2000, Art. 5). While heavily 
dependent on preceding EU law, the directive is also innovative and challenging as it 
goes beyond previous directives regarding its scope and enforcement mechanisms. 
Restricting its scope to the field of employment would have been a simple and 
uncontroversial task for the norm entrepreneurs since most member states at the time 
had developed some legislation granting such protection at national level. Yet, since 
the norm entrepreneurs understood discrimination as performed in everyday life 
situations not exclusive to the workplace, the directive’s scope was very broad 
covering and going beyond the fields outlined in UK’s race relations legislation. The 
idea for mandating anti-discrimination bodies to carry out the competencies outlined 
in the directive (Art. 13) was also borrowed from domestic anti-discrimination 
legislation.   
The Race Equality Directive incorporates key legal principles and 
mechanisms that were first articulated and designed by US political elites and 
subsequently brought over and codified into UK law by progressive norm promoters 
there. These legal transplants, the analysis shows, have become a part of EU anti-
discrimination law through the efforts of the SLG in which British experts played an 
important role in crafting. The EU case study demonstrates the existence of a 
regional cascade that unfolded contrary to Finnemore and Sikkink’s model, because 
of differences in the types of driving agents and the irrelevance of the notion of norm 
threshold to the successful cascading of new norms. 
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Post-threshold norm cascading  
The transposition of the 2000 directives into national law across the 28 
member states represents an unprecedented attempt at the 'Europeanization' of anti-
discrimination law. Although space does not allow an extensive analysis of the 
transposition process across the different countries, several observations should be 
made because they validate the claim that norm cascades should not be presented as 
faits accomplis once a new norm has reached a tipping point. The European case in 
the post-RED adoption period shows that the subsequent norm diffusion faced 
serious challenges from national governments and required EU institutions to resort 
to coercive measures to bring about the directive’s transposition.  
The latest report from the Commission on the implementation of the Race 
Equality and Employment Directives shows some of the challenges the norm has 
encountered in its post-threshold phase. Over five years after RED’s adoption, the 
Commission launched infringement proceedings against 25 member states due to 
delayed transposition and non-conformity of national legislation with the directive 
(European Commission, 2014: 3).  
 The principal reason for the non-compliance stemmed from the reluctance of 
the national governments especially of new member states to recognise the principle 
of racial equality. The lack of political will to embrace the norm especially within 
the new member states has disrupted the cascade. Interviews with representatives 
from national employment agencies, trade unions and employers from these states 
show a tendency to question the necessity of the directive because it was considered 
that discrimination was not actually a significant problem (EU FRA, 2011:10). The 
interviewees from the new member states, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 
reports, tended to view “anti-discrimination legislation as part of a ‘western Europe 
package’ of ‘exotic’ issues forced upon them from the outside” (2010: 10). Some 
expressed the opinion that the implementation of the directive was “a question of 
time and that the new Member States needed time to ‘catch up’” (ibid). Other 
respondents denied the existence of ethnic discrimination in their countries, 
particularly in relation to their Roma minority, by suggesting that the poor labour 
market position of the Roma population was a consequence of individual 
characteristics (ibid). This position is also held by current prominent political elites 
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in the FIDESZ government in Hungary and by former and current representatives of 
the Czech government (interview with a former Hungarian commissioner 
responsible for school integration, 2014, interview with the Hungarian Minster of 
State for Social Inclusion, 2014 and interview with a senior official from the Czech 
Ministry of Education, 2014). This failure to acknowledge discrimination and the 
motives behind it stand in apparent contrast to the behaviour of political elites in the 
early phases of the First Reconstruction, during the Second Reconstruction and 
during the liberal hour of British race relations. The American and British political 
elites framed racial equality and the protection of their racial minorities as an issue of 
national priority. The political elites in new EU member states tend to downplay or 
simply reject the racial equality norm. The reasons for this are complex and have to 
do with the uneven pressure the European institutions applied on these states, the 
mixed attitudes towards the norm by influential actors within European institutions, 
the high political cost of norm conformity for the domestic elites and their resistance 
to norm socialising processes. These issues are analysed in considerable detail in 
chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis.  
 Other contributing although markedly less significant factors that explain the 
non-uniform and problematic norm diffusion have to do with the novelty of the 
legislation and with particulars of the directive itself, which make it difficult to 
respond effectively to the needs of different domestic contexts. In her comparative 
assessment of the implementation process in eight countries, Valérie Guiraudon 
concludes that although the EU directives created a thin layer of Europeanization 
they came "up against legal and mobilization cultures that are not always compatible 
with the concepts and procedures introduced" (2009: 535). The new concepts of 
indirect discrimination and the shift of the burden of proof in some cases were 
simply inserted within pre-existing legal structures revealing a hasty 'cut and paste' 
approach to implementation. The option for positive action was also rarely included 
in national legislation (Guiraudon, 2009: 539). The compliance with the requirement 
for the designation of independent equality bodies has also caused concern in certain 
instances. Ensuring public visibility and independence from the national government 
have remained elusive as in many cases equality bodies are both a part of their 
respective ministry and lack autonomy and tangible powers (Bell, 2008b). Most of 
these transposition issues are considered the result of unfamiliarity of the 
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implementing policy makers with anti-discrimination law (European Commission, 
2014: 3). 
Another relevant issue to consider is the design of the Race Equality 
Directive. RED was drafted in a context concerned with the integration of 
immigrants. No reference was made either in the SLG draft or the Commission 
proposal to historic national minorities or the Roma. In the new member states, 
however, ethnic discrimination is commonly associated with such national minorities 
and the Roma communities making it questionable how well the formal transposition 
of RED could actually also be an effective response to local situations. It is debatable 
whether the enactment of the race legislation could provide a useful framework for 
the development of national policy tools for the redress of the structural 
discrimination these minorities face. Segregation is a persistent problem for Romani 
communities in many areas such as education and housing in most of the new 
member states (Bell, 2008b: 38). Yet, segregation is not explicitly addressed in RED 
and neither is institutional racism. Moreover, RED's individual rights model of 
enforcement in which the case must be brought forward by the victim, cannot 
adequately address structural inequalities and could hardly be a sufficient instrument 
to halt the practice of systemic discrimination against the Roma.  
Jurisprudence building at the European level  
Here I examine the race anti-discrimination jurisprudence-building at the 
European level by focusing on the case of D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic 
(2007) in which the European Court of Human Rights for the first time found 
violation of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity.  I claim that although significant 
in terms of legal developments, the D.H. case does not constitute a Brown v. Board 
of Education moment for the largest historically and systemically discriminated 
minority in Europe. I argue that the weakness of the case law lies in 1) the 
formulation of the judgment, which unlike Brown was not unanimous and a 
significant number of judges wrote strong dissenting opinions displaying opposition 
to the norm and 2) the judges opted for the recognition of indirect instead of direct 
discrimination which suggests non-intentionality and can be perceived as a ‘lesser’ 
or more innocuous form of discrimination. I demonstrate that the questioning and 
debating of the race anti-discrimination norm within the panel of ECtHR judges 
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weakens the norm and reduces its chances for successful cascading and domestic 
acceptance. 
The section briefly outlines the domestic developments of the D.H. case 
before engaging in an analysis of the ECtHR Second Section and Grand Chamber 
judgments.  The analysis suggests that from a legal point, the case has been qualified 
as landmark and ground-breaking – Europe’s Brown v. Board of Education 
equivalent – because of the recognition of indirect discrimination evident in the de 
facto existence of two separate systems of education in the Czech Republic, one for 
children from the Czech ethnic majority and another inferior system for children 
from Romani ethnicity (Goodwin, 2009 and Grand Chamber Judgment, 2007: Para. 
207-210). However, a closer examination of the verdict reveals substantial 
differences with the Brown verdict: these include a softer language and absence of 
strong statements affirming equality of the kind found in in the American judgment. 
Ultimately, the aim of the analysis is to uncover the norm contestation processes that 
take place within norm enterprising structures that subvert norm diffusion. The 
analysis further showcases the arguments and attitudes of Czech national elites and 
helps shed light on the factors that perpetuate racial and ethnic discrimination in the 
country. 
The case of D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic: domestic developments (1999-2000) 
The launch of the case began in 1999 when the Soros-funded European Roma 
Rights Center sent researchers to the Czech city of Ostrava to collect data on the 
school enrolment of Romani children in the city’s schools. The timing and country 
selection for the anti-discrimination lawsuit were not coincidental. The Czech 
national elites were facing mounting international pressure over Romani asylum-
seekers, the scandal over the apartheid wall in Usti nad Labem had broken out, and 
the Czech Republic was preparing for EU accession. More generally, the ERRC 
legal director James Goldston explains that the Czech Republic was chosen because 
it was perceived as the poster-child of the post-communist region in terms of its 
relative wealth and enlightened view of human rights (2008: 2). It was in that 
context, that the ERRC assisted by a network of advocacy organizations7 set up the 
                                                          
7Minority Rights Group International, the European Network Against Racism, the European Roma 
Information Office, the Roma Education Fund, the European Early Childhood Education Research 
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D.H. lawsuit which became a litmus test both for the actual commitment of Czech 
authorities to the anti-discrimination norm vis-a-vis its Romani minority and for the 
commitment of the European Court Human Rights towards the protection of 
vulnerable minorities from discrimination.  
The lawsuit alleged that the Romani applicants were placed in special schools 
for children with intellectual deficiencies on account of their Romani ethnicity 
without objective justification. The plaintiffs first lodged an application with the 
Ostrava Educational Authority to reconsider the special school placement, which the 
local administrators denied claiming that the assignment of the children to special 
schools did not violate the law. Subsequently, the claimants filed an appeal with the 
Czech Constitutional Court claiming that they were de facto discriminated against 
through their placement in special schools resulting from the general state of the 
educational system and far exceeding their individual interests (ECtHR, 2005). The 
Ministry of Education denied any discrimination transferring the blame onto the 
children’s parents who the officials framed as having the tendency “to have a rather 
negative attitude to school work” (ECtHR, 2006: Para. 16). Essentially, the 
Constitutional Court also placed the blame onto the parents citing their consent as 
the decisive factor for the special school placement. The Court dismissed the appeal 
partly on the grounds that it was unfounded and partly because it claimed a lack of 
competence to hear the case. 
The domestic developments show that the norm faced rigid opposition from 
local and national elites. In both cases, the relevant authorities refused to form an 
independent investigation to assess the allegations preferring to revert to denial of 
existing discrimination and to prevailing stereotypes related to Romani lack of 
interest in and negative attitude to education. Even the highest national court 
divested itself from responsibility by refusing to examine the case. The case 
dismissal demonstrates that the judiciary affirmed the status quo of the double 
standard educational system through inaction. Although at the time the Czech 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Association, the International Step by Step Association, Interights and Human Rights Watch acted as 
third-party interveners in the lawsuit. Their research was supplemented by the testimony of a 
myriad of educational and other experts from the USA, the UK, and the Czech Republic among 
others (see Application presented by D.H and Others against the Czech Republic, available at 
http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=3559. See also the third-party comments submitted by the listed 
advocacy organisations at http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=3559 [accessed on 12 January 2016]).  
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Republic did not have national law explicitly prohibiting discrimination in education, 
if willing, the Court could have applied the Strasbourg legal standards for proving 
racial discrimination under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights  
which had been binding on the Czech Republic for seven years at the time.  
D.H. developments at the European level: the ECtHR Second Section Judgment 
(2006) 
 This section traces the case developments at the supranational level. It draws 
attention to the arguments of the pro-Roma transnational norm entrepreneurs and the 
response of the Czech government before turning to assess the verdict of the Second 
Section. The analysis finds that the unfavourable verdict was due to the 
unwillingness of the Strasbourg judges to broach the subject of institutional 
discrimination preferring to examine the circumstances of the individual applicants 
in isolation from the wider context. More significantly, many of the judges on the 
panel who came from the new member states opted to give the Czech Government a 
large margin of appreciation in the way it ran its educational system. The judgment 
encapsulates the prejudicial attitudes of some members of the judiciary and reveals 
the marked reluctance of the panel to uphold Article 14 of the ECHR (prohibition of 
discrimination) despite the ample evidence offered before it by the petitioners, 
educational experts, and other Council of Europe bodies. Ultimately, the judgment 
reveals the arduous process of embedding the norm into European case law and 
sheds light on the negative impact the judges’ initial rejection and ambivalence 
toward applying the legal norm to the Roma minority has had upon domestic norm 
acceptance processes. 
By the time the case made its way to Strasbourg, the placement of Romani 
children in special schools in CEE states had become a common target of criticisms 
by NGOs and European bodies. Mounting evidence detailed the extent and the depth 
of the exclusion of Romani children from mainstream education.8 Anthony Lester, 
one of the main experts behind UK’s Race Relations Acts and James Goldston, an 
                                                          
8 See HCHR. 2006. Report on the human rights situation of the Roma, Sinti, and Travellers in Europe. 
15 February 2006; CoE. 2005. Report submitted by the Czech Republic pursuant to Article 25, 
Paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. (2nd cycle); CoE. 
2002. Recommendation No. 1557. The legal situation of Roma in Europe; ERRC. 2004. Stigmata: 
segregated schooling of Roma in Central and Easter Europe, a survey of patterns of segregated 
education in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia.  
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American lawyer with expert knowledge about his country’s civil rights litigation 
history, argued the case before the Court. The main goal of the ERRC and its 
transnational partners as is the norm with most strategic litigation was not to seek 
remedy for the individual applicants but to persuade the judges to rule against the 
systemic practice of educational segregation of Czech Roma children. The objective 
of the lawsuit was threefold: 1) using the European judiciary, the legal experts 
sought to pressure the Czech Republic to amend its education law and take steps 
towards desegregation; 2) by arguing for the existence of ethnic discrimination in the 
Czech educational system, the norm entrepreneurs sought to set a precedent to 
delegitimize the structural discrimination, which although not legalized is de facto 
normalized in governmental and social structures across CEE states with Romani 
populations; and 3) the lawyers expected that a positive ruling would have wider 
implications by paving the way for desegregation in other areas (employment, 
housing, etc.) 
The language and arguments of the petitioners clearly show the intent of the 
norm entrepreneurs to seek effective remedy not for the individual Romani children 
but to invalidate the entire educational system of the Czech Republic. Very little in 
the case documents deals with the personal circumstances of the applicants. The case 
architects instead sketched broadly the social context of institutionalised racism in 
which the Romani minority lives selecting evidence that established a national 
pattern of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity. The core evidence that 
substantiated the plaintiffs’ claims were Czech municipal and national statistics 
along with ERRC’s own data which revealed that Romani children were 27 times 
more likely to end up in special schools than those of the main ethnic group (ERRC, 
2000: 15-17). Borrowing from the techniques of the NAACP lawyers who 
orchestrated Brown, the ERRC brought in world renowned experts on the 
overrepresentation of minorities in special education who upon examining the 
statistics concluded that the representation of Roma students in special schools was 
unprecedented, and was itself prima facie evidence of racial segregation and 
discrimination (ERRC, 2000: 15-17 and Goldhaber, 2007: 161). 
The ERRC used evidence from Czech educators and local and state officials 
to illustrate a situation of school segregation that results from a historically 
maintained societal belief in the intellectual and/or socio-cultural inferiority of the 
Roma minority as an ethnic group, which finds tangible expression in the actions of 
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local officials to assign Romani children to special schools. The ERRC argued that 
the disproportionate representation of Romani children in special schools for those 
with mental disability primarily stemmed from the dominant understanding of the 
meaning of Czech ethnicity. In the words of the ERRC legal team, “being ethnic 
Czech means being treated as “normal”...Czech society maintains an official 
commitment to race- and ethnic- neutrality...However, it is no secret that being 
Roma in Czech society means existing within a social category that carries many 
negative connotations...of laziness, of not wanting to work, of criminality, of 
stupidity, of violence, and of not being sufficiently concerned about the education of 
their children...Indeed, the fact that school and government officials for so long have 
tolerated disproportionate placement of Roma students in special schools...itself 
reveals a complacent acceptance of those disproportions built on the “ inherent” 
intellectual inferiority of Roma” (ERRC, 2000: 45). The post-communist period, 
witnesses also testified, had brought new economic incentives for preserving the 
status quo as special schools’ administrators used Roma children to fill the student 
quota to prevent school closures (ibid., 48).  More broadly this status quo was said to 
be maintained by official tolerance at the national level despite the common 
knowledge that the majority of Romani students in those schools do not have a 
mental disability. 
The ERRC further built the case by citing evidence from Council of Europe 
documents to add weight to the claims about quasi-automatic transfer of Romani 
children in special schools, the subjectivity, cultural insensitivity and inappropriate 
administration of psychological tests used to determine the placement of Romani 
children in these schools and the inferior tuition the children received, which in 
practice precluded the majority of children from returning to mainstream schools 
(ibid., 24-26 and 34).   
The manner in which European jurisprudence-building related to the race 
anti-discrimination norm has taken place comes closest to conforming to the pre-
threshold norm diffusion stage of the norm life cycle model. Just as the model 
suggests, we see a group of transnational norm entrepreneurs led by the ERRC using 
its power of persuasion to convince an international organisation to recognise the 
new norm and in turn use its own mechanisms to stimulate norm diffusion at the 
domestic level (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 898-899). Even here, however, there 
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are evident links with domestic norm entrepreneurship and the historical processes 
analysed in the earlier chapters.  
To restate, Anthony Lester who argued the case before the Grand Chamber 
was instrumental in the design of UK’s race relations legislation and both Lester and 
Goldston, the chief case architect, were heavily influenced by the litigation strategy 
of American civil rights lawyers. Morag Goodwin (2004) whose research examines 
the way in which pro-Romani norm entrepreneurs use the strategies and techniques 
developed over the course of the American civil rights movement, claims that the 
influence the American civil rights approach has had on jurisprudence-building 
related to the discrimination of the Roma minority in CEE is profound. She 
substantiates her claims by pointing out that the majority of pro-Roma legal counsels 
had been trained by influential American human rights lawyers including the 
President of the NAACP (Goodwin, 2004: 1437). She highlights similarities in the 
focus of the work since much of ERRC’s legal efforts attempt to combat segregation 
in education just like the Brown lawyers did employing the same methods of using 
statistical evidence and well-known experts to construct a convincing case (ibid. 
1437-1440). Goodwin’s comparative analysis shows how the pro-Roma legal experts 
sought to transplant legal strategies from the American to the European context with 
the goal of producing normative change through legal means. The developments 
continue to highlight both the importance of domestic norm entrepreneurs who 
embed themselves and their experience into transnational advocacy coalitions and 
the significance of the American experience which has impacted the course of 
Strasbourg case law related to racial anti-discrimination. 
 Returning to the case it is important to point out that the Czech government’s 
response to the ERRC arguments was less persuasive mainly because the statements 
used to address the claimants’ allegations were contradictory. The lawyers for the 
state justified the children’s placement in special schools on procedural grounds. In 
other words, they alleged that state authorities had followed the proper procedure 
(psychological assessment and the obtainment of parental consent) for assessing 
mental deficiency, which did not involve the consideration of the student’s ethnic 
background (ECtHR, 2006: 11). This was contradicted by statements in which the 
Czech legal counsel stated that the lack of school preparedness of Romani children 
was often due to their disadvantaged socio-cultural environment and was dealt with, 
in part, by their placement in special schools (ECtHR, 2005: 14). Although this did 
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not represent an explicit admission of ethnic discrimination, it did indicate both 
awareness that many Romani children did not suffer from mental disability and 
denigrated their cultural difference. The clearest example of the prejudicial attitude 
the Czech government displayed is contained in its remark to the ECtHR, “The 
Government emphasizes that thanks to the existing system [of special schools], the 
vast majority of Roma children are literate and have had a complete elementary 
education." (ibid.,15) This affirmation of the use of special schools as a tool for 
educating Romani children along with parental blame9 demonstrated the normality of 
institutional racism amongst Czech bureaucrats and the comment even contained a 
hint of pride at the ‘achievement’ of ensuring a level of literacy for Roma children. 
Despite the extensive evidence the ERRC presented to the panel, the judges 
almost unanimously (one judge disagreed) found no violation of Article 14 
(prohibition of discrimination) in conjunction of Article 2 of Protocol 1 (right to 
education) of the Convention. In its reasoning, the Court maintained that the Czech 
Republic had managed to convince the judges that the system of special schools was 
not introduced solely to cater for Romani students and stressed that states should 
have a wide margin of appreciation to set up different schools for children with 
different educational needs. Importantly, the Court limited itself to the specific 
situation of the individual applicants and thus ignored most of the evidence presented 
by the ERRC including national and regional school statistics, reports and 
recommendations by its own advisory bodies, ECRI and the FCNM Advisory 
Committee, about patterns of systemic ethnic discrimination in the Czech 
educational system (ECtHR, 2006: 15-16). 
James Goldston has commented that it was not coincidental that the judges 
from CEE states on the panel voted against recognition of discrimination 
(Goldhaber, 2007: 165).  Although one must be cautious in suggesting a link 
between the judges’ country of origin and their decision, it is striking that all of the 
CEE judges sided with the Czech government. The Court’s position ultimately 
affirmed the status quo and failed to recognise the norm. The case outcome 
demonstrates that international organisations which the Finnemore and Sikkink 
model characterises as powerful norm entrepreneurs are not monolithic and cohesive 
                                                          
9The Government argued that it must not be held responsible for an “indifferent” and “passive” 
attitude of Romani parents.   
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entities and can struggle with norm ambivalence and norm contestation within their 
own structures.  
 
D.H. developments at the European level: the ECtHR Grand Chamber Judgment 
(2007)  
In November 2007 the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR overturned on appeal 
the previous decision by finding that the assignment of Romani children to special 
schools amounted to indirect discrimination on ethnic grounds in the Czech 
educational system. In doing so, Goodwin remarks, “the Court appeared to have at 
last ceased to drag its feet in the area of non-discrimination and fully aligned itself 
with a progressive European normative framework” (Goodwin, 2009: 93). At first 
glance, it may seem that the judgment represents a landmark moment, a Brown v. 
Board of Education equivalent in European anti-discrimination jurisprudence with 
significant implications for the institutionalisation of the anti-discrimination norm in 
the Czech Republic and the rest of Europe’s norm violating states.   
The new judgment was six times longer than the previous decision. Although 
length alone is not enough to draw meaningful conclusions about the quality of the 
judgment when taken along with other indicators, it shows that the Strasbourg bench 
saw the case as being central to defining the Court, its vision and purpose (Goodwin, 
2009: 99). The decision revealed a markedly different approach the Grand Chamber 
adopted in its deliberations. Unlike the exceptionally narrow focus of the Second 
Section, the Grand Chamber acknowledged the wider national and regional context, 
which is evidenced by the seriousness with which the Court examined the data 
provided by the NGOs’ submissions, Council of Europe sources, Community law, 
UN anti-discrimination standards, and seminal UK and US cases of racial 
discrimination. Instead of basing their judgment on the individual circumstances of 
the Romani children, the Court established that the applicants had been treated 
unequally because the relevant national legislation as applied in practice had a 
systemic “disproportionately prejudicial effect on the Roma community” in the 
Czech state (ECtHR, 2007: Para. 209). The Court not only recognised indirect 
discrimination in Czech schools but went as far as declaring that although the 
decision is legally binding only on the Czech Republic, this is a problem of a 
European scope setting a precedent that Roma (and other minority groups) in similar 
predicaments from other member states could use in domestic courts. 
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Despite the euphoria surrounding the verdict, the D.H. case has fallen short 
of constituting a Brown v. Board of Education moment for Europe’s Roma and the 
ECtHR. Some legal experts have questioned the sincerity and commitment of the 
judges to the decision. They have pointed that the weight afforded to the third party 
submissions, especially those produced by CoE advisory bodies, suggests that some 
pressure may have been exercised upon the Grand Chamber to raise the profile of the 
issue and add gravity to the ECRI and FCNM Advisory Committee demands for 
substantive educational equality (Farkas, 2008: 54-55). 
More significantly, the judges opted to present the discrimination 
experienced by Romani children as indirect, instead of direct, meaning that no proof 
of intent was required. This contributed to the perception that the discrimination in 
the Czech educational system was non-intentional and consequently nobody was to 
blame as it simply resulted from measures created in a neutral fashion by the Czech 
authorities that happened to have a disparate impact upon the Roma. The applicants, 
however, argued the case on the basis of direct (intentional) as well as indirect 
discrimination because they alleged that the creation of the educational tests and the 
analysis of test results were not done in a neutral fashion. In other words, the 
claimants argued that the Czech authorities plainly acted in a discriminatory manner 
on the ground of ethnicity, as explained in a European Commission report (European 
Commission, 2007: Ch. 2.3). By refraining from finding direct discrimination, the 
Strasbourg bench considerably lessened the impact of the case. 
Unlike Brown, the ECtHR judgment is silent on the harm done to children 
who have been placed in special schools. It did not address the irreparable 
psychological damage and the social stigma children in such schools experience nor 
did it consider their long-term impact. The only place, in which harm in terms of the 
school placement is discussed, is to determine the non-pecuniary damages for the 
children, whose meagre amount appears to be more a symbolic token than a well-
considered effort at compensation. Moreover, in a case that concerns the de facto 
segregation of children in educational establishments, the word segregation is never 
mentioned. In Goodwin’s words, the Grand Chamber “denied itself the opportunity 
to echo the US Supreme Court in declaring that segregation per se is invidiously 
evil” (2009:102). Absent from the judgment are the powerful statements found in 
Brown concerning the developmental retardation and sense of inferiority resulting 
from segregation and the all-important call for a racially integrated school system. 
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The clearest indication of the continued norm contestation within the Grand 
Chamber is the non-unanimous vote in favour of the violation of the Convention 
anti-discrimination clause. While in Brown the US Supreme Court issued a 
unanimous call for school desegregation, four judges voted against the Grand 
Chamber decision. All of them submitted caustic dissenting opinions, which 
revealed the depth of disagreement the norm evoked within an institution designed to 
uphold it (ECtHR, 2007). Judge Borrego Borrego was dissatisfied with the new 
approach of the Court, which he believed risked turning it into another ECRI instead 
of focusing on the individual case (ibid., Para.7). Judge Zupančič from Slovenia 
claimed that “the Court in this case has been brought into play for ulterior purposes” 
and implied that it would have been better for the Czech Republic not to try to tackle 
the education of Romani children at all but to act with “benign neglect” leaving them 
without the opportunity to access any school (ibid., 76). Judge Šikuta from Slovakia 
echoed the claim and continued insisting that the onus of school placement rested 
with the parents (ibid., 86-88). The Czech Judge Jungwiert expectedly was the most 
vocal critic of the verdict. According to his questionable reasoning, inegalitarianism 
in the Czech educational system was justified because it had a positive aim namely 
to get Romani children to go to school to have a chance at success (ibid., 81). The 
opinions of these judges subvert the anti-discrimination norm and effectively argue 
that parallel and unequal educational systems represent an acceptable way to ensure 
schooling for Romani children.   
Related to implementation, the judges did not give the CoE Committee of 
Ministers, whose role is to supervise the implementation of the verdict, a mandate to 
request specific changes in the national legislation and educational structure. In line 
with the principle of wide margin of appreciation, the Court allowed the Czech 
government to decide on the measures it would undertake to remedy the problem 
(ibid., Para. 216). Consequently, it denied the Committee of Ministers the 
opportunity to push harder for effective and expedient reforms (Devroye, 2009: 96-
97). These omissions denote hesitancy on behalf of the judges and ambivalence 
about how far the Court’s norm commitment should stretch. The judges’ 
ambivalence ultimately turned what initially appeared to be a landmark decision into 
a verdict without teeth. 
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Conclusion  
 This chapter traced the diffusion processes that institutionalised the race anti-
discrimination norm at the European level. The empirical evidence suggests that 
although the formulation of the European race anti-discrimination legislation and 
case law was largely driven by transnational advocacy networks, the main norm 
entrepreneurs within these networks came from domestic elites who had either 
played a key part in domestic norm creation and institutionalisation or experts with 
strong links to influential domestic norm entrepreneurs and familiarity with the 
American and British race relations experiences.   
 The chapter also demonstrated that the norm threshold is not a reliable 
indicator, which once attained guarantees a quasi-automatic norm cascade. The 
transposition of the Race Equality Directive has shown that even when all states 
within a particular group or region (not just one third as the model stipulates) 
formally commit themselves to uphold a new norm, the cascade process can be 
delayed and contested (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 901). European case law 
developments have also problematised the predicted behaviour of international norm 
entrepreneurs. The actions of the Strasbourg judges show that international 
organisations are not cohesive bodies that speak with one voice about new norm 
promotion. Contradictory opinions about the validity of new norms and direct 
opposition to their recognition within the international structures designed to uphold 
them are issues the norm life cycle model does not take into consideration and thus 
creates an inaccurate presentation of these bodies as monolithic and influential norm 
entrepreneurs that strive to ensure a rapid cascade (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 
902). The empirical evidence disproves this and suggests instead that norm 
contestation within institutions at the supranational level contributes to norm defying 
behaviour by domestic political elites tasked with incorporating the norm into their 
states’ legislative frameworks. The next chapter which traces the institutionalisation 
of the race anti-discrimination norm in the Czech Republic and specifically examines 
the compliance of the Czech government with the Strasbourg verdict, will shed 
further light on the factors that hinder domestic conformity and the theoretical gaps 
in the internalisation stage of the norm life cycle model.  
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Chapter Four 
Domestic norm internalisation I: Roma politics in the Czech Republic 
So far the thesis has evaluated the emergence and cascading stages of 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle model. I have argued that the model is not 
designed to analyse situations where the new norm is initially constructed at the 
domestic level prior to its internationalisation because it focuses on norm 
development in an international context and therefore does not concern itself with 
the study of domestic agents and structures. I have claimed that a complementary 
approach that examines the role of domestic factors, and national elites in particular, 
is necessary because the latter have a determinate role in the subsequent 
instutionalisation of new norms into law and institutional practice. I have also 
claimed that these norm entrepreneurs are driven by ideational and instrumental 
motives which when in convergence heighten the agentiality of norm promoters. 
The evaluation of the cascading stage of the race anti-discrimination norm 
demonstrated that domestic elites can continue to be important driving mechanisms 
of norm diffusion as a part of or together with transnational norm entrepreneurs. In 
certain instances, as the UK case has shown, they can drive the process entirely on 
their own. The EU case study has further demonstrated that the norm threshold 
indicator is not a useful tool for determining the success of a cascade as even in 
situations when all states within a region, in this case the European Union, formally 
agree to recognise a new norm the actual process is fraught with difficulties resulting 
from unfulfilled and partly fulfilled commitments.  
The next two chapters continue to trace the journey of the race anti-
discrimination norm by analysing the factors that determine the level of domestic 
norm internalisation and the motives that drive the norm enterprising agents in this 
phase. This chapter analyses norm internalisation developments in the Czech context 
by tracing anti-discrimination legislation and its implementation vis-à-vis the 
Romani minority because although not numerous, the Roma have historically faced 
the highest degree of ethnic discrimination and social exclusion in the country. In 
this and the next chapters I trace the process of domestic norm acceptance in order to 
identify the factors that determine the degree of norm institutionalisation in the 
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Czech Republic and Hungary. I do that by building upon the wider literature on 
international norms and international law in domestic politics by analysing how the 
agency of domestic political elites and how domestic structural factors influence the 
degree of norm institutionalisation (Checkel, 1997, Simmons, 2009, Sikkink, 2005 
and Cortell and Davis, 1996 and 2005). Here I do not engage with the norm life 
cycle model because its main objective is to sketch out international norm diffusion 
rather than to explain the process of domestic norm acceptance.  As the norm life 
cycle model does not set out to analyse domestic politics, it jumps from norm 
cascading to a potential third phase, deep internalisation, without explaining the 
conditions under which such taken-for-granted norm embeddedness can be achieved 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 904-905). My goal is to shed light on the domestic 
processes of norm internalisation and to clarify the conditions under which human 
rights norms can become institutionalised in the domestic order of states.  
The Czech case suggests that the behaviour of national political elites is key 
in determining the success or failure of a new norm’s institutionalisation. The 
analysis shows that in the Czech Republic influential elites from the three branches 
of the government contested the racial anti-discrimination norm. Their behaviour has 
prevented the cascading and internalisation of the norm into legislation, institutional 
practices and the wider domestic social and political order. The legislative and 
executive branches challenged the norm by constructing a citizenship law that 
disproportionately denaturalised Romani individuals and by opposing the 
transposition of the Race Equality Directive in domestic law. The judiciary has 
remained reluctant to uphold the social and political rights of Czech Roma citizens. 
Based on the empirical evidence I continue to advance the claim that even in 
situations when a new norm becomes codified into regional institutions and 
legislation and national governments agree to recognise the norm, cascading and 
internalisation can be seriously disrupted when national political elites renege on 
their formal commitment.  
These findings support Kathryn Sikkink’s work on the interaction of 
domestic and international opportunity structures (2005). Sikkink’s multilevel 
governance model stipulates that when domestic opportunity structures are seen as 
closed and international opportunity structures as open, activists tend to seek 
international allies to bring pressure upon their government creating a boomerang 
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pattern of interaction (2005: 161-163). In the Czech case, a boomerang pattern is 
evident in the process of the incorporation of the Equality Directives into Czech 
national law and in the implementation of the D.H. judgment. In both instances, 
domestic and transnational norm entrepreneurs and European institutions brought 
pressure upon the Czech government to comply with European law. Sikkink 
hypothesises that this boomerang activism is expected to open up domestic space for 
political activism and change and ultimately domestic political blockages. In the 
Czech case, it is to be seen if, when and how this opening of the domestic political 
opportunity structures will take place. 
 The Czech case also shows that when taken together the nature of the new 
norm and the level at which it is constructed matter for its domestic 
institutionalisation. The US and UK cases have already demonstrated that 
controversial norms that raise questions of citizenship and belonging are more likely 
to be institutionalised and remain uncontested in the long run when advanced by 
justice-driven domestic elites. The Czech case, on the other hand, illustrates that 
controversial norms imposed from institutions at the supranational level are unlikely 
to achieve long-term institutionalisation if the domestic elites are wholly driven by 
instrumental concerns (in this case narrow political interests related to quick EU 
accession). I claim that unlike in the US and UK cases, the Czech elites have had no 
ideational commitment to the race anti-discrimination norm, which has resulted in its 
superficial codification into law and policy that have never been properly 
implemented. In other words, despite the elites elaborate albeit occasional window 
dressing efforts, the norm was never accepted and continues to be exposed to 
institutional and societal contestation and lack of enforcement.  The findings relate to 
Beth Simmons’ observation that the ability of international treaties that bring in new 
norms do change national legislative agendas; however, this legislative change “does 
not speak as such to deeper problems of implementation or enforcement on the 
ground” (2009: 129). This is only possible if the ratifiers are sincere and as noted 
earlier if the branches of the government and the sub-national actors take up the new 
norm (ibid).  
The chapter begins by sketching the policies of the early post-communist 
governments throughout the 1990s that have had a substantial impact on the Roma. 
It is important to start at this point because since the establishment of the Czech state 
115 
 
in 1993, the very first government constructed legislation that stripped many Roma 
residing in the Czech Republic of the rights and protections afforded to them by their 
citizenship and pushed them on the margins of the political and social life in the 
country. The chapter pays particular attention to the formulation and adverse impact 
of the Czech citizenship law, which I argue purposely made large numbers of 
Romani individuals ineligible for Czech citizenship. The analysis shows that 
international pressure to remedy the situation resulted in delayed cosmetic 
amendments to the law which have not resolved the predicament of many of those 
denaturalised persons. This suggests international influence cannot bring about 
substantial normative change when the domestic political elites are hostile to the new 
norm.  
The chapter then turns to the accession period. The examination indicates that 
the Czech elites made considerable efforts at showcasing concern for the Roma 
minority before the international community. This concern was manifested in the 
language of commitment to racial equality especially in EU-related communication 
and the creation of Roma policies and government bodies tasked with Roma 
integration and human rights protection. These efforts, I argue, have been driven by 
instrumental concerns for compliance. They represent an attempt at window dressing 
rather than a normative shift of the ruling elites’ behaviour, which is evident in the 
elites’ language inconsistencies (supporting racial equality before the international 
community and opposing it in their national rhetoric), the non-implementation and 
contestation of the very anti-discrimination and integrative policies that the elites 
created, the design of the main anti-discrimination bodies and their role, which is 
limited to providing anti-discrimination advice and recommendations. The chapter 
concludes by assessing the post-accession situation and confirms the initial claim 
that the norm has never been seriously considered and accepted by the successive 
Czech governments.  Some of the governments have openly opposed it while others 
have been mostly silent due to the norm’s association with a politically unpopular 
cause and its clash with firmly held countervailing domestic norms. The 
developments surrounding the transposition of the Race Equality Directive and the 
implementation of the 2007 D.H. verdict unequivocally display the depth and 
strength of the Czech elites’ resistance to the norm. 
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Norm denial: Roma politics (1993-1997) 
Since the collapse of the communist regime the former assimilationist 
approach towards the Roma minority has been abandoned, nevertheless the political 
consensus on a pathway to an integrated society has not yet been realised. Between 
1989 and 1992 the Czechoslovak policy on minorities and more specifically on 
Roma was characterised by two main formal features. First, the policy on minorities 
that the state adopted was based on the “civic principle” meaning that one group of 
citizens should not enjoy access to more resources or have more rights than another; 
it also meant that the expression of ethnic difference was relegated to the private 
sphere (Vermeersch, 2007: 80). This approach was in sharp contrast with Hungary’s 
minority policy developments at the time which like Czechoslovakia recognised the 
existence of its minorities but also granted them cultural autonomy through the 
system of minority self-governments at the local and national levels (Law LXXVII 
on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities). Secondly, the Romani minority 
was regarded in the same way as the rest of the minorities in Czechoslovakia. This 
meant that the state made no distinction between the position of the Roma vis-à- vis 
that of other minorities (Vermeersch, 2007: 80). 
After the ‘Velvet Divorce’ in 1992 the Czech Republic quickly adopted the 
formal institutions and practices associated with a liberal democracy. The country 
joined the Council of Europe and ratified the ECHR less than a year after its split 
from the federation. Already in 1993, the Czech Republic was ranked “free” 
according to the Freedom House ratings which gave it a score of 1 for political rights 
and 2 for civil liberties.10 As Safia Swimlear (2008) points out, the Czech Republic 
was behaving as a liberal democracy and a supporter of human rights and its political 
elites pointed to these developments as expressions of the new state’s priority to 
reclaim its rightful place in Europe. This perception by both Czechs and foreigners 
was enhanced by the election of the former dissident and Roma champion Vaclav 
Havel as the first Czech president. Havel was well-known in the West as a founding 
member and spokesperson for the dissident group Charter 77, which since its 
establishment in 1977 until the 1980s, amongst its other activities, exposed and 
                                                          
10After the Czech Republic entered the EU in 2004, its ratings were upgraded to a score of 1 for all 
categories. See Freedom House Report. 2005. Available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/czech-republic#.UuWnevvLddg, 
[accessed on 24/11/2014].  
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denounced the human rights abuses and assimilationist policies of the Czechoslovak 
Communist Regime against its Romani population (Charter 77, 1979 and 1979a). 
Havel’s election created the illusion that minority groups including the Roma were 
afforded protection by the new state. The perception was bolstered by Western 
media which presented the Czech state as “a bastion of tolerance and lofty ideals” 
that had easily embraced democratic values (Perlez, 1995). 
Between 1993 and 1997 the situation of the Romani communities was a low 
priority on the government’s policy agenda. Eva Sobotka describes the period as one 
of ‘stagnation and denial’ in which ministerial proposals on Roma issues “were 
barely taken seriously, and ...the Romani issue was downplayed” and inaction was 
justified by authorities on the basis of the civic principle approach (2001a: 6 and 
2001b). At the same time, the exclusion of Roma from public space intensified and 
the minority became a main target of newly formed neo-fascist groups ranging from 
skinhead gangs to the Bilá Liga (White League) and Ku Klux Klan-esque societies 
(Tritt, 1992: 2-3). According to Human Rights Watch (1996), Roma were routinely 
prohibited from accessing public establishments such as swimming pools, pubs and 
restaurants managed by both private parties and the state. The organisation estimates 
that between 1989 and 1995 at least 27 Roma had died as a result of racially 
motivated attacks (ibid). The Czech Helsinki Committee (1994) also observed 
increasing cases of crimes directed at Roma, which it claimed were caused by ethnic 
intolerance. Fawn (2001) theorises that although the Czech government and society 
strove to project an image of a tolerant, open and forward-thinking democratic 
nation, in the early 1990s the Czechs were, in fact, involved in a delayed nation-
building project, which did not provide the political space for a discussion of racial 
equality, inclusivity and integration which are pre-requisites for the creation of a 
multicultural society.  
This narrative suggests that racial equality was not on the agenda of the early 
post-Communist ruling elites. Although the national government officially adopted 
the principle of formal equality through its civic principle approach towards 
minorities, the approach cannot simply be understood as resulting from an attitude of 
benign neglect because it masked an increasing intolerance towards Romani 
individuals manifested in everyday acts of discrimination by private persons and 
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representatives of the state and ethnically motivated violence.11 In the next section, 
through an analysis of the drafting, passage and implementation of the new Czech 
citizenship law I show that the Czech political elite went beyond the official policy 
of benign neglect towards the Roma minority and, in fact, openly engaged in 
discriminatory acts at the highest level. 
The Czech citizenship law 
According to Human Rights Watch (1996), discussions amongst Czech 
political elites on containing the “Gypsy problem” started less than half a year prior 
to the official split of Czechoslovakia and revolved around the perception that Roma 
were largely responsible for an increase of criminal activities. In addition, the Czech 
authorities at the time were concerned with potential emigration of Roma from less 
developed Slovakia and their permanent settlement on Czech territory (ibid). An 
internal government document tellingly entitled, the ‘Catastrophic Scenario’, shows 
that the elites strategized to rid the new state of its now redundant Romani 
population and thus to further divest itself of its responsibilities concerning its 
Romani citizens. The document recommended that the Czech government “should 
use the process [of the split] for the purpose of departure of non-needed persons from 
factories, especially for the reasons of structural changes, and for the departure of 
people of Roma nationality to the Slovak Republic” (quoted in Human Rights 
Watch, 1996, my emphasis). The document reveals that the Czech elites actively and 
intentionally planned the construction of a major piece of legislation that was 
inherently discriminatory on the basis of ethnicity as it specifically targeted the 
Roma minority and aimed to deprive Roma residents from citizenship in the country 
they had been residing in for decades. The eventual law, as the chapter shows, had 
devastating consequences for the Roma population whose situation the Commission 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe qualified as potentially the largest 
denaturalization in Europe since WWII (Perlez, 1995).  
                                                          
11 As previously mentioned, between the fall of Communism and May 1995, Human Rights Watch 
estimates that 27 Roma including children died as a result of racial violence – by beating, knifing, 
drowning, shooting, burning, bombing and garrotting. Yet the government did little to protect the 
Romani citizens. Opinion polls (e.g., Times Mirror) reported worryingly high levels of hostility 
towards the Roma. Everyday discrimination was most visible in the area of employment. Besides 
being the worst affected by the ongoing economic restructuring, the Roma minority suffered from 
relaxation of legal restrictions on employers which allowed the employers to discriminate routinely 
solely on the basis of the applicant’s Romani ethnicity (Will Guy. 2001: 294-295). 
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The law itself was carefully crafted in a way that did not target overtly a 
particular group. On the surface O’Nions notes the law was not particularly unusual 
in the citizenship requirements (2007: 117). It required permanent residence in the 
Czech Republic for the previous 2 years, a clean criminal record for the past 5 years, 
and mastery of the Czech language. However, these pre-requisites for citizenship had 
a devastating impact when applied to the Roma. The Tolerance Foundation (1994) 
estimates that over 20,000 Roma were stripped of their citizenship as a result of the 
new legislation citing the failure of many Romani families to satisfy the residency 
requirement due to sub-standard and overcrowded dwellings that were not 
considered permanent settlements by local authorities. The clean criminal record 
requirement also tellingly known as the ‘Gypsy clause’ had a particularly 
exclusionary effect when applied to Romani individuals (O’Nions, 2007: 117). Since 
the law did not make a distinction between minor and major offences, it has been 
estimated that as many as fifty percent of adult Roma were made stateless because of 
minor infractions (Gross, 1994). The language requirement also impacted negatively 
a high percentage of Roma in comparison with the Czech majority population and 
other well-integrated minorities. Other contributing factors were instances of 
bureaucratic resistance to the registration of Romani individuals as citizens even in 
cases in which they fulfilled the legal requirements and occasional violence, which 
forced some Roma to flee their homes and abandon the registration process 
(O’Nions, 2007: 118).  
The citizenship law according to Papp (1997, 1-3) should be understood as an 
expression of the ethno-centric nature of the Czech understanding of citizenship and 
thus it is inherently discriminatory towards those who are perceived as non-Czechs. 
Holy’s thesis (1996) also advances the claim that belonging to the Czech nation is 
commonly conceptualised as based on ethnicity. In other words, being born on 
Czech territory and speaking Czech is not sufficient; one has to have “Czech 
parents”, a view that makes Czech citizenship exclusionary and effectively precludes 
Roma inclusion. The ethnocentric design of the law also points to the absence of 
influential norm entrepreneurs in the ranks of the national elites tasked with the 
building of the new political order, which stands in contrast to the other cases 
examined so far. It shows that from the very creation of the new state the domestic 
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elites advanced an agenda that perpetuated the historical norm of the social and 
political exclusion of the Romani communities.  
Initially, there was little international criticism against the law, which could 
be explained partly by the poor understanding of the law’s impact upon the Romani 
population, partly by the perception of the Czech Republic as a liberal democracy 
and by the fact that at the time the Roma were not deemed to be a political priority at 
the European level. From 1994 onwards, however, international criticism mounted as 
Czech NGOs (primarily the Czech Helsinki Committee and the Tolerance 
Foundation) provided more information and evidence about the disparate impact of 
the law upon the Roma. The US Congress, the UNHCR and the Council of Europe 
criticised the law for violating established international legal principles and were 
particularly concerned about potential large scale refugee migration resulting from 
the forced expulsions (US Department of State, 1994, 1995, 1996, UNHCR, 1996, 
CoE, 1996). The Czech government initially rejected the criticisms. PM Vaclav 
Klaus characterised the conclusions of the 1994 US State Department Report as 
“distorted and oversimplifying” while the Chair of the Czech Parliament’s Foreign 
Affairs Committee denied practices of discrimination against the Roma (Lidove 
Noviny, 2000a). The Czech Ministry of Interior also rejected the allegations while 
the Czech Ambassador to the US at the time referred to the Human Rights Watch 
report as “lies” (Lidove Noviny, 2000b). Even the generally pro-Roma Havel refused 
US requests to “exert his considerable moral authority” to push for changes to the 
law and instead replied that it was “more worthwhile to work for the proper 
implementation and application of the citizenship law of the Czech Republic than to 
seek its amendment” (Crowe, 1996).  
Still the government made several cosmetic changes to the law including the 
granting of power to the Ministry of Interior to waive the criminal record 
requirement on a case-by-case basis. These changes though have largely been seen 
as responses to international criticism designed to perpetuate the country’s image as 
a democracy of a ‘Western kind’ rather than as a genuine attempt to help long-term 
Romani residents in the Czech lands to gain citizenship. The criminal record waiver, 
while an improvement on the original law, allowed officials to make arbitrary 
decisions and did not help those whose applications had been previously refused 
(Crowe, 1996). Estimates suggest that half a year after the amendment entered into 
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force only 200 individuals were granted citizenship, an insignificant number 
considering the tens of thousands of denaturalised Roma (ibid).  
The developments show that the Czech political elite was paying lip service 
to the Roma predicament. Unlike African Americans during the Second 
Reconstruction, Czech Roma wielded little political power and had virtually no 
organised domestic lobbies of their own, which left them with no leverage and 
entirely dependent on the will of the political establishment (ibid). The absence of 
any genuine attempts amongst political leaders to take up the Roma cause confirms 
that international pressure alone cannot ensure the domestic acceptance of new 
norms when support within the domestic political establishment is lacking. The 
evident instrumental motives (soft security concerns) behind the international 
community’s demands for change did not help either and may have in fact 
strengthened the Czech elites’ resolve to come up with an instrumental solution in 
response to the pressure from above.  
The road to EU accession: tactical concessions (1997-2004) 
 This section looks at the pre-accession period, which was characterised by 
mounting international pressure exerted on the Czech national elites to come up with 
reforms to ensure racial equality amongst ethnic groups in the country and, in 
particular, the social inclusion of the Roma. It examines the government’s response 
to the demands of the international organisations. The government’s recognition of 
the existence of discrimination against the Roma in the country and the proliferation 
of documents displaying the pro forma assurance of the government to tackle the 
issue should be viewed as a tactical concession rather than as the start of a 
socialisation process founded on a domestic political consensus that this is the right 
thing to do. The elites’ window dressing attempts can be understood as a matching 
strategic response to the instrumental concerns that belied the demands of the 
international organisations and western states aiming to stem Roma migration 
westwards. Other contributing factors were the uneven and ad hoc manner in which 
the international demands were presented and the immense domestic political cost 
that would have accompanied a potential adoption of substantive racial equality 
measures. 
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1997 was marked by a peak of Roma emigration to Canada and to the UK 
where Czech Roma sought asylum upon arrival (Bancroft, 2005: 102-107). 
International criticism and calls for action on the part of the Czech government to 
ensure the protection of its Roma intensified (Romove Radio, 2000). Following on 
the demands of western states for concrete steps to further ameliorate the effects of 
the citizenship law, Council of Europe officials visited the country to assess the 
situation of Czech national minorities and to determine the Czech Republic’s 
adherence to CoE obligations and commitments (ibid). The mounting international 
pressure forced the Czech elites to respond by commissioning the very first report on 
the situation of the Roma in the Czech Republic. The report which was ordered by 
Pavel Bratinka, the Minister without Portfolio and Chairman of the Government 
Council on National Minorities, is largely seen as a formal marker in the Czech 
policy toward its Roma minority. It shifted the language Czech elites employed 
before the international community from one of denial of institutional racism and 
indifference towards the Roma to a language that recognised Roma as a minority 
within Czech minorities in need of further assistance and protection. Bratinka and his 
deputy minister Viktor Dobal became the first Cabinet members “to admit publicly 
that racism and intolerance of national minorities is reflected in the work and 
attitudes of the police, the state bureaucracy, and even employers” (Lidove Noviny, 
2000b). Bratinka claimed that the ultimate problem as to why Czech society was 
unresponsive to other nationalities was the absence of a unified government concept 
which would help suppress prejudice (ibid).  
The Bratinka Report is important in so far as it became the first ministerial 
document that publicised data on the discrimination and social exclusion Roma faced 
and criticised the government suggesting that the civic principle approach to dealing 
with minorities in the republic had failed the Roma (Czech Government, 1997). In it 
the government conceded that international criticism was substantiated and Roma 
emigration was largely the outcome of high societal hostility and opposition to 
possible integrative measures (ibid). Initially, the government rejected the report 
because, in Dobal’s opinion, “none of the ministers realised how serious the situation 
is” and because it was not “typical government material” as it emphasised positive 
developments by the government “too little” and criticised “too much” its inaction 
(Romove Radio, 2000). However, only two months later in the wake of the newly 
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released Council of Europe report on the situation regarding racism and intolerance 
in the Czech Republic and facing the threat of UK’s re-introduction of visa 
requirements for Czechs, the very ministers who opposed the Bratinka report quickly 
accepted its findings (Lidove Noviny, 2000b and Perlez, 1997). A direct 
consequence of the Bratinka report was the formation of a new advisory body, the 
Inter-Ministerial Commission for Romany Community Affairs (IMC), whose 
responsibilities were to assist the government by proposing new policies aiming to 
enhance Romani integration into Czech society.  
The actions of the Czech political elites appear to suggest the formal 
abandonment of the ‘civic approach’ in regards to the Roma and the start of a new 
approach in which the Roma were constructed as a minority in need of greater 
support than other minority groups. Such an interpretation, however, is misleading. 
The elites’ behaviour should be understood instead as a tactical response to the 
international community that was driven exclusively by instrumental rationality. The 
Czech government did not initiate substantive reforms in the area of racial equality 
and social integration and the IMC was nothing more than a shell institution, which 
was underfunded, devoid of decision-making powers and with dubiously selected 
Romani representatives (Vermeersch, 2006: 84 and OSI, 2001:124). The 
government’s public acknowledgment of racial discrimination should be seen as 
nothing more than an attempt at mimicking the language of international 
organisations and western states while the creation of the IMC an act of window 
dressing to satisfy their demands.  
The behaviour of the ruling elites demonstrated a fundamental lack of 
political will, which can be explained by societal opposition and hostility to the idea 
of substantive equality and by the duplicitous approach European institutions and 
western states used in their dealings with the Czech Republic. The latter requires 
further elaboration. While many western states employed a human-rights discourse 
to pressure the Czech government to ensure racial equality, it was easy to discern 
that the concerns for Roma wellbeing were of a rather pragmatic nature and revolved 
around stemming Roma emigration. The UK government is a case in point. While 
recognising the discrimination and vulnerable position of Roma in the Czech 
Republic, it domestically encouraged the framing of the newly arrived Czech Roma 
as economic migrants and detained many of them questioning their asylum seeker 
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claims (Romove Radio, 2000). Other western states like Germany also employed this 
double approach of criticising the Czech Republic for violating the rights of its 
Roma citizens but domestically delegitimising the claims of Roma refugees to divest 
themselves of the responsibilities such categorisation would entail. This treatment 
which became a common West European response to follow up attempts by CEE 
Roma to flee their countries conflates the distinction between norm violators and 
norm entrepreneurs and contributes to explaining why norm socialisation never took 
off. Western governments similarly to European organisations should have behaved 
as consistent norm promoters according to the norm life cycle model because they 
were seen as having a certain “moral stature” since had already embedded the norm 
in their domestic laws and institutions (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 901). The 
empirical evidence, however, shows that on the one hand they behaved like norm 
entrepreneurs in their bi-lateral dealings with the Czech government by demanding 
political and social rights for the Roma. On the other hand, their actions towards 
asylum-seeking Roma in their own states completely undermined their high claims 
of respect and commitment to the norm. 
The illusion of norm acceptance 
Laura Cashman (2008) argues that the formal approval of the Czech Republic 
for EU accession combined with the persisting international pressure on the Czech 
government to contain Roma emigration triggered the beginning of a more coherent 
and long-term pro-Romani policy. At first glance, it appears that the actions of the 
Czech government support the claim. The annual accession reports on the Czech 
Republic between 1998 and 2002 show that the European Commission increasingly 
demanded action to improve the situation of the Roma minority. From the beginning 
the Commission framed the Roma as a socially and institutionally discriminated 
minority joining the rest of the transnational actors in criticising the government for 
its inaction in cases of racially motivated violence and for perpetrating spatial and 
educational segregation (European Commission, 1998: 11 and 1999: 16-17).  Using 
conditionality as its leverage, it mandated the formulation of a new comprehensive 
policy to fight discrimination and social exclusion (ibid).  
The government responded by designing the Concept for the integration of 
the Romani community in 2000 (2000 Concept hereafter), which it heralded as the 
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beginning of a new long-term policy initiative.  The overarching goal of the 2000 
Concept was to achieve “conflict-free coexistence of the Romani community” with 
the Czech majority, which would depend on the fulfilment of a variety of other 
socio-economic goals amongst which was the “removal of all forms of 
discrimination” (Czech Government, 2000). The problem with the drafting of the 
2000 Concept is that unlike in the UK and US cases, the process was devoid of 
discussions about the moral evil of ethnic discrimination and segregation. Instead the 
Concept was meant to be a political statement that mirrored the language in the 
Commission’s reports without genuine political will (as the drafting of the anti-
discrimination law shows) for new race relations legislation. The evidence suggests 
that the single reason for the creation of the 2000 Concept was instrumental and 
concerned the ensuring of compliance with the accession criteria. This was made 
clear in the conclusion of the Concept, in which the government declared that the 
goals laid out in the Concept “will have a significant influence on the assessment of 
the EU Committee for the Czech Republic. In its last appraisal report this Committee 
was critical about the current manner of co-existence between the majority and the 
Roma. The report to be made in autumn 2000 will be crucial for the entry of the 
Czech Republic to the EU. In this sense, the government solution of the integration 
of the Roma into society will influence the integration of the Czech Republic into 
Europe” (ibid, my emphasis). 
In the pre-accession period, the Government persistently continued ‘talking 
the talk’ of the European institutions. The content of the updated 2002 Concept 
continued to proclaim that the human rights of the Roma, their nationality and socio-
economic and cultural integration were key priorities. The overall goal, according to 
the document was the need to ensure that the Roma were able to exercise their 
citizenship rights “fully and without discrimination” (Czech Government, 2002). 
Domestically, however, actual violations against the Romani minority continued to 
grow and to be marked by the government’s characteristic unwillingness to take 
action to protect the Romani communities.12  
                                                          
12In 2001 the OSI reported that polls showed negative attitudes towards Roma and membership in 
racist organizations in the Czech Republic was on the rise (OSI. 2001. Minority protection in the 
Czech Republic.) 
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 Generous promises for the protection and integration of the Roma minority 
continued to dominate the discourse around the fulfilment of the political criteria in 
the context of the approaching accession. Assurances were given for the adoption of 
comprehensive racial anti-discrimination legislation that would transpose the Race 
Equality Directive in order to ensure the general institutional safeguarding of the 
race anti-discrimination norm and to employ it as a specific mechanism for Roma 
protection from discrimination. The Czech government even proposed affirmative 
action to eliminate racial discrimination in all social fields basing its decision on the 
recommendation of such action by RED, CERD and FCNM and categorising Roma 
as historically disadvantaged group.  
 In the pre-accession period the Czech government appeared to comply 
procedurally with the institutionalisation of the race anti-discrimination norm. It 
ratified the instruments for combating discrimination in the two main international 
human rights systems, the United Nations and the Council of Europe. The 
government continued to affirm before international bodies the three-fold approach 
to Roma integration –human rights, minority rights and socio-economic measures - 
amongst which the human rights perspective emphasising protection from 
discrimination was framed as a prerequisite for the successful integration project 
(Czech Government, 2006 and Czech Minister for Human Rights, 2009). It also 
decided to participate in the Decade of Roma Inclusion in an attempt to showcase its 
commitment to the principles of equal treatment and integration.  
In actuality the ratification of the international conventions and the adoption 
of the political documents for Roma integration did not contribute to the domestic 
institutionalisation of the racial anti-discrimination norm. The human rights 
discourse the government employed in its discourse at the supranational level was 
not replicated domestically. These discursive and behavioural contradictions, which 
are examined in more detail next, show that no norm socialisation process was taking 
place and suggest the government was not planning any legislative changes that 
would provide protection from discrimination. In particular, the circumstances 
surrounding the transposition of the Race Equality Directive, which is discussed in 
the following section, demonstrate that the ruling elites did not simply lack political 
commitment but were in fact hostile towards the enshrinement of the new norm into 
national law.   
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The behaviour of the Czech government is unsurprising considering the 
prevailing anti-Roma sentiment in the country and the European Commission’s own 
ambivalent attempts at political conditionality. The Commission’s behaviour is 
particularly puzzling and contradicts its role of a norm enterprising actor that the 
norm life cycle model assigns it. One of the main problems was the Commission’s 
inconsistency in defining what constituted compliance with the “respect for and 
protection of minorities” criterion (Copenhagen Criteria, 1993). While the annual 
progress reports consistently brought up the issue of the institutional and social 
discrimination Roma in the Czech Republic endure, in each report the Commission 
concluded that despite these violations, which breached the minority protection 
requirement for accession, the Czech Republic nonetheless fulfilled the Copenhagen 
criteria. Furthermore, the Commission regularly highlighted that the transposition of 
the Equality Directives into national legislation had to be completed prior to the 
2004 accession date (Georgescu, 2009: 48). The Czech government did not meet the 
deadline and therefore the Czech Republic did not comply with the acquis. Yet the 
accession went ahead, which suggests the protection from discrimination was a low 
priority for the Commission, something that was easily detected by the Czech elites 
and emboldened them in their norm subversive actions which became increasingly 
obvious in the post-accession years. 
Problematising the domestic acceptance of the racial anti-discrimination norm 
 This section analyses selected key developments that expose the norm 
subversive agenda of Czech elites. It examines the events surrounding the 
transposition of the equality directives, the setup of the new anti-discrimination 
bodies and those institutions that aim to protect the rights of minorities, the 
amplification of the norm’s rejection at the local level, and Czech resistance to 
comply with the D.H. verdict. These issues have been selected because they most 
prominently display the domestic denial of the norm and demonstrate the failure of 
the norm diffusion process. 
Anti-discrimination legislation  
The adoption of a new and comprehensive anti-discrimination law by the 
Czech government was seen as a matter of political urgency for transnational NGOs 
and European institutions throughout the 2000s because the existing Czech 
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legislation provided inadequate protection as it consisted of ad hoc provisions 
limited to the area of employment.13 It lacked definitions of the different forms of 
discrimination (direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and victimisation) and 
many areas including education, access to health care and social security, had no 
anti-discrimination provisions. The Czech system also lacked a specialised 
independent body to assist victims of discrimination (Boucková, 2007). In 2002, the 
Czech government promised to draft a new anti-discrimination bill by the end of the 
year but a draft did not materialise until 2004 (OSF, 2002: 146). The Anti-
discrimination Bill was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies in the Czech 
Parliament in January 2005 where it was adopted, by the thin margin of one vote. In 
January 2006, however, the Senate rejected the Bill, “allegedly because it would lead 
to unwanted cases of positive discrimination” (Council of Europe, 2006). The bill 
was passed around in various forms through Parliament until 2008 when it was 
finally approved by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate and sent to President 
Klaus who vetoed it (Czech Republic, 2008). Klaus who largely shaped the anti-EU 
domestic discourse throughout his 12-year tenure as president justified his refusal to 
sign the bill claiming that the current legislation was adequate (Czech Republic, 
2009). His veto delayed the adoption of the bill for over a year when Parliament 
finally overrode the veto under mounting pressure from the European Commission, 
which threatened to initiate sanctions that would have resulted in substantial 
financial penalties (Milena Štráfeldová, 2009). 
The fact that the Czech Republic was the last member state to transpose the 
equality directives demonstrates by itself the marked absence of political will and 
willingness of the national elites to codify the norm. The drawn out nearly decade-
long journey of the bill’s enactment into law reveals the double standard the 
government continued to employ on the issue in the post-accession years. On the one 
hand, the norm was affirmed and the need for anti-discrimination law highlighted in 
all updated Roma integration strategies. On the other, the bill was persistently 
opposed and neglected in domestic parliamentary discussions.  As EU pressure 
                                                          
13See, for example, ECRI. 2009. Report on the Czech Republic (fourth monitoring cycle) p. 16; CoE. 
2006. Follow-up report on the Czech Republic (2003 – 2005). Assessment of the progress made in 
implementing the recommendations of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights. 
CommDH (2006) 15. Strasbourg, Available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=984269&Site=CommDH&BackColorInternet=FEC65B&BackColor
Intranet=FEC65B&BackColorLogged=FFC679#P449_68356 (accessed on 2 December 2015). 
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intensified, the ruling elites dropped the pretence of norm commitment, openly 
displayed their hostility towards the norm and resisted the Commission’s demands 
until the time when the potential political and economic losses left the government 
with no other route except to pass the legislation. In other words, the anti-
discrimination law was adopted because ‘this was the only option’ rather than 
‘because it was the right thing to do’ suggesting that it was driven by instrumental 
rationality only and significantly harming the norm’s prospects of domestic impact.  
Ineffective anti-discrimination institutional framework  
In the early and mid-2000s institutions whose goal was to monitor the 
protection from discrimination of the Roma minority and to advance its integration 
were formed rather quickly. The construction of these institutions was the outcome 
of the Czech government’s efforts to showcase the tangible steps it was taking to 
improve the situation of the minority. These bodies were predominantly and 
purposely designed to have no power of their own and no mechanisms to shape anti-
discrimination policy, to conduct independent investigation and to assist victims of 
discrimination. They should be viewed as shell institutions that are unable to 
advance deeper and wider norm acceptance. For example, the Council for Roma 
Minority Affairs (previously the Inter-ministerial Roma Commission) established in 
1997, is the only Roma-specific body that advises and recommends Roma 
integration policies. However, the Council is not independent from the government 
and has only advisory functions.14 The Council’s attempt to establish a separate 
Office for Ethnic Equality and Integration with its own budget and legislative powers 
was met with opposition by the cabinet and eventually abandoned (OSI, 2002:146). 
As the former Czech Commissioner for Human Rights, Peter Uhl comments, the 
government formally recognised and approved the principle of Roma integration, of 
which anti-discrimination is an essential component, but not the administrative and 
legislative support to execute it, which yet again points to the entrenched lack of 
political will to challenge the status quo (OSI, 2001:168-169).    
All other official bodies that deal with issues of discrimination – the Council 
for Human Rights and the Council for National Minorities set up in 1998 and 2001 
                                                          
14 See the Inter-ministerial Commission for Roma Community Affairs website 
http://www.vlada.cz/en/ppov/zalezitosti-romske-komunity/the-council-for-roma-community-
affairs--50634/ (accessed on 1 March 2016).   
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respectively – are also relegated to having an advisory role.15 While their reports and 
recommendations are treated as government policy documents instead of 
independent assessments, the bodies remain isolated from ministerial meetings 
where the political priorities and policies are set (US Department of State, 2000). 
The Office of the Ombudsman set up in 1999 is the only mechanism that can take 
initiative and carry out independent investigations on behalf of potential victims of 
discrimination. However, it does not possess sanctioning powers on its own, which 
renders the institution “toothless” in terms of providing actual remedy to victims. 
The government’s engineering of these token institutions with virtually no political 
legitimacy and inability to participate in the policy agenda-setting process provides 
further evidence that the national political elites were not involved in norm 
socialisation, which is the vehicle that ensures norm diffusion.  
Dynamics between the national and local level  
 The dynamics between authorities at the national and local levels provide 
additional understanding about the depth of hostility towards the new norm. While at 
the national level the elites have had to restrain their language and actions to keep up 
appearances before the international community, local elites have largely been left 
free to breach the new norm. In practice when it comes to domestic practices I argue 
that the political actors at both levels mutually reinforce differential treatment on the 
basis of ethnicity. The Romani communities do not enjoy protection from the 
national authorities and only in the rare instances when international actors draw 
attention to particularly brazen cases of discrimination, are national elites compelled 
to get involved. The fragmented and decentralised system of governance in the 
country has facilitated the norm subverting dynamic between the national and local 
authorities providing an excuse for the former not to interfere in local affairs. The 
developments at the local level also demonstrate that international pressure 
influences domestic norm conformity minimally when the elites oppose the new 
norm. 
                                                          
15 See the Council for Human Rights website http://www.vlada.cz/en/ppov/rlp/government-council-
for-human-rights-50632/ and the Council for National Minorities website 
http://www.vlada.cz/en/pracovni-a-poradni-organy-vlady/rnm/historie-a-soucasnost-rady-en-
16666/ (accessed on 1 March 2016).  
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The widely publicised example of the apartheid wall built in Usti nad Labem 
in 1999 shows how little influence transnational norm entrepreneurs have over 
domestic elites who are impervious to change. The wall was erected overnight 
between a Romani apartment complex and their neighbours by the order of the city 
council. The city mayor framed the wall as a “fence” that stood as a symbol of “law 
and order” built as much for the protection of Roma as to appease their Czech 
neighbours (The NYTimes, 1999a and US Department of State, 1999). The priority 
of the local authorities was to satisfy the ethnic Czech residents’ demands, which put 
the national government in a predicament. The government was facing direct 
pressure from EU officials overseeing the intended enlargement to have the wall 
removed while seeking a way to appease the local authorities and the ethnic 
majority. A compromise was achieved when the government paid the local 
authorities to remove the wall in exchange for the investment of the funds into 
initiatives to improve the social conditions. The local council consented but 
announced that it would use the funds to buy up the homes of those Czechs who did 
not wish to live next to the Roma settlement, an initiative that contributed to the 
long-term ghettoisation and spatial segregation of the Romani population (The 
NYTimes, 1999b). The case shows that as far as international outcry goes, once the 
wall was dismantled, it died out; the national elites managed to satisfy international 
and local officials, and the local officials satisfied the ethnic Czechs who benefitted 
the most as they were given the opportunity to move to more desirable parts of town. 
The ultimate losers were the Romani families who not only continued to live in the 
substandard municipal housing complex but were denied co-existence with the non-
Roma population, which intensified their marginalisation. In sum, the role the 
national elites play in present day Czech Republic is comparable to that of the US 
federal authorities after the demise of the First Reconstruction. They act mainly as 
tacit enablers whose lack of political will to implement the anti-discrimination 
legislation and the policy of integration is responsible for the continued violation of 
the human rights of Czech Roma. 
More recent examples of developments at the local level suggest that the 
current situation is unlikely to change soon. In 2012, the US Department of State 
reported that in spite of the new legislation that explicitly prohibits discrimination in 
housing on ethnic grounds, some municipalities make social housing decisions on 
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criteria that put Roma families at a disadvantage (e.g., the applicant’s reputation at 
previous residence) (US Department of State, 2012). That same year Parliament 
passed a law that gave municipalities the authority to expel residents for repeated 
misdemeanour offences. Critics interpreted the legislation, as a revival of the 
citizenship law and an obvious attempt to target Romani residents (ibid). 
The interplay between local and national officials has amplified the rejection 
of the anti-discrimination norm by the political elites in the post accession years. 
Repeat attempts at the local level to reinforce spatial segregation in the form of 
erecting fences and walls are no longer only ignored or tacitly approved by national 
elites. Without the restraints of EU conditionality, national elites have become more 
vocal in justifying acts of discrimination inflicted upon Romani communities 
(Minority Rights Group International, 2008). For example, the “neprisposobimi” 
discourse, which was started by two local mayors in Moravia and Bohemia and 
exclusively labels Roma as ‘inadaptable’, has been taken up by the media and 
nationally elected representatives including senior officials from the government 
(Interview with an expert from the Czech Agency for Social Inclusion, 2014). The 
assignment of collective blame on the Romani minority for social ills continues to be 
popular in Czech society and a convenient political tool that is utilised by local and 
national centre-right elites. 
 To sum up, political actors across the national and local levels mutually 
reinforce the old norms of discrimination and segregation domestically. While in the 
pre-accession period the worst displays of discrimination were somewhat mitigated, 
in the absence of strong material leverage from above, this is no longer the case. The 
post-accession political developments in the Czech Republic are analogous to those 
at the end of the First Reconstruction when the federal government withdrew its 
protection from the freedpersons and left them exposed to the whims of 
overwhelmingly hostile state and local officials who were keen to promote the 
opposite norms of segregation and discrimination. The decentralised governance 
system in the Czech Republic which is similar to the US federal system, gives 
substantial decision-making power to the municipalities and contributes to the 
invalidation of the new norm. 
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The case of D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic: desegregation with all deliberate 
delay (2007-2014)  
No other case better illustrates the domestic failure of the racial anti-
discrimination norm cascade in the Czech Republic than the verdict implementation 
of the 2007 case of D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic. Although as mentioned 
previously, from a legal point the case was a qualified success, its wider social 
implications have thus far been extremely limited. These limitations confirm that the 
racial anti-discrimination norm continues to be domestically contested and denied. 
The analysis of the domestic implementation of the judgment shows that the Czech 
ruling elites have made successive perfunctory legislative changes that have not 
triggered educational desegregation of the American kind. The few attempts of a 
handful of more liberally-minded officials to initiate school desegregation were met 
with extreme social hostility. In the absence of high level political support as in the 
US case, these reforms were stifled from the beginning. The tracing of the lack of 
implementation of D.H. demonstrates the limited salience of the anti-discrimination 
norm and shows that the two main factors that preclude proper norm internalisation 
in the Czech Republic are the high level of societal resistance to the norm and the 
lack of political will within successive governments to embrace politically unpopular 
reforms.  
Between 2007 and 2010 the Ministry of Education, the main organ charged 
with the implementation of the D.H. case, saw three ministers with mildly varying 
views on anti-discrimination reforms come and go. Minister Liška who headed the 
institution in 2007 has been characterised by government officials and civil society 
representatives as a relatively progressive individual who unlike his successors 
publicly acknowledged that the current educational system contains elements of 
segregation that result in the wrong enrolment of Romani children in special 
schools16 (Interviews with a senior advisor in the Ministry of Education and 
representatives from the Office of the Czech Ombudsman, 2014; Hruba, 2008: 37 
and Johnston, 2009). Although under Liška, the Ministry did not engage in plans for 
a more radical reform like disbanding the system of practical schools or freezing 
admission to these schools, the Ministry did show willingness to work with the pro-
                                                          
16 The special schools were eventually renamed ‘practical’ schools but de facto have retained their 
functions. The practical schools continue to enroll a disproportionately high number of Romani 
pupils under a reduced educational curriculum, which amounts to providing substandard education. 
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Roma advocacy network, Together to School,17 to coin a new action plan and 
legislative amendments that would strengthen the anti-discrimination provisions in 
the 2004 School Act. The Ministry also opened the door for a public dialogue on the 
need for systemic changes in the educational system including a move towards 
inclusive education for children with disabilities and social disadvantages. Czech 
pro-Roma activists claim that Liška’s team laid the foundation for potential reforms 
but did not have sufficient time to execute any of the intended changes (ibid). 
According to a senior official in the Ministry of Education, Liška’s reformist 
talk met with strong domestic objection against the abolition of practical schools 
resulting from the quick mobilisation of the special education establishment, which 
created its own association that has emerged as one of the most vocal and influential 
voices in shaping popular resistance to inclusive education measures (Interview with 
a senior official from the Ministry of Education, 2014). In 2010, in response to 
demands from the CoE Committee of Ministers the Czech government adopted the 
National Action Plan for Inclusive Education (NAPIE). In an extra gesture of 
goodwill to the CoE, the then Education Minister Kopicova sent a letter to all 
practical schools calling on them to refuse enrolment of all children without genuine 
disability. This action reportedly met with an angry protest from educators and, in 
turn, the Ministry quickly abandoned its reformist tendencies (Open Society Justice 
Initiative, Greek Helsinki Monitor and European Roma Rights Centre, 2011: 6-7). In 
response to public opposition, the Ministry went as far as to declare that seeking 
radical solutions was unnecessary and the lower intellect of a high number of 
Romani children is a fact that simply needs to be accepted. It also closed the 
Ministry’s education reform group and demoted the key ministerial implementer of 
the D.H. judgment (ibid). Even non-desegregation measures like the proposal for 
elective Romanes language classes faced staunch opposition and were stalled (Czech 
Press Agency, 2010).  
Education Minister Dobeš who took office after the parliamentary election in 
2010 retreated further from norm commitments made by the previous minister. 
Dobeš abandoned planned public awareness raising campaigns against racial 
discrimination and retreated from plans to amend education decrees that allow the 
                                                          
17 Together to School is a coalition of OSF Czech Republic, the European Roma Rights Center and the 
Roma Education Fund. 
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placement of children without disability in classes established specifically for 
students with disabilities (Open Society Justice Initiative, Greek Helsinki Monitor 
and European Roma Rights Centre, 2011: 9-11). Several officials tasked with 
monitoring the school desegregation efforts appear to have contested the norm 
negation within and ended up publicly resigning over the issue. (Romea, 2010). 
Allegations included the lack of genuine desire of the Ministry to meet its 
international obligations under D.H. and its continuing tendency to come up with 
inadequate plans for school integration (Sucha, 2010). 
Currently, educational discrimination remains the norm in the Czech 
Republic both in legislation and in practice. In 2011, the government-invited group 
of experts charged with the implementation of NAPIE collectively resigned blaming 
Minister Dobeš for sabotaging the inclusion of Romani students and disabled 
students into mainstream schools (Czech Press Agency, 2011).  Facing international 
embarrassment and increasing demands for action from the Council of Europe, the 
government adopted the Strategy for the Fight Against Social Exclusion, 2011-2015, 
which is premised on the transition of all children into mainstream schools (Open 
Society Justice Initiative and European Roma Rights Centre, 2011). The 2011 
Strategy, however, is not binding and contradicts NAPIE, which is markedly more 
conservative in its approach to school inclusion. The 2011 Strategy has been heavily 
opposed by Czech society. In February 2013, the government organised a public 
hearing in response to a petition of over 70,000 citizens for the preservation of the 
practical schools’ system. During the hearing most Czech officials backed down 
from mainstreaming education and went as far as calling practical schools 
“irreplaceable” and their closing “catastrophic” (Romea, 2013). Even already 
adopted legislative amendments to constrain the admission of non-disabled children 
into practical schools have been delayed by several years or dropped completely 
(Open Society Justice Initiative, COSIV, European Roma Rights Centre and Open 
Society Fund – Prague, 2013). The financing of practical schools, which often 
receive twice the amount per student as ordinary schools by local authorities, and the 
lack of supplemental financing for social integration in mainstream schools continue 
to create powerful incentives for maintaining a high level of school segregation 
(Kostlán, 2013).  
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Not much is likely to change in the foreseeable future despite the coming to 
power of PM Sobotka’s centre-left government and its re-establishment of the 
Ministry of Human Rights whose minister has announced his support for inclusive 
education. The new Minister of Education who is characterised as populist, 
uninterested in systemic changes to strengthen equal access to quality education, and 
antagonistic towards the Minster of Human Rights is unlikely to move forward with 
substantial changes (Interview with senior official, Ministry of Education, 2014 and 
interviews with representatives of the Roma Education Fund and COSIV, 2014). The 
unpopularity and opposition to the D.H. verdict, which has been framed in 
mainstream media and societal discourses as foreign, invasive and unjust, 
significantly contribute to the status quo (ibid). 
The D.H. post-litigation developments confirm that the racial anti-
discrimination norm never cascaded to the domestic level as the norm life cycle 
model predicts. Considering that the Czech government has been unwilling to 
comply with the D.H.  judgement even on legislative grounds alone, indicates that 
the anti-discrimination norm in relation to the Roma has not achieved formal 
codification despite continuing normative pressure from the CoE Committee of 
Ministers and material pressure by the European Commission, which in 2012 halted 
structural funds for education citing insufficient attempts to make systemic changes 
in the educational system (Open Society Justice Initiative, COSIV, European Roma 
Rights Centre and Open Society Fund – Prague, 2012). Although the Strasbourg 
judgment has “uncorked” the issue of separate education in the Czech Republic, 
supranational efforts of norm socialisation and material pressure have failed to 
produce the expected outcome of norm diffusion, which in turn should have led to 
norm internalisation (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 902-904). Instead, the 
supranational level at which the verdict was delivered has contributed to the 
domestic rejection of the norm. The ECtHR ruling has been perceived by Czech 
society as foreign and posing undue burden on the Czech state. It could be argued 
that if the Czech Constitutional Court had delivered the verdict instead, its 
implementation would have been more likely as in the Brown vs. Board of Education 
case because it would have come from a domestic court.  
On the one hand, the Brown verdict implementation developments suggest 
that the level at which a court is located matters little in terms of judgment 
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compliance if the executive and legislative branches of the government take no 
action to enforce it. Implementing the Brown ruling in thousands of local school 
districts, as Frank Brown observes, “required local plaintiffs, money, and data” 
(2004: 182). It was not until a decade later after Congress enacted the Civil Rights 
Act in 1964 that school desegregation actually began. Crucial for desegregation was 
the clause in the Act which authorised the US Attorney General to bring legal action 
against segregated school districts on behalf of plaintiffs seeking school integration, 
free of charge (ibid). The legislation also authorised the Department of Education to 
collect data on school enrolment by race which made it possible to prove the 
existence of racial segregation in a court of law (ibid). In the US case, therefore, the 
national elites enacted a piece of legislation that gave the victims of educational 
segregation and the relevant federal authorities the tools to dismantle state-imposed 
segregation. In the Czech case, the national political elites have been reluctant and in 
certain instances purposefully stalled the amending of the School Act.  
On the other hand, the level at which a verdict is issued still matters. When 
the US Supreme publicly recognised the anti-segregation norm, the ruling, along 
with the demands of African American activists for action, put pressure upon the 
political elites in the other two branches to work towards compliance with the 
verdict. In the Czech case, a hugely unpopular verdict delivered by a little known 
European legal body with weak compliance mechanisms has meant that the national 
elites have had very little impetus for actual compliance. Moreover, in the United 
States which follows the common law system, local, state and federal courts have 
had to uphold the racial equality precedent in Brown in subsequent lawsuits 
addressing school segregation in the decades after Brown. In the Czech Republic 
which follows civil law, there are no mechanisms that can in practice obligate the 
Czech judiciary to uphold the D.H. anti-discrimination principle should similar 
lawsuits be launched in the Czech courts.  In sum, in the Czech Republic the 
unpopularity of any educational reform that phases out practical schools with 
domestic society, weak grassroots advocacy work to counter the path dependence 
and normalisation of educational apartheid and the virtual absence of Roma voices 
demanding political action have created an environment in which the ruling political 
elite benefits the most by taking no action against ethnic discrimination and hence 
maintaining the status quo.   
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Conclusion 
 A variety of factors contribute to the absence of domestic impact of the racial 
anti-discrimination norm in the Czech Republic. The resistance to international 
demands and monitoring exemplified by the strong societal opposition to 
implementation of the D.H. judgment combined with an equally strong societal 
discourse which affirms long-standing institutional structures that perpetuate racial 
inequality is a major deterrent to normative change. The clash of the racial anti-
discrimination norm with long-held anti-Roma attitudes, which have been 
exacerbated in the recent times by the financial crisis of 2007-2008, impede 
internalisation. The unwillingness displayed by senior government administrators 
toward the introduction of major legislative changes to close loopholes that allow for 
systemic discrimination, especially in the area of education and the setup of token 
anti-discrimination bodies also reveal that the norm was never accepted. The 
conviction that the Roma minority ought to enjoy full citizenship rights is on the 
whole missing amongst political elites and the very notion continues to be 
challenged within state institutions. The empirical evidence has shown that the 
formal acceptance of the racial anti-discrimination norm before the international 
community represents a concerted effort at elites’ window dressing. In fact, the norm 
was never institutionally accepted and continues to be in a state of constant domestic 
rejection.   
More generally, the evidence confirms that the behaviour and ideational 
commitment of national political elites determine the success of a new norm’s 
acceptance. If these are absent and the compliance of political elites is exclusively 
driven by a logic of consequences, the cascading process can be seriously disrupted 
and domestic norm acceptance almost never takes place. The level at which a new 
norm is constructed can be an important enabling condition but only if the ruling 
political elites are justice-driven. The US and UK cases have shown that norms that 
are constructed domestically have a high chance of permanent internalisation 
provided that the elites willingly take on the role of institutional norm entrepreneurs. 
The Czech case in contrast suggests that disputed norms that are perceived as 
imposed from supranational institutions are very unlikely to gain domestic 
legitimacy unless the ruling elites choose to enforce the norms. When domestic 
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political elites are hostile to the new norm and advance countervailing norms the 
level at which the norm was constructed is irrelevant.  
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Chapter Five 
Domestic norm internalisation II: Roma politics in Hungary 
This chapter continues to shed light on the conditions that account for the 
degree of domestic norm conformity. The Hungarian case examined here evidences 
the main claim running through the thesis that the agency of national elites is an 
important determinant for the degree of embeddedness of a new norm into the social 
and political order of states. The Hungarian analysis re-confirms the findings in the 
US case where I suggested that an analytical distinction ought to be made between 
the national and the subnational level and where the case empirics supported Cortell 
and Davis’s claim that the setup of a state’s governance framework (centralised or 
decentralised) acts as an intervening variable that facilitates or inhibits the 
internalisation of the new norm at the sub-national level (2005). To recall, the 
analysis of the US case demonstrated that when national political elites view norm 
adoption as necessary and the government system is (even temporarily) centralised, 
the norm acceptance at the local level is greater. The process is reversed when the 
national government relinquishes its power. This case study shows that when 
political elites who display norm commitment act within a decentralised system, 
norm conformity at the local level is negligible. The post-2010 political 
developments in Hungary show that the centralisation of the government system can 
hasten the erosion of the new norm when national political elites refuse to embrace 
it. 
The Hungarian case largely mirrors the US developments during the First 
Reconstruction. Here I argue that successive centre-left Hungarian governments 
throughout the 2000s, just like the earlier Radical Republicans in the 1870s, 
displayed strong commitment to the institutionalisation of the racial equality norm 
into legislation and national policy and to ensuring the political representation of the 
Romani minority within governing structures. Just as with the last Radical 
Republican administration from 1869 to 1877, which faced an economic downturn 
and corruption scandals, the final years in government of the Hungarian central-left 
ruling elites were also marred by an economic recession and a series of corruption 
scandals. In both cases, these events led to rising social tensions and the eventual 
abandonment of the racial equality agenda by the institutional norm entrepreneurs. 
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With the coming to power of the centre-right FIDESZ party, the norm’s prominence 
in Hungary has been eroded. The norm has disappeared from the public sphere 
leaving the Roma minority in a particularly precarious and vulnerable position. This 
scenario echoes the situation of the African Americans in the South during the 
Redemption period.  
Still it should be noted that despite these notable similarities, the US and 
Hungarian cases are far from identical. During the First Reconstruction in the United 
States, the ruling elite was able to impose direct federal supervision upon state and 
local authorities. Until 2010 the Hungarian elites, however, governed within a 
radically fragmented and decentralised municipal system, which did not allow for 
substantial changes at the local level (Fekete, Lados, Pfeil and Szoboszlai, 2002). 
The racial anti-discrimination norm is now well-institutionalised in the US political 
order. But in Hungary, the norm’s internalisation remains incomplete because the 
gains the set of governing norm promoters made in the past decade has been undone 
by the succeeding ruling elites. It remains to be seen if and when, a change in 
Hungarian policy analogous to the Civil Rights era will occur.  
Besides the US case, the Hungarian case most clearly challenges the assumed 
linear pattern of the norm life cycle model. The empirical evidence disputes the 
presumed linearity and proposes a dynamic model, in which the norm can move 
forward and backward and stay at a standstill for long periods. The Hungarian case 
together with the US study shows that norms can undergo dramatic leaps forward, 
serious setbacks and long-lasting stagnation. At the extreme, the norm can 
experience a civic death, as developments during the First Reconstruction in the US 
and the current FIDESZ rule in Hungary demonstrate. The US case also shows that 
the norm can re-emerge with the presence of new triggers such as highly activist 
social movements and institutional norm entrepreneurs sympathetic to the norm and 
willing to use their political influence to embed it in the laws and policies of the 
state. This empirical evidence calls for the norm life cycle model to be re-designed to 
reflect the complexity and dynamic nature of the life of norms.  
This chapter examines domestic compliance with the racial anti-
discrimination norm by tracing the development of Roma policy in Hungary from 
the 1990s until present. It begins by sketching Hungary’s ambivalent approach to 
142 
 
racial equality in the 1990s. The analysis shows that during that period, racial 
equality was not on the government’s agenda. At that time the main priority was the 
creation of minority rights legislation, which was drafted not out of concerns for 
minority groups in Hungary but to ensure the wellbeing and cultural autonomy of 
those ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring states. The case study then turns to 
the 2000s, the time when the racial anti-discrimination norm reached a high level of 
prominence in Hungary. This prominence was due to extensive and consistent 
changes in policy and legislation made by Roma and non-Roma institutional norm 
entrepreneurs within the Centre-left coalition. These norm entrepreneurs placed a 
special emphasis on educational equality and integration. Yet despite the progressive 
and comprehensive legislative and policy reforms at the national level, the evidence 
suggests that segregationist and discriminatory practices at the local level either 
remained the same or increased. This occurred because municipal authorities used 
their substantial power within the decentralised system to circumvent or ignore the 
new anti-discrimination laws and policies. The findings link to and validate Beth 
Simmons’ theorising about barriers posed by sub-national governments to new 
commitments to human rights laws undertaken at the national level (2009: 69). As 
Simmons would expect the majority of the Hungarian local governments strongly 
and persistently resisted what they saw as the national government’s encroachment 
on their prerogatives and as the ultimate threat to the established social order and 
their political existence.  
The chapter concludes by examining the gradual erosion of the norm in the 
late 2000s and its civic death with the establishment of PM Orbán’s right-wing 
government in 2010. The Orbán government took the decision-making power away 
from the municipalities, an approach that has been described as an “obsession with 
centralisation” (Kornai, 2015 and Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 2013). The 
government also put aside the system of checks and balances including the 
independence of the judiciary, which had made progressive steps towards affirming 
racial equality in Hungarian case law in the previous decade (ibid). The sharp 
reversal of the pre-2010 policies and legislation by the current FIDESZ government 
has not only stalled the norm’s progress but has made the issue of racial equality 
disappear from the domestic public domain. The post-2010 developments show that 
while a centralised government setup is hugely beneficial to norm enterprising 
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national elites for their norm institutionalisation agenda, centralisation can quicken 
the norm’s demise when national elites oppose the new norm.  
Norm ambiguity and norm contestation: Roma politics in the 1990s 
 This section examines the behaviour and policy agenda of the Hungarian 
political elites in relation to racial equality in the early post-communist years. I 
suggest that similarly to the Czech elites, in this initial period the Hungarian 
authorities largely embraced the new norm formally. However, the implementation 
of the agreed anti-discrimination measures remained unfulfilled and the domestic 
political discourse was inconsistent with the government’s commitments made 
before the international community. As in the Czech case, toward the end of the 
1990s, EU conditionality emerged as a major factor that kept the racial anti-
discrimination norm on the official agenda of successive governments on both sides 
of the political spectrum. Instrumental rationality accounted for the initial steps 
towards norm conformity. For example, the Hungarian Minorities Law was enacted 
largely out of concern for the ethnic Hungarians residing in neighbouring states. The 
Roma policies during this period showcased the government’s concerns for the 
minority before international audiences while remaining unpublicized and 
unimplemented in Hungary. Yet, unlike their Czech counterparts, Hungarian elites 
displayed consistent effort to codify the rights of minorities. The emphasis during the 
early and mid-1990s was mostly on cultural autonomy. Very little attention was paid 
to anti-discrimination and social inclusion measures. Still, the Hungarian officials 
neither defied nor displayed the high level of hostility towards the norm that the 
Czech authorities did, a key difference that hinted at the possibility for eventual 
norm socialisation. 
Unlike the Czech Republic which in the 1990s approached the situation of 
the Roma minority employing what has been referred to as the civic principle, 
Hungarian governments throughout the 1990s promoted Roma issues through a 
minority rights framework.  This minority rights framework emphasised both Roma 
identity and cultural difference along with a degree of political autonomy evidenced 
in the creation of a separate political community with its own ethnic representation 
structures. Simultaneously, this was accompanied by official discourses on inclusion, 
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which were followed up by policies that formally set as their goal the reduction of 
societal discrimination against Roma communities. 
Hungary was one of the first Council of Europe members to ratify the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in 1995. The centre-left government at 
the time had already passed the Law on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities 
in 1993 presenting it as a display of Hungary’s commitment to upholding its 
international obligations (ECRI, 1996: 5). International organisations generally 
regarded the Minorities Law as a progressive and ambitious piece of legislation 
because it established a system of elected local and national minority self-
governments (MSGs) with authority over issues related to the culture, language and 
education of minority groups. The law also created the post of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities. But the actual role 
and functions of the Commissioner have been limited to monitoring and providing 
policy advice (Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1996: 2 and ECRI, 2004: 7).  
On the one hand, the Minorities Law constitutes a departure from the 
communist assimilationist strategies while affirming that Hungarian minorities are 
“part of the sovereign people: integral elements of the state [and] their culture is a 
part of Hungarian culture” (Minorities Law. 1993.  Para. 3(1)). Statements of senior 
political elites at the time also suggest consistency between legislation and political 
discourse in affirming the equality of Roma people with the rest of Hungarian 
citizens. Shortly after the Law’s passage, PM Horn stressed that “Hungarian Gypsies 
are truly the children of our country, not fostered but born endowed with rights” 
(AmaroDrom, 1994: 2, quoted in Kovats, 1997: 59). On the other hand, the focus on 
minority autonomy and distinct minority cultures has been criticised for obfuscating 
the state’s responsibility towards the particular needs of the Roma and detracting 
from the establishment of equal opportunities and socio-economic measures to 
counter the rapid spread of poverty among Romani communities in the 1990s (ibid). 
The promotion of a distinct and different Roma culture through the minority rights 
framework has continually risked reinforcing stereotypes that explain the socio-
economic conditions of many Roma in terms of cultural difference rather than as the 
outcome of economic failure and unequal access to social goods, services and 
political representation. 
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In a more general sense, the Minorities Law has been criticised as having no 
intrinsic domestic value. Its intended purpose, some international observers have 
claimed, has been to boost Hungary’s foreign policy objectives and image before 
Western states and European institutions (Human Rights Watch/Helsinki. 1996: 3).  
Meanwhile, it has been suggested that real commitment to minority rights, and the 
improvement of the Roma situation, never existed (ibid). This claim, which negates 
ideational commitment as an underlying motive for Hungary’s minority protection 
legislation, is affirmed in the writings of the former Minorities Ombudsman, Jenô 
Kaltenbach.  Kaltenbach provides further insights of the elites’ motives behind the 
law’s formulation. He claims that the creation of the Minorities Law was dictated by 
expectations and assumptions that the neighbouring countries with Hungarian 
nationals would embrace the reciprocity principle and make similar provisions by 
recognising at a minimum the cultural autonomy of Hungarian communities in 
Transylvania, Felvidék, Transcarpathia and Vojvodina (Kaltenbach, 2006:12). 
Related to this and particularly illuminating is the omission of the ‘ethnic’ minorities 
phrase from the initial draft of the law, which if sustained would not have recognised 
the Roma as a distinct minority. Schaft (1999) reports that the Roma were included 
in the Minorities Law only after vocal protests from Roma groups, which shows that 
the elites were reluctant to confer minority rights to the largest Hungarian minority. 
The turning point in formulating a comprehensive Roma policy took place 
under the socialist-liberal government of PM Horn which was in power between 
1994 and 1998. Unlike in the Czech case, initially the policy was predominantly 
motivated by the advocacy work of Roma activists who were highly critical of the 
previous government’s failure to deal with racism and the rapid rise in 
unemployment amongst Roma. European political elites did not feel there was the 
need to exert much pressure on the government. Roma emigration from Hungary 
was not considered an issue and the Hungarian government had not attempted to 
produce anti-Roma laws as the Czech elites did. The first Roma-specific 
Government Resolution18 established the Public Foundation for Gypsies in Hungary 
and the Coordination Council for Roma Affairs, which was vested with the authority 
to oversee Roma-related programmes (OSI, 2002). Although the resolution was only 
a statement of intentions and did not contain concrete proposals, it was nevertheless 
                                                          
18Resolution 1120/1995 was passed in December 1995.  
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important. In it, the Hungarian government made the commitment to develop a 
specific Roma action plan. Indeed, two years later the government issued a formal 
Medium Term Action Plan for Improving the Living Standards of Gypsies (MTAP). 
This plan was drawn up, in part, through collaboration with the newly elected Roma 
national MSG. This collaboration suggests that the views of some Roma 
representatives were taken into account in the drafting process (Kovats, 2002/3). The 
MTAP passage put the anti-discrimination norm on the policy agenda. The 
document formally recognised the need to reduce prejudices and eliminate 
discrimination directed at the Roma by state and local authorities.  
However, the drafting and adoption of the MTAP and the government’s 
initial commitment to the policy were not matched by subsequent implementation 
assurances. Of particular importance are two pledges that never materialised. First, 
the provision for the development of public awareness activities to popularize the 
government’s efforts to improve the situation of the Roma was never carried out. 
Second the government decided against creating new anti-discrimination measures 
and legal aid mechanisms (Órsos, 1998, quoted in OSI, 2002: 252). The non-
allocation of resources to the already prepared programme for awareness raising 
activities, whose implementation would have coincided with the upcoming national 
elections, demonstrates that strategic considerations trumped commitments to 
politically unpopular causes. The incongruity between the MTAP’s goal to tackle 
discrimination and the government’s refusal to undertake legal reforms to strengthen 
and expand anti-discrimination provisions denote two things. First, the government 
displayed awareness and recognition of the norm. Second, the formal norm 
affirmation was not matched by acts towards actual internalisation in state and local 
structures, which in turn suggests limited norm adherence at the time.  
The FIDESZ-FKGP19 right-wing coalition led by PM Orbán came to power 
in 1998. Initially, it sought to reverse the slight gains made by the previous 
government by marginalising the Roma issue. Within weeks of coming to power, 
FIDESZ withdrew the MTAP for review (Kovats, 2002/3: 78). The reversal of 
political priorities regarding the Roma was also reflected in the general Government 
Programme. Insofar as minority measures were concerned, emphasis was once more 
                                                          
19Alliance for Young Democrats (FIDESZ) and Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic 
Party (FKGP). 
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diverted at identity strengthening and cultural autonomy through the MSG 
mechanism. The Programme neither mentioned the situation of the Roma minority 
nor any measures to address ethnic discrimination and societal prejudices (OSI, 
2002: 253). This silence demonstrates the government’s backtracking on the actions 
of its predecessors. A substantial shift took place a year later when the government 
somewhat abruptly reinstated the MTAP, in a form that differed very little from the 
initial Action Plan of the socialist government. The shift in priorities in relation to 
the Roma minority at this juncture was predominantly the result of external material 
and normative pressure. This motivation is evidenced by documentation, in which 
the government recognised the high importance of Hungary’s Roma policy for the 
EU and the Council of Europe (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000: 6-8). 
More specifically, the early Orbán government was compelled to bring back the 
MTAP upon signing the Accession Partnership. The Accession Partnership required 
Hungary to prioritise Roma integration with an emphasis on mainstream education 
and active measures to curb discrimination in society (European Council, 2001: 6). 
The FIDESZ government re-instated the MTAP because it required minimal effort. 
The MTAP was framed as a necessary policy of continuity with the previous 
government. But in reality the sole impetus behind the placement of the issue on its 
political agenda was clearly to move forward with the EU accession process. 
Between 1998 and 2002 the FIDESZ-FKGP government undertook some 
positive developments such as the expansion of support grants for Roma pupils and 
the formation of the Roma Client Service Network for Anti-Discrimination20. 
Nevertheless, these remained limited to a minimal moderation of existing 
inequalities through increased reliance on EU funds in contrast to the effusive 
display of political will to Roma integration before international audiences. 
Domestic developments suggest a considerable deviation from the pledge to reduce 
discrimination against Roma in society. Despite the lobbying efforts by civil society 
groups and the Minorities Commissioner for a new anti-discrimination law in 
compliance with the newly passed equality directives, the government at the time 
decided against a comprehensive law. This decision was made despite the weak and 
scattered anti-discrimination provisions in different spheres, which were declaratory 
                                                          
20The Network consisted of legal practices across Hungary that provided court representation in 
cases involving the discrimination of Roma persons on the grounds of ethnicity. The practices 
contracted with the government to provide these services to Roma clients for free.  
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and, except for the labour law, were not accompanied by specific sanctions. The 
considerable discrepancy between the presentation of Hungary’s Roma policy in 
international forums and its domestic promotion also suggests limited norm salience. 
The 2002 OSI Report on Minority Protection in Hungary draws attention to the 
government’s significant efforts to highlight its Roma initiative before international 
audiences including the production of a wide range of MTAP materials in English. 
Meanwhile, its domestic promotion lagged especially, among its key beneficiaries, 
the Romani communities (OSI, 2002: 261). More problematically, the approach the 
FIDESZ government employed domestically to publicize the MTAP stressed the 
financial costs without relating them to the goal of realising fundamental rights. This 
tactic essentially presented the Roma as a drain on public resources thus enhancing 
the countervailing societal norms of intolerance and prejudice against the minority 
(Interview with the Deputy President of the Office for National and Ethnic 
Minorities, quoted in OSI, 2002: 261). 
The tracing of the Hungarian government’s approach towards the race anti-
discrimination norm vis-à-vis the Roma in this period shows that the formal 
recognition of the norm in Hungary, as in the Czech Republic, was a window 
dressing act. The policy measures adopted to ensure racial equality and integration 
were routinely ignored. This lack of follow through confirms that liberal and 
conservative elites assigned low political importance to the issue of racial equality 
and were instead driven by instrumental reasoning. The double approach of the 
government to the Romani minority - the formal discourse on inclusion and anti-
discrimination accompanied by communication to the Hungarian public that 
invalidated it – was particularly pronounced during Orbán’s initial leadership.  This 
approach contributed to the already precarious status of Romani communities, which 
in general saw a decline in social position and faced increasing anti-sentiments from 
the ethnic majority during that period.21 Still the Hungarian case shows that political 
elites did not display hostility towards the norm and neither did they target the Roma 
through legislative measures in the manner the Czech elites did. In fact, despite the 
pragmatic considerations behind the creation of Roma policy and the lack of 
                                                          
21 Research from the 1990s puts Roma at the top of the most unpopular minorities in Hungary 
surpassing Africans and Arabs. Only 18% were open to a friendship with a Romani person and 15% 
to have a Romani person as neighbour (Lendvay Judit and Szabó Ildikó. 1994. Zárt karokkal. 
Kisebbségkedvelés. Heti Világ - Gazdaság (29 April): 105–106). 
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consistent implementation of its provisions, the narrative suggests that the early 
governments, except the FIDESZ-FKGP coalition, displayed a relative openness to 
the Roma situation. This relative openness was evident in the willingness of the 
political elites to both adopt the first official policy on Roma and to negotiate with 
and make qualified room for the input of Roma representatives in the policy-making 
process.  
Norm progress: Roma politics, 2002-2008 
The 2000s have been characterised as an unprecedented period of innovation 
in welfare reforms, a time in which ‘enlightened liberals’ in power embraced the 
human rights and equal opportunities paradigm to eliminate discriminatory practices 
against socially and ethnically marginalized groups (Interview with a legal expert, 
2014 and interview with a former senior official from the Directorate General of 
Equal Opportunities, 2014). This section examines such claims in the context of the 
educational desegregation reforms. In so doing it confirms that the racial anti-
discrimination norm gained noticeable momentum at the national level due to the 
efforts of Roma and non-Roma norm entrepreneurs within the ruling elite. The norm 
was codified into extensive anti-discrimination legislation and the government 
consistently affirmed its commitment to ethnic equality in international and domestic 
discourse. This development suggests a shift from a policy dominated by 
instrumentalism to one that incorporated a notion of appropriateness. In other words, 
the post-2002 policy developments reflected the understanding that norm conformity 
was the right thing to do. However, I argue that these considerable efforts that gave 
the impression of successful norm diffusion did not result in deeper internalisation at 
the local level. This was due to the decentralised and fragmented system of 
governance that concentrated considerable decision-making power in the hands of 
municipal authorities who commonly resisted the new government’s approach since 
they viewed the new desegregation measures as a political liability. The Hungarian 
developments between 2002 and 2008 in many aspects mirror those of the First 
Reconstruction. The institutional norm entrepreneurs at the national level in both 
cases displayed significant ideational commitment to the norm early on by 
enshrining the norm into law and in both cases the norm underwent incomplete 
institutionalisation. The incomplete institutionalisation was the outcome of the 
strong opposition to the norm by municipal officials and by the ethnic majority at the 
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local level and of the eventual decline of the elites’ political will and commitment to 
the norm once material and ideational priorities diverged at the face of economic 
downturn and corruption scandals. 
The liberal MSZP–SZDSZ22 coalition which succeeded FIDESZ in 2002 
quickly transposed the Race Equality Directives by passing comprehensive anti-
discrimination legislation without noticeable pressure from the EU institutions to do 
so. This legislation signaled a normative shift in the politics of racial equality. The 
new administration, according to norm entrepreneurs involved in the drafting 
process, displayed a high degree of openness to the proposals of the anti-
discrimination experts and worked with them to produce an effective and 
comprehensive law (Interview with a legal expert, 9 April 2014). The follow up 
appointment of a minister without portfolio responsible for equal opportunities 
confirms the government’s commitment to the norm. The minister introduced the 
Equal Treatment Act and oversaw the development of the Roma social integration 
programme. Unlike the MTAP, which framed the anti-discrimination norm in an 
abstract manner, the Equal Treatment Act expressly named the decrease in 
discrimination and educational desegregation as a priority. The Act went further than 
the requirements set out in the Race Equality Directive. It explicitly allowed positive 
temporary measures to advance equal opportunities for disadvantaged groups. The 
commitment to the norm is also evident in the setup of the Equal Treatment 
Authority (ETA), the body which monitors and ensures compliance with the anti-
discrimination law. Unlike its Czech counterpart, ETA has tangible powers. It can 
issue decisions that are binding upon the parties and can impose civil and 
administrative sanctions, mostly fines, upon violators of the anti-discrimination 
principle in addition to conducting ex officio investigations and providing policy 
advice (ECRI, 2004 and interview with a government official, the Equal Treatment 
Authority, 2014). The powers granted to ETA suggest that the government went 
beyond formal compliance with EU legislation and sought to create an institutional 
structure that would work independently to effectively enforce the principle of equal 
treatment. 
The state of norm salience and internalisation can be approximated by the 
degree of incorporation of the norm into public discourse, policies and the daily 
                                                          
22 Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). 
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practices of state institutions. In a sharp departure from the FIDESZ Government 
Programme, which did not mention the Romani minority at all, the new government 
framed the integration of the Romani community in a way that echoed the language 
of the Civil Rights era and actively opposed long-standing practices of segregation at 
the local level. The government claimed that it  
“pays special attention to the situation of Roma in schools, their acceptance and the 
abolition of segregation. We will review the system of redirections [into separate 
schools] and we will impede the exclusion of Roma children from school education 
by declaring them private students” (quoted in Nemeth, 2004:14, my emphasis).  
The goal was re-stated in the 2004-2006 Government Programme after the 
change of the prime minister suggesting a consensus amongst the ruling Hungarian 
elite of the need for normative change. The document ensured that “We [the 
government] continue the efforts that ensure opportunity creation and freedom from 
discrimination for our Roma fellow countrymen in the field of education” and that 
the newly launched integration programmes would continue to ensure the teaching of 
“Roma and non-Roma children in an integrated way, not in separate classes…[and] 
to bring back the children that have been classified as disabled to the classes with 
regular curriculum” (quoted in Nemeth, 2004: 15). The statement is significant 
because it indicates norm continuity in the face of top leadership changes, 
consistency before international and domestic audiences despite widespread 
domestic resistance, and determination to confront local institutions over 
longstanding segregationist practices.  
The government followed up its stated promises by directing much of its 
political capital towards strengthening anti-discrimination legislation and 
establishing programmes and new bodies to implement and supervise the education 
reforms which aimed to combat spatial school segregation, Roma only “catch up” 
classes with reduced curriculum, the relegation of Roma students to “private student” 
or homeschooling status, the streaming of Roma into dead-end short-term vocational 
schools and their channeling into special schools. The Minister of Education 
nominated a Commissioner for the Integration of Disadvantaged and Roma Children. 
Such positions, as seen in the previous study, tend to be token posts without 
decision-making power. But the Commissioner’s Office became a hub within the 
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Ministry, which was “impossible to circumvent” when it came to legislative 
amendments, new programmes and their execution and monitoring (ibid). Another 
important indicator that points to ideational motives is the inclusion of Roma 
professionals in the design of desegregation policies and programmes. Over 80% of 
the employees in the Commissioner’s Office were Roma. A high number of external 
Roma experts also participated in the policy formulations and Roma organisations 
were regularly consulted during the policy drafting process (ibid). The former 
Commissioner responsible for School Integration confirms this unprecedented 
opening of political space for Roma professionals. Although it is impossible to 
speculate about the extent to which the top MSZP–SZDSZ leaders personally 
identified with and believed in the desegregation initiative, there was a consensus 
amongst the ministers about providing support to the Commissioner’s Office. As a 
result, the Commissioner’s Office was given generous financial resources and left to 
draft and implement the education reforms at its own discretion (Interview with a 
former Commissioner responsible for School Integration, 2014). 
The legislative reforms during that period show remarkable normative 
progress. The Commissioner for School Integration and his staff were the major 
drivers for the reforms. They proposed key amendments to the Act of Public 
Education (PEA), which were passed without much contestation in Parliament. The 
PEA amendments introduced important incentives for the desegregation of special 
schools by doubling the amount of per-capita funding for integrated pupils and by 
requiring municipalities to re-draw their school catchment areas if there was 25% or 
more disparity in the proportion of multiply disadvantaged children attending the 
various schools within their jurisdiction.23 The amendments also narrowed the 
definition of disability to prevent the placement of children diagnosed with mild 
disability into a special school, tightened the requirements for “private pupil” 
(homeschooling) status, and made school participation in tendering for funding 
programmes and financial integration support conditioned upon the adoption of 
equal opportunity plans (Decade Watch, 2005-2006: 89, ECRI, 2009: 29 and Keller, 
                                                          
23 Reportedly, Roma represent about 50% of this category, which consists of children whose parents 
receive state assistance and who did not progress beyond primary school. The Roma children who 
are classified as multiply disadvantaged represent three-fourths of all Roma children in Hungary. 
(Interview with a former commissioner responsible for school integration, 2014)  
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2008: 19). At the request of the Commissioner, the government also incorporated 
positive discrimination measures in the Higher Education Act by providing free 
university education to multiply disadvantaged children (Roma Education Fund, 
2007: 35).24 
The Commissioner pushed for the incorporation of the anti-discrimination 
norm in key policies and programmes for multiply disadvantaged children. His 
Office was responsible for the creation of the National Education Integration 
Network (OOIH), which provided professional support for schools that chose to 
participate in the integration programme. Further measures included the ‘Tanoda’ 
programme, a network of after-class study halls and community centres mostly in 
Roma communities, substantial financial incentives in the form of grants to local 
authorities that agreed to close down segregated schools on their territory and the 
launch of the first re-evaluation programme whose objective was to re-integrate 
healthy children into regular schools (ibid).  
The evidence suggests that the institutionalisation of the racial anti-
discrimination norm in legislation, policy and practices was well underway at the 
national level. The majority of drivers for normative changes were government 
officials of Romani origin which was something unprecedented for the CEE region. 
The Commissioner and MEP Viktoria Mohacsi, both of Romani ethnicity, stand out 
as particularly instrumental in generating inter-ministerial support for the norm’s 
acceptance (Interview with a former senior official from the Directorate General of 
Equal Opportunities, 2014). They actively used the again unprecedented for the CEE 
region support for racial equality across the executive, legislative and judicial25 
branches to exert pressure on municipalities and individual schools tackling the 
complex issues of in-school segregation and spatial segregation through school re-
zoning. They also encouraged cooperation between pro-Roma civil society norm 
entrepreneurs and governmental supervisory bodies to exercise stronger political 
pressure on municipalities and schools (ibid). 
                                                          
24The multiply disadvantaged university candidates have to meet the basic entry standards for 
students who pay full tuition. However, they do not need to comply with the merit-based 
requirements for academic scholarships. 
25 The county courts were reluctant to recognise the existence educational discrimination based on 
race but the higher domestic courts tended to partially or fully embrace the norm. For an overview 
of the major domestic cases see S. Nemeth (Ed.) 2007. Discrimination in Education. UNESCO Country 
Report – Hungary, pp. 27-ff. 
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The anti-discrimination approach of the government sought to ensure 
equality of outcome by compensating for socio-economic disadvantage and by 
dismantling segregationist practices. Civil society representatives have repeatedly 
characterised the measures as strong, progressive, decidedly positive and thus far the 
only consistent effort to initiate systemic structural changes that challenge 
discriminatory local practices and structures (Interviews with representatives from 
the Roma Education Fund, 2014 and Chance for Children Foundation, 2014). At the 
same time, the changes did not trigger significant normative shift at the municipal 
level, within individual schools and in Hungarian society. Official figures, in fact, 
point to an increase in the number of homogenous non-Roma classes from 5.9% in 
2000 to 10.1% in 2004 and in the number of homogenous Roma classes from 10.6% 
to 13.6% for the same period (National Institute for Public Education, 2006, quoted 
in ECRI, 2009: 31, note 47). The increase suggests that discriminatory practices 
intensified locally in the face of the changes the national government was instituting.  
The major reason for the limited implementation of the anti-discrimination 
norm through the new policies was the decentralised institutional system setup that 
limited the authority of the central government.26 This meant that despite the national 
level reforms the implementation of policies was never ensured as there was little 
central monitoring. The Ministry of Education and the Commissioner’s Office within 
it had little leverage beyond providing financial incentives. Hence the measures were 
applied in a non-uniform manner depending on the mostly optional participation of 
individual municipalities. For example, the decision to apply for integration support 
and other supplementary funds was voluntary. Reports indicate municipalities were 
largely reluctant to apply because they feared political repercussions from the non-
Roma electorate (Decade Watch, 2005-2006: 89). The resistance of municipal 
authorities to the new programmes is also evidenced in the few applications to the 
grant scheme for segregated schools’ closures. The low level of applications (only 
seven in 2005) has been explained by the fact that electability considerations 
outweighed the financial burden of maintaining segregation (ibid). Observations by 
the Minorities Ombudsman also alleged that local governments were not just 
reluctant to synergise their policies with the national ones. Instead they often 
                                                          
26 The decentralisation of the education system during the 1990s gave municipal governments 
authority over schools and the free choice of schools introduced in 1985 gave parents the option to 
enrol children in schools beyond their catchment area. 
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engaged in discriminatory practices like undermining effective supervisory 
procedures when it came to the placement of children in special schools (Roma 
Education Fund, 2007: 33). The resistance of local authorities to normative change is 
demonstrated by their refusal to communicate with the national government about 
the new measures. For example, only six out of twenty-three counties sent local 
representatives to a national communications meeting on special schools monitoring. 
This low attendance underscores the gulf between the priorities of national and local 
political actors (Nemeth, 2007: 23). The impact through the judiciary was also 
limited. Even though domestic courts sided with the plaintiffs in many of the anti-
segregationist lawsuits, due to the civil law system verdicts did not extend beyond 
the circumstances of individual cases and the implementation varied significantly 
depending on the local context.  
The ineffectiveness of the national government in explaining and justifying 
the reforms to municipalities, educators, and the general public also contributed to 
the negligible ‘on the ground’ impact of the anti-discrimination norm. Conversations 
with former government consultants and current authorities suggest the government 
did not have a communication strategy in place. Instead, it went ahead with the 
reforms without public discussions on the issue (Interview with a legal expert, 2014). 
The government struggled to construct frames that were persuasive, resonated with 
the majority and publicised the measures in a positive way (Interview with officials 
in the Ministry of Human Resources, Secretariat of Roma Inclusion, 2014). Positive 
discrimination, inclusive education and desegregation were often perceived as 
foreign and relevant for non-Hungarian (namely western) societies or remained 
unfamiliar and vague notions. These perceptions suggest that although the resistance 
of local officials was frequently motivated by pragmatic electoral concerns and 
direct racism in some cases, it was also due to a lack of understanding of how to 
apply the new concepts in practice. 
This analysis clarifies the conditions that allow for domestic norm 
conformity to occur. The Czech case shows that domestic norm diffusion is 
impossible when national political elites contest the norm regardless of the strength 
of norm enterprising efforts from the supranational level. The Hungarian case 
demonstrates that norm internalisation is not guaranteed even when the key drivers 
of normative change, the national political elites, initiate comprehensive reforms and 
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persistently challenge the existing counter norms. The actions of these norm 
entrepreneurs are seriously constrained within a decentralised government system, 
especially where the new norm is opposed by local actors despite having garnered 
support across all branches of the national government. 
Norm erosion: Roma politics, 2008 – present 
 This section traces the process of norm reversal which started in the last years 
of the centre-left government and accelerated and intensified under the Orbán 
government. The analysis highlights the similarities between the behaviour of the 
Radical Republicans towards the end of the First Reconstruction, 1874-1877, and the 
Hungarian liberal elites, 2008-2010. Both sets of norm entrepreneurs reneged on 
their norm commitment once it was no longer viable to uphold the norm without 
serious political risk for their parties’ electability. The re-centralisation of the 
government system under PM Orbán’s leadership (2010 – present) has been 
inconsequential as far as norm progress goes. Indeed, it has facilitated further norm 
erosion because it has made it easier for the conservative elites to undermine the 
norm through a myriad of new legislation and policy changes. The disintegration of 
the system of checks and balances and the concentration of the power within the 
executive branch have eliminated the possibility for institutional norm support from 
the legislative and judicial branches. 
 The section begins by assessing the broader political developments that led 
the Hungarian liberal elites between 2008 and 2010 to the decision to abandon their 
anti-discrimination agenda. It traces the shifts of patterns in the public discourse 
about racial anti-discrimination paying attention to the large role extreme right-wing 
parties have had in increasing social tensions and in particular anti-Roma sentiments. 
It then focuses on the behaviour of the FIDESZ political elites from their rise to 
power in 2010 onwards. FIDESZ’s offensive against the anti-discrimination norm as 
regards the Roma and promotion of segregationist and exclusionary state practices 
have undone the previous gains and resulted in the civic death of the norm. 
The rise of extreme right-wing ideology 
 The softening of the socialist’s government’s anti-discrimination stance 
began with the onset of the economic crisis in the late 2000s. This period was also 
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characterised by the parallel, rapid rise of anti-Roma rhetoric advanced by 
increasingly popular right-wing parties especially the Hungarian Guard and Jobbik27. 
Surveys assessing the application of anti-discrimination and integration measures 
point to a sharp decline of the norm in the Hungarian political context at this time. 
While a 2007 Decade Watch report placed Hungary on the top of best performing 
Roma Decade participants, a 2009 Decade Watch survey evaluating the impact of 
governmental policies on Roma concluded that Hungary, along with the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, performed the worst. These markedly contrasting findings 
suggest that the anti-discrimination norm underwent a sharp decline in Hungary 
between 2007 and 2009 (Decade Watch, 2010: 8). 
 To understand the social transformations that led to the explicit targeting of 
Romani communities in the last years of the socialist-liberal government in Hungary 
it is necessary to take into consideration the undercurrent of discriminatory practices 
that persisted throughout the previous reform period and the local resistance to 
desegregation measures. The widespread societal uncertainty in the already 
stagnating pre-crisis Hungarian economy and the general disappointment with the 
ruling government served as the immediate triggers for social discontent. The 
disappointment with the ruling political elites culminated in the resignation of PM 
Gyurcsány in 2009 after a series of political and corruption scandals and 
significantly contributed to the rising social tensions (Norwegian Helsinki 
Committee, 2013: 7). In this climate, Jobbik’s advancement of ‘Roma criminality’ as 
an explanatory category for the social ills gained momentum and the fragile 
prohibitive boundaries around proper political discourse on Roma, which the 
government had promoted, collapsed (Bernáth and Messing, 2013: 9-10). A survey 
shows that in 2008 over 90% of interviewees affirmed the existence of a ‘Roma 
criminality’ phenomenon while over 70% held that Roma were more predisposed to 
commit crime than non-Roma (ibid., 10). Hungarian experts identify the highly 
publicised killing of a sportsman allegedly by individuals of Romani ethnicity as the 
“deal” that sealed the social consensus on Roma criminality (ibid. and interview with 
a legal expert, 2014). In response to these shifts in societal sentiments and opinions, 
the socialist government’s support for the norm weakened considerably as evidenced 
by the gradual replacement of the human rights discourse with a discourse on 
                                                          
27 The far right Movement for a Better Hungary. 
158 
 
economic measures and by the drastic reduction of the Equal Treatment Authority 
budget (Interview with a legal expert, 2014 and ERRC, 2013). Much like its Radical 
Reconstruction counterparts in the 1870s, the government abandoned its lofty 
ideational pledge in the face of impending threats to their re-electability prospects. 
The rise of Jobbik to a parliamentary party in the post-2010 political reality 
also contributed to the norm erosion by bringing extreme right-wing rhetoric into 
mainstream politics and so constricting the existing political space for counter-
arguments (FXB Center for Health and Human Rights, 2014). Anti-Roma marches in 
Roma neighbourhoods in economically suppressed regions and calls for Roma 
expulsions orchestrated by Jobbik and its sister organisations were employed as 
election campaign tools both at the national and the local level deconstructing and 
reinterpreting the existing patterns of appropriate behaviour.28 Nationally, Jobbik ran 
both of its campaigns on the promise to draw attention to the issue of ‘Hungarian-
Roma’ coexistence positioning itself as the only political force capable of solving the 
‘problem of Gypsy crime’ through punitive measures (Magyar Távirati Iroda, 2013a 
and 2013b). Jobikk’s senior leaders framed the Roma issue using emotive and urgent 
language to appeal to the majority linking the ‘Gypsy’ situation to ‘civil war’, which 
can be resolved only through drastic interventions. In their words, for those 
unwilling to return to a “world of work, laws and education” two alternatives were 
proposed “they can either...leave the country because we will simply no longer put 
up with lifestyles dedicated to freeloading and criminality; or, there is always prison” 
(Traynor, 2010). The resonance and ‘normative fit’ of Jobbik’s message with voters’ 
perceptions of Roma has been very successful. In 2010, the party won 16% of the 
popular vote, which represents an eightfold increase from the 2006 elections. In the 
2014 elections, Jobbik increased its gains to 20% of the popular vote making it one 
of the most successful right-wing parties in Europe (Mudde, 2014). 
The shift in mainstream political discourse is commonly associated with 
Jobbik’s parliamentary gains. However, as Bernáth and Messing (2013: 11) have 
shown, Jobbik has no exclusive dominion over false generalisations, stereotyping 
and hate speech. In fact, right-wing provocative messages are perilous not only 
                                                          
28 See, for example, Magyar Távirati Iroda. 2010. Socialists outraged by Jobbik mayoral candidate’s 
call to banish Roma criminals. 26 August 2010. Available at 
http://www.politics.hu/20100826/socialists-outraged-by-jobbik-mayoral-candidates-call-to-banish-
roma-criminals/ (accessed on 19 December 2015).  
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because of their stigmatising, oversimplified and aggressive solutions to the Roma 
situation but also because they can obfuscate and normalise equally dangerous 
though less obvious prejudicial statements and behaviours of mainstream political 
elites like FIDESZ. Both types of political statements, the authors argue, have 
influenced and reinforced the spread of anti-Roma sentiments. Their analysis of 
media discourse on Roma shows the almost complete disappearance of the coverage 
of discrimination-related issues from the public domain. While in 2000, articles on 
the issue made up 22% of all Roma-related articles, in 2011 they had diminished to 
3% (Bernáth and Messing, 2013: 26). In contrast, commentaries that present Roma 
exclusion as the outcome of the minority’s unwillingness to integrate had increased 
considerably (ibid.). While the human rights discourse on Roma has all but vanished, 
the discourse on Roma criminality is ascendant. In their media sample, Bernáth and 
Messing show that crime-related articles involving Roma individuals rose from 25% 
in 1996-1997 to 37% in 2010-2011, with the newspaper with largest readership in 
Hungary presenting Roma in a criminal context in roughly half of its articles. Also 
problematic is their conclusion that public policy articles focus on the high levels of 
financial spending on Roma and rarely report on policy implementation and impact, 
thus furthering the public’s impression of Roma as a burden on the public assistance 
system (ibid., 20-27). 
This section has examined the shifts of patterns in the public discourse about 
racial anti-discrimination. It focused on the role extreme right-wing parties have had 
in constructing a political reality in which discussions on racial equality have 
become a taboo. The analysis has shown that the rapid decline of the norm was the 
outcome of cardinal political shifts in Hungary, which saw the distancing of the 
socialist government from its anti-discrimination agenda and paralleled the rise of 
right-wing ideology. The next section will focus on the behaviour of the Orbán-led 
political elites. In it I argue that the FIDESZ government has consistently subverted 
the norm by framing anti-discrimination as an unhelpful political concept, by 
eschewing its incorporation into its policies and by producing new ones that have 
had a disproportionately negative impact upon individuals of Romani ethnicity. The 
re-centralisation of the system of governance and the breakdown of the system of 
checks and balances have also contributed to the civic death of the norm. 
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FIDESZ’s approach to race and anti-discrimination  
The Orbán government, which came to power in 2010 and was re-elected in 
2014, has marginalised the racial anti-discrimination norm and reversed the 
progressive politics of the previous government towards Roma integration. The 
constitutional reforms and institutional consolidation undertaken by FIDESZ have 
concentrated governing power in the hands of the executive. This concentration of 
power, the international community and domestic activists argue, has led to the 
deconstruction of the system of checks and balances and the overall decline of 
democratic governance in Hungary (Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 2013). János 
Kornai (2015: 4) describes the post-2010 developments as a “sharp U-turn” taken by 
the FIDESZ government that has started the systemic destruction of Hungary’s 
fundamental institutions of democracy. In practice, Kornai argues, “the executive 
and legislative branches are no longer separate, as they are both controlled by the 
energetic and heavy hand of … [Viktor Orbán] who has positioned himself at the 
very pinnacle of power…” (ibid). The legislative branch has become a law factory 
whose sole function is to stamp the new legislation mostly with no parliamentary 
discussions “at unbelievable speed” (ibid., 5).  
The ruling political group also seems to be taking control over the judiciary. 
The Chief Prosecutor whose office should in theory be independent from the rest of 
the government was selected by PM Orbán rather than parliament which 
formalistically approved the appointment. The President of the Supreme Court, who 
had been appointed by the previous government, was dismissed early, before his 
term expired. A new institution, the National Office for the Judiciary, was created 
and from the very beginning was vested with exceptionally wide powers: both to 
appoint judges and to decide which cases should be heard by which courts. 
Particularly troubling was the administration’s move to reduce significantly the 
retirement age for judges, which resulted in the expulsion of the older generation, 
including progressively minded judges in leading positions within the judiciary 
system (ibid.,6 and Dezso, Czigler and Takacs, 2012 and Gyulavári and Hős, 2013). 
The authoritarian approach of the FIDESZ political elite means that the 
legislative and judiciary branches are no longer able to serve as a counter-balance to 
monitor and limit the actions of the ruling group. Neither are they able to provide an 
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alternative discourse to keep the racial equality norm on the political agenda. The 
government itself has not delayed putting an end to the norm’s political existence. 
The changes the executive instituted within the Equal Treatment Authority and the 
Minorities Ombudsman’s office have undermined the state’s protection of the Roma 
minority. The government abolished the ETA advisory board of human rights 
experts, whose role was to monitor and provide guidelines for the proper 
implementation of the Hungarian anti-discrimination law (ERRC, 2013). On the 
basis of Hungary’s new constitution and the new Nationalities Act adopted in 2011, 
the positions of the four Commissioners were consolidated into a single post, the 
Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, who is aided by deputies one of which is 
responsible for the protection of the rights of nationalities. This, in practice, means 
significant curtailment of power and capacity. The deputy, unlike the former 
Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minorities, no longer has independent 
powers, cannot launch ex officio investigations and operates with 3 instead of the 
previous 15 staff members (Interview with a legal advisor in the Office of the 
Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, 2014 and Decade of Roma Inclusion, 2013: 
35). The new government also terminated the Roma Anti-Discrimination Client 
Service Network eliminating the only free legal aid provider for Roma (Decade of 
Roma Inclusion, 2013: 34). 
These changes confirm that the Orbán government tolerates “no liberal fuss 
about rights and liberties” (Interview with administrators in the Secretariat of Roma 
Inclusion, 2014). It is especially troubling that the government uses its power to 
define ‘proper’ behavior through penal measures de facto implementing Jobbik’s 
political platform. Two recent measures will have a disproportionately negative 
impact on young Roma. The amendment to the 2011 Petty Offences Act now allows 
for the imprisonment of juveniles while changes to the Criminal Code lower the age 
for serious crimes to 12 years (Decade of Roma Inclusion, 2013: 43). The changes 
reflect the FIDESZ political message of ‘strengthen[ing] the order of daily life’ by 
enacting laws that enjoy popular support and are perceived as enhancing public 
safety and order. At the same time, through these reforms the ruling elite 
oversimplifies the complex issues of poverty and social inequalities and therefore 
enables practices of institutional discrimination to continue. 
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In terms of Roma-specific policies, FIDESZ has actively promoted a so 
called “new paradigmatic shift”, which places the responsibility for integration on 
the targeted minority which ought to live according to the standards and expectations 
of the majority society (Interview with the Minster of State for Social Inclusion, 
2014). This is problematic because it distorts the very concept of integration and 
obfuscates the responsibility of the government to ensure proper policy design and 
implementation and the responsibility of the ethnic majority to provide the 
environment in which Hungarian Roma can exercise full citizenship rights. The 
Minister for Social Inclusion who characterises the human rights approach of its 
predecessors as ineffective has sought to replace it with a ‘common sense’ 
perspective that he claims will deal efficaciously with everyday problems (ibid). 
However, he has not been able to articulate what the ‘common sense’ perspective is 
and why it is preferred to the implementation of the existing anti-discrimination 
legislation by the specialised equality bodies to resolve problems related to racial 
discrimination. He also discards the need for anti-discrimination awareness raising 
campaigns with the simplistic argument that everything is being provided for the 
Roma but they do not take advantage of the provisions (ibid). In sum, FIDESZ’s 
version of Roma integration presents the Roma minority as a homogenous group of 
undeserving and irresponsible individuals while absolving the government and the 
majority from social responsibility. 
 The actions of the FIDESZ senior leadership in the field of education are 
particularly striking as they point to the state’s explicit approval and promotion of 
educational inequality and even school segregation on the basis of ethnicity. The re-
centralisation of the educational system undertaken by FIDESZ, which makes the 
state rather than the municipality the maintainer of public schools, has facilitated the 
implementation of new legislation and policies that have effectively destroyed the 
previous anti–segregation efforts. In terms of access to higher education, the 
government has reduced the number of state-sponsored university places. The 
reduction has drastically diminished the educational prospects of the already 
negligible number of qualified Romani students (Decade of Roma Inclusion, 2013: 
52). The government has also lowered the compulsory school age from 18 to 16, 
which educational experts warn will have a disparate impact on Romani children as 
this will make it easier for schools to refuse enrollment to Romani students since the 
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schools will no longer be legally required to do so for their post-16 classes 
(Interview with a representative from the Roma Education Fund, 2014). The 
Ministry of Justice has also proposed an amendment to the Act on Equal Treatment 
to amend the provision of equal opportunities in relation to education to “equal 
opportunities and catch up29 segregated classes”. The proposed amendment codifies 
segregation and prevents lawsuits against the state (Decade of Roma Inclusion, 2013: 
61).  
The marginalization of civil society organisations with experience in 
integrated schooling30 and the outsourcing of segregated schools to churches and the 
Roma Minority Self-Government have become an important feature of the 
government’s approach to do away with the integration question. Minority self-
governments, according to the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, are ill-suited 
to run schools because of their lack of capacity and expertise in the field of 
education.  Additionally, since the students are exclusively of Romani ethnicity, 
these schools draw a high percentage of multiply disadvantaged children, which in 
practice makes them segregated schools that provide inferior education (Hungarian 
Commissioner for Fundamental Rights). In effect, by providing incentives for 
minority self-governments to run their own nationality schools, the national 
government transfers the responsibility for school segregation onto the local Roma 
leadership. 
Extensive church engagement in education is another prominent feature of 
Minster Balog’s politics.31 He views the role of the church as a helper of 
disadvantaged communities able to provide Romani children with added “spiritual 
and disciplinary” guidance (Interview with the Minster of State for Social Inclusion, 
                                                          
29 “Catch up classes” is a well-known euphemism for segregated schooling. The expression is 
employed widely by the ruling elite in the domestic public discourse. ‘Integration’ is the term 
reserved for these same practices before international audiences. 
30The government treats civil society organisations as political actors rather than policy partners. In 
practice, this treatment precludes expert input in important legislation. Civil society organisations, 
especially those associated with George Soros, are perceived as competitors who strive to influence 
policy-making processes and who have to be “reigned in” and “re-oriented” to support FIDESZ’s 
politics. (Interview with the Minster of State for Social Inclusion, 2014 and Interview with 
administrators in the Secretariat of Roma Inclusion, 2014). 
31 The Minster of Human Resources, Zoltán Balog, who in the current state of consolidation 
supervises the Ministry of Education and the Secretariat of Social Inclusion, has complete power to 
restructure all segregated school districts but he has rejected the possibility. A former theologian, 
Balog has given the church privileged status as State Partner on educational matters.  
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2014). Balog has encouraged churches which have traditionally been responsible for 
private elite education to take over “catch up”, or in other words, former and current 
segregated schools. The Nyíregyháza lawsuit is particularly revealing of the extent of 
the minister’s promotion of segregation and of the arguments he [and the rest of the 
FIDESZ elite] uses to justify school apartheid. At the trial, Minster Balog took the 
stand as a witness for the church, which had re-opened a segregated school in a 
Romani neighborhood32. Balog argued for the need for a two-stage integration 
process in which the less able students first “catch up” in a separate educational 
environment and then integrate into mainstream schools (Mohásci, 2014). The re-
opened Roma school was framed as allowing the students to study in “a loving, 
accepting and open atmosphere, close to their families” (Hungarian Ministry of 
Human Resources, 2013). At the same time, it was clear that the church did not 
intend to integrate the students in the near or distant future because it refused to 
enroll Roma children who had displayed interest in its downtown elite school since it 
would be “harmful to other children” (Mohásci, 2014). 
The government’s framing of integration as a ‘catch up’ process is politically 
convenient because unlike the frames used by the previous government – positive 
discrimination, desegregation and inclusive education – it reflects cultural and 
historic norms and in practice realises Jobbik’s populist agenda [and the aspirations 
of its voters] to situate the Roma in the proper social stratum, aka the bottom of 
society, while dismantling the vestiges of social solidarity. The case highlights the 
unsuitability of churches and minority self-governments to perform integrative 
functions and the absence of political space for domestic norm enterprising non-state 
actors to engage in a dialogue with the ruling political group. The post-2010 political 
shift towards re-centralisation and authoritarian rule has been very successful in 
eroding the racial anti-discrimination norm. The present situation in Hungary is 
reminiscent of the period between the two reconstructions in the southern United 
States,1877- 1954, where much in the same way the federal government reneged its 
                                                          
32The Roma school in Nyíregyháza was closed down during the anti-segregation campaign of the 
socialist government and the children were bussed to other schools in town. After the Greek 
Catholic Church, which already runs an elite school in the city, took over the building, it reopened it 
as a segregated school. Material incentives and the termination of the bus service programme under 
the orders of the FIDESZ town mayor left little choice for the Romani parents but to re-enroll their 
children in the segregated school. The Chance for Children Foundation took the case to court 
requesting the school’s closure and its transformation into an afterschool activity centre.  
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commitment to racial equality and protection for its African American citizens 
because of instrumental concerns related to the general societal hostility against the 
norm and future party electability. The retreat of the US federal government from 
state matters and Hungary’s re-centralisation both resulted in the destruction of the 
race anti-discrimination norm. These parallel facts reconfirm that the behaviour of 
political elites in power (whether it is inaction or the active promotion of counter-
norms) determines if norm cascading and internalisation would take place and the 
degree of their success.  
Conclusion 
 This analysis has traced the shifts in the development of the anti-
discrimination norm in relation to Hungarian Roma. It has challenged the linear 
framework of the norm life cycle model by demonstrating that norm movements 
from stage to stage and within each stage are dynamic and vary depending on the 
behaviour of national ruling elites and secondary enabling conditions namely the 
setup of the state’s government system, the existence of domestic counter norms and 
the degree of societal opposition to the new norm. In the Hungarian case, the 
internalisation stage was characterised by rapid norm progression throughout the 
2000s at the national level due to the ambitious agenda of the ruling elites followed 
by a subsequent erosion of the norm from the late 2000s onwards. The research 
suggests that even at the height of the norm’s progress, institutional norm 
entrepreneurs had limited success. They made important inroads in terms of the 
norm’s institutionalisation into anti-discrimination legislation and desegregation 
action programmes. However, they faced strong resistance from municipalities and 
the general public. The decentralised and fragmented administrative structure of the 
Hungarian state at the time and the lack of effective framing of the norm, which was 
perceived as vague, foreign and a poor ‘cultural match’, explain the limited salience 
of the norm in Hungary despite the ambitious agenda of the norm entrepreneurs.  
The analysis of domestic norm internalisation shows that besides long-term 
norm conformity (US Second Reconstruction and UK cases) and norm rejection 
from the onset (Czech case), there is a third possible scenario, incomplete 
internalisation, which is visible in Hungary and the Frist Reconstruction in the 
United States. Incomplete internalisation takes place when a set of norm-supporting 
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political elites makes important steps to codify the norm into national law and policy 
but the succeeding set of political elites un-does the previous gains. The Hungarian 
case (pre-2010) and the case of the First Reconstruction in the United States have 
shown that two factors account for incomplete internalisation. First, the norm tends 
to be short-lived when the ideational and instrumental motives that underpin the 
behaviour of the norm enterprising national elites diverge. Second, the chance for 
norm reversal is greater when the institutional norm entrepreneurs act within a 
decentalised system of governance and face significant resistance from the local 
authorities and the ethnic majority. Under these circumstances decentralisation 
hinders the internalisation of the new norm. Temporary centralisation also presents a 
barrier to norm internalisation because it does not provide sufficient timeframe and 
permanent mechanisms to ensure long-term norm compliance. The next chapter 
further analyses the different norm internalisation scenarios.  
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Chapter Six 
Theorising normative change 
This thesis has traced the journey of the racial anti-discrimination role by 
applying Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle model and the wider literature on 
norm compliance to five case studies to examine the validity of their core premises. 
This final chapter compares the findings across the cases. It concludes that the 
investigation into the creation, diffusion and internalisation of the racial anti-
discrimination norm problematises several of the key assumptions made by 
Finnemore and Sikkink, specifically as regarding the structure of the model’s 
framework, the motives that drive norm entrepreneurs, and the dominant 
mechanisms they employ to produce normative change. Unlike the norm life cycle 
model which privileges the transnational norm entrepreneurs as the agents of 
normative change, the thesis studied the agency of domestic norm entrepreneurs, in 
particular domestic political elites, whose actions it argued impact the construction 
of new norms when they emerge first in a domestic context and the 
institutionalisation of these norms in domestic laws, policies and structures. This 
approach sought to complement Finnemore and Sikkink’s model and to contribute to 
the literature on domestic compliance with international standards of appropriate 
behavior.  
The empirical findings contradict the linear and sequential presentation of the 
evolution of new norms and problematise the design of the individual stages of the 
model in terms of the level of norm construction and the signifiers that are employed 
to mark the start of a successful norm cascade. The evidence points to the need for a 
complementary conceptualisation of the identity of the norm entrepreneurs. It 
recognises domestic governing elites as norm entrepreneurs who can drive norm 
creation33, diffusion and internalisation and who are supported in their actions by 
domestic and/or international advocacy networks and international organisations. It 
points to a complex interaction between ideational and instrumental motives that can 
either drive norm entrepreneurship (when ideas and instrumentalism pursue the same 
objective) or lead to norm regression (when pragmatic considerations diverge from 
ideational commitments).  
                                                          
33 This is valid if the norm originates in a domestic context.  
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The findings confirm the model’s hypothesis that norm socialisation is 
essential for the success of norm cascading and for the permanent embeddedness of 
new norms in the political, institutional and social order of states. However, norm 
socialisation only works if national elites display the political will and commitment 
to recognise and promote the new norm. When it comes to norm internalization, 
using Cortell and Davis’s work on domestic structures (2005), I have argued 
throughout the thesis that the state’s system of government acts as an intervening 
variable which can either enable or constrain norm conformity. The norm enforcing 
agenda of national elites can be significantly constrained if the system is 
decentralised and there is widespread opposition to the new norm at the local level. 
The institutionalisation of a new norm tends to be long-term and minimally 
contested if the norm-promoting national elites act in a centralised system. Finally, 
the government setup is mostly irrelevant if national elites are indifferent to the 
given norm although a centralised system can contribute to the civic death of new 
norms if the national elites are hostile to the norms in question. 
 The chapter begins by outlining the main problems the thesis of the racial 
anti-discrimination norm presents to the norm life cycle model when it comes to its 
overall structure and its individual phases. It then turns to each phase addressing the 
contradictions between the empirical evidence and the model’s theories. Besides 
pointing to the weaknesses, the chapter develops the model further by paying special 
attention to the norm internalisation phase.  The findings suggest three possible 
internalisation scenarios depending on the actions of national political elites – no 
internalisation, incomplete internalisation and permanent internalisation.   
The chapter concludes by addressing the weaknesses of traditional, positivist-
oriented constructivism to derive a general theory of normative change. It suggests 
that norms like racial anti-discrimination, which are related to issues of identity and 
belonging, may be too complex to be explained solely by causal models of norm 
evolution. Such norms could be more deeply investigated by post-structuralist and 
critical constructuvist approaches that adopt post-positivist methodologies which use 
social theory, historical sociology, and linguistics to explore the linkages between 
the discursive and historical constitution of identities (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). 
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The structure of the norm life cycle model 
 The case studies in this thesis show that the three clearly defined and separate 
phases of the norm life cycle model are in practice more complex than postulated by 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). Each of the three phases of norm evolution 
frequently incorporates within itself elements of the other two stages. The US case 
study in chapter one, which traces the emergence of the racial anti-discrimination 
norm contains elements of domestic norm cascading and norm acceptance. The UK 
and EU cases in chapters two and three, which showcase the diffusion of the norm 
also display features of norm construction and norm acceptance in the respective 
political contexts.  Even the Hungarian and Czech studies in chapters 4 and 5 that 
trace the norm cascade from the moment it enters the domestic political space and its 
path to internalisation, begin by examining the emergence of the norm into the 
state’s political order. In other words, the model does not just consist of three distinct 
phases but of modified and smaller scale norm life cycles within each phase. This 
adds a layer of complexity and brings a degree of dynamism to the model.  
 Related to this is the main conclusion that the thesis confirms earlier 
criticisms of the model’s linear and consecutive presentation of norm evolution. The 
US and Hungarian cases most clearly dispute the assumed linear pattern of the 
norm’s development. In the two cases, we witness dynamic norm movements as the 
norm undergoes dramatic leaps forward, serious setbacks and long-lasting 
stagnation. At the extreme, the norm undergoes a civic death as the developments at 
the end of the First Reconstruction in the US and the FIDESZ rule in Hungary 
demonstrate. The US case also shows that it is possible for eroded norms not only to 
re-emerge in the presence of new triggers but to achieve permanent 
institutionalisation in the government system of the state.  
 Besides demonstrating that norm movements from stage to stage and within 
each stage are varied and dynamic, the thesis has identified the factors which 
determine the course of the new norm’s progress, stagnation or destruction. The 
norm’s movements in the case studies, I have argued, have depended considerably 
on the actions of national ruling elites and on secondary enabling conditions the most 
significant of which is the type of the state’s government system followed by the 
existence or absence of counter norms and the degree and breadth of the societal 
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opposition to the new norm. I have noted that the norm enterprising behaviour of the 
Congressional Reconstructionists – the establishment of federal authority and 
military control over the Southern states – was key in realising racial equality in the 
aftermath of the Civil War. In the same way, the actions of the national elites namely 
the withdrawal of the legislative and executive branches from governing the affairs 
of the conquered Confederate states and the actions of the judiciary which legalised 
racial segregation, led to the norm’s demise. Similarly, the norm re-emerged on the 
political agenda only after the judicial activism of the US Supreme Court and the 
follow up actions of political elites within Congress and the Office of the President, 
including the mobilisation of the military, which enforced the rights of African 
American citizens. 
 Similar conclusions about the driving forces behind the progress or decline of 
new norms can be drawn from the Hungarian case. The racial anti-discrimination 
norm was raised to prominence throughout the 2000s as a result of the ambitious 
agenda of the Centre-left elites, which made significant inroads in terms of the 
norm’s institutionalisation into anti-discrimination legislation and desegregation 
programmes. However, their impact was severely hampered by a decentralised 
administrative system and strong local resistance by the authorities and the ethnic 
majority. The subsequent erosion of the norm under the Orbán government 
effectively deinstitutionalised the norm and reversed the progressive policies. The 
empirical evidence, therefore, calls for the model’s re-design, to reflect the 
complexity and dynamic nature of the life of norms. The model should be re-drawn 
to incorporate the possibility for small-scale norm life cycles within the main 
framework and to allow for non-linear movement of norms while further specifying 
the primary agents and the enabling conditions that determine the norm’s 
development.  
Norm emergence 
International and domestic norms 
I have noted that the distinction Finnemore and Sikkink make between 
international and domestic norms is problematic and presents analytical difficulties 
for research on norms. Many international norms, as Finnemore and Sikkink 
recognise, start out as domestic norms and subsequently become internationalised 
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(1998: 893). By claiming that domestic norms ought to be analysed separately, they 
present the ontological beginning of international norms at the moment in which the 
new norm emerges at the supranational level regardless of whether it originated in a 
domestic or international environment (ibid). Their analytical framework needs to be 
either re-thought or complemented by a separate approach that examines domestic 
agency because for those international norms whose construction takes place in a 
domestic context, it means that the norm life cycle both misses a critical step in their 
development and prevents the examination of the causal mechanisms that drive norm 
building and norm diffusion at the national level. This thesis has shown that 
beginning at the level at which the new norm is articulated initially, is critical for 
analysing the norm creation phase accurately and for accounting for the factors that 
determine the norm’s successful or failed emergence and cascading.  
The model could be re-designed to allow for two distinct norm emergence 
scenarios depending on the context in which the norm is constructed and for 
different causal mechanisms. If the norm is constructed domestically, the national 
elites could play a substantial role in the production and especially in the subsequent 
institutionalisation of the norm. Non-state enterprising actors – networks of loosely 
connected domestic advocacy networks – tend to act as an intervening factor. They 
seek to influence the policy choices of national elites and to enhance the prevention 
of norm reversal. If the norm originates at the regional or international level, 
international organisations and transnational advocacy networks drive the norm 
building process. 
Norm entrepreneurs  
Finnemore and Sikkink present norm emergence as a process that is realised 
by the actions of transnational norm entrepreneurs namely non-governmental 
organisations and individual actors embedded within them and the networks the 
NGOs form (1998: 897-900). These norm entrepreneurs aim to secure the support of 
critical states and major international organisations to endorse the new norm and 
make it a part of their high level agenda (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 897-901). 
This research into the genesis of the racial anti-discrimination norm points to the 
possibility for an alternative and at the same time complementary approach in which 
national political elites influence norm building and the norm’s subsequent 
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internalisation through its institutionalisation into law, policy and institutional 
practice. The construction of the anti-discrimination norm in the US case shows that 
national governing elites influenced both the formal recognition of the new norm and 
its subsequent institutionalisation and adherence. The analysis of the First 
Reconstruction demonstrates that that the Republican governing elites at the time 
were the key actors who advocated for and had the power to initiate post-war 
reforms that formally incorporated former slaves into the community of American 
citizens and granted them access to political participation.They constructed the new 
norm through legislative, judiciary and military means leading to the brief 
flourishing of the racial equality norm in the aftermath of the Civil War and its 
permanent institutionalisation during the Second Reconstruction.  
The norm commitment of the national governing elites is evidenced in their 
choice of discourse, which framed the Confederate states as “conquered provinces” 
under the control of Congress creating a political reality that allowed the Radical 
Republican-controlled Congress to pursue its Reconstruction agenda to 
“revolutionize the South’s institutions, manners and habits” (McPherson, 1992: 6). 
The choice of reform – the conferral of citizenship upon the former slaves and the 
prohibition of voting denial on account of race, color or former servitude in the 
constitution – provided the highest level of norm institutionalisation because 
constitutional amendments are nearly impossible to reverse as opposed to other 
forms of Congressional legislation. The validation and upholding of the newly 
granted citizenship and the suppression of Confederate separatism through 
reinventing the social and political opportunity structures in the South would not 
have been possible without the agency of the Radical Republican faction. These 
actors also constructed new institutions, the Department of Justice and the Office of 
the Solicitor General, to enforce the norm and protect citizens’ rights. They drafted 
and passed the first Civil Rights legislation prohibiting racial segregation and used 
their constitutionally bestowed powers to employ the military to enforce compliance 
with the newly constructed norm of racial equality. Once the political support for the 
radical Republican policies declines and the Compromise of 1877 was finalised, we 
almost immediately see erosion of the norm in the swift ‘redeeming of the South’ 
through the resurgence of Southern nationalism and social practices. These ante-
bellum social practices reinvented the social hierarchy based on white supremacy 
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and legal codes which instituted apartheid and directly and indirectly robbed the new 
citizens of their rights.  
The developments during the Second Reconstruction reinforce the argument 
about the key role governing elites have in constructing and enforcing the racial anti-
discrimination norm. The unanimous judiciary reversal of the ‘separate but equal’ 
doctrine in Brown, which was eventually enforced by the president’s emergency 
measures through the mobilisation of the United States Army and the federalization 
of the National Guard in a number of southern states, further demonstrates that 
national political elites are necessary for the recognition and institutionalisation of 
new norms. These elites are necessary because they have the available resources and 
legal authority to enforce norm compliance at the regional and local levels even in 
exceedingly hostile contexts, in which the majority population and local political 
elites endorse counter norms.  
The American example, however, also underscores the supporting role of 
non-state norm enterprising agents, in this case a loosely organised domestic 
advocacy network of African American organisations, in norm production and 
compliance. The First and Second Reconstruction show that the risk of norm erosion 
is significantly higher in the absence of domestic non-state norm entrepreneurs who 
raise and keep the issue on the political agenda, raise awareness and provide expert 
information on norm-related violations. Despite their radical reforms, governing 
elites during the First Reconstruction soon reneged on their commitment to social 
integration. Other post-war issues – electoral politics and reconciliation –quickly 
became perceived as urgent enough to address even at the expense of the rights 
bestowed upon the new citizens. These other priorities plunged the attempts at racial 
equality construction into a period of norm decay, which reached its height with the 
legal codification of racial discrimination at state and local level under the ‘separate 
but equal’ principle. During the Second Reconstruction, however, the sustained 
pressure by African American legal elites resulted in the judicial delegitimation of 
racial discrimination norms. The advocacy work of African American civil groups 
influenced the emergence of a cross-party consensus on the implementation of the 
racial anti-discrimination norm and a consistent political discourse that since then 
has affirmed the norm and continues to frame African Americans as a constitutive 
part of the nation state.  
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The argument about the elites’ role in causing the evolution or devolution of 
new norms is not limited to the norm emergence stage. The claim that domestic 
political elites can serve as norm entrepreneurs, or norm violators depending on their 
motives and political environment, also runs through the latter stages of cascading 
and internalisation. 
Motives 
In terms of motives the original model proposes that in the norm creation 
phase norm entrepreneurs are driven by altruism, empathy and ideational 
commitment (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 898). Here Finnemore and Sikkink’s 
hypothesis is partly correct because the empirical evidence suggests that the 
motivational forces consist of a mixture of ideational and instrumental 
considerations. Although I have noted that the US elites were largely justice-driven, 
these motives which followed a logic of appropriateness were entwined with 
pragmatic concerns related to party-building and electoral outcomes. The thesis 
suggests that the steps Congressional reformers took toward the political inclusion of 
the newly freed male population in the US were seen as a matter of justice and as a 
political necessity to keep the Republican Party in power. While the African 
American vote was needed to guarantee a Republican electoral win the freedpersons 
needed to keep the party in power to ensure their own protection. Put differently, 
when ideas and instrumentality converge, they reinforce the normative commitment 
of political elites and enhance their agentiality. When they diverge, as it happened at 
the end of the First Reconstruction and the last years of the Hungarian centre-left 
government, the instrumental concerns tend to take over stalling or completely 
eroding the norm’s progress. 
To reiterate, the investigation suggests that the construction of domestic 
norms, especially those related to minorities, are largely driven by ideational 
motivations visible in the justice discourse employed by domestic norm 
entrepreneurs who tend to justify the need for a new standard by framing the given 
group as disenfranchised citizens in search of their right to belong fully into the 
nation state. Internationally crafted norms of such nature tend to be security-driven 
and reinforce the primacy of instrumentalism in international relations. This 
distinction demonstrates that the justice concept is easier to employ in domestic 
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discourses on normative change. This is due to the ability of the norm enterprising 
agents within a nation state to establish linkages between anti-discrimination and 
citizenship by framing minority groups - African Americans in the US and 
commonwealth migrants in the UK - as a constitutive part of the nation state. Similar 
frames are more difficult to construct supranationally. Such frames are less 
persuasive when employed by international organisations, which are perceived as 
having little legitimacy in determining who belongs to a given nation state, 
especially when the underlying motivations betray soft security concerns and the 
approach they use to ensure norm compliance contains a mixture of ‘carrot and stick’ 
elements. The research on the emergence of the anti-discrimination norm in relation 
to the Roma in Europe shows that European intergovernmental organisations acted 
as the driving forces behind norm construction and the initial norm diffusion was in 
part due to their ability to exercise a degree of material leverage over norm violating 
states (Sobotka, 2003, Ram, 2010 and Cahn, 2004).34 The formation of European 
Roma policy was driven by the member states’ demands for action prompted by 
migration fears and by the advocacy efforts of NGOs for the equal treatment and 
social inclusion of Roma.  
The thesis confirms what others have already found regarding different 
European institutions’ somewhat different approaches to Roma. The OSCE adopted 
a security- human rights- minority rights paradigm, the Council of Europe embraced 
migration management-human rights-minority paradigm while the European Union 
seemed to strive for diversity management and improvement of the Roma situation 
in the context of the enlargement (Sobotka, 2007:105). Yet, security concerns have 
dominated over justice and moral entrepreneurship. European institutions took on the 
new norm after Roma-related concerns of their old member states increased 
suggesting that even though the Roma issue is discursively dressed up as a human 
rights problem the underlying impetus for Roma policies has been dictated mainly 
by national interests linked to soft security and to a lesser extent in response to the 
moral pressure and advocacy work of transnational NGOs. Ultimately, the problem 
                                                          
34 A distinction should be made between the emergence of the racial anti-discrimination norm at the 
EU level and the linking of the norm with the situation of the Roma minority. The first was driven by 
the actions of domestically based norm entrepreneurs organised in the transnational advocacy 
Starting Line Group that lobbied for race equality legislation binding for all EU member states. The 
second issue was elevated to regional prominence by the major European institutions. 
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here lies in the lack of coalescence between instrumental (security) motives and 
ideational motives. To reiterate, the reinvention of the Roma as a ‘true European’ 
minority in search of reclaiming its citizenship rights and the incorporation of the 
Roma into the organisations’ human rights frameworks were not sufficiently 
persuasive to domestic political elites. Instead norm violating domestic elites 
perceived them as ambiguous and even hypocritical attempts driven by the priorities 
of influential western member states. The perception has contributed to weak norm 
conformity that has been regularly challenged across member states. 
The level of norm construction  
The level at which a new norm is constructed should also be taken into 
consideration, albeit only in conjunction with the behaviour of the norm 
entrepreneurs because it influences the norm’s prospective internalisation in the 
domestic political and social order. The US and UK studies show that norms which 
emerge domestically are more likely to achieve greater embeddedness in domestic 
laws and institutional practices even if they face staunch opposition by societies 
holding onto countervailing pre-existing customs, habits and practices. Again, this 
can be explained by the role that national elites play in the genesis of new norms, 
which in turn translates into greater commitment to policies of norm enforcement. 
The Czech case shows that norms created at the supranational level, which do not 
resonate with existing domestic understandings of proper behavour, tend to be 
perceived as imposed from above by foreign actors with insufficient domestic 
legitimacy who possess little knowledge of the domestic context. In such cases, 
national elites feel coerced to institutionalise the new norm and comply with the new 
standard in a superficial manner before the international community (formal 
acceptance without implementation) and contest the norm outright before their 
domestic audience. 
Norm cascade  
Norm entrepreneurs, motives and diffusion mechanisms 
The analysis of the process of norm cascade or the manner in which norms 
‘travel’ to other states and become embedded in their political and social order 
confirms the existence of cascading. Norm transference can and does take place 
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although it does not necessarily always take place in the way laid out by Finnemore 
and Sikkink. In terms of agency, the norm life cycle model presents international 
organisations and the networks they form along with critical states as the drivers of 
norm diffusion (1998: 898). The main mechanism they are said to employ to make 
norm violating states internalise new norms is norm socialisation (ibid). The 
empirics of this thesis, however, point to more varied pathways to norm diffusion 
and challenges the hypothesis that international actors are the sole drivers of norm 
transmission.  
The historical evidence about the formation of the UK race relations policy 
shows that the British “liberal hour” political elites were chiefly responsible for the 
transference of the norm and they have been more successful than international 
actors tasked with a similar responsibility. Curiously, the main mechanism for the 
norm diffusion was norm socialisation but in reverse. The norm life cycle model 
expects norm exporting states and international organisations to act as teachers of 
norms by applying a mixture of persuasion and knowledge exchange to positively 
influence the behaviour of national elites from the norm violating state. However, the 
UK case study shows that this is not always the case.  The UK case reveals that the 
political elites in their own context searched for a way to re-define British 
citizenship, re-categorise who belongs in the British state and how to balance the 
complexities of migration politics with justice-driven ideals. In this case there were 
no norm socialising efforts initiated by the US political elite or international 
institutions. Instead we see that British institutional norm entrepreneurs led by the 
reformer Roy Jenkins constructed the UK’s race anti-discrimination legislative 
framework by initiating direct knowledge exchange with US law makers and 
administrators at the federal and state levels and conducting first hand research on 
the American civil rights experience. This highly entrepreneurial behaviour led to 
both direct transference and modified appropriation of legal notions, practices and 
monitoring mechanisms from the US context. 
The investigation into the institutionalistion of the racial anti-discrimination 
norm at the EU level also credits domestic experts along with European institutions 
with norm diffusion. In its first half the process of EU norm synchronization was led 
by domestic elites who were mostly past and present government officials and 
experts from quasi-governmental equality bodies from the UK and a few other west 
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European states with well-developed anti-discrimination legislation whose aim was 
to institutionalise protection measures for racial minorities within the European 
Union. In its latter part the cascade phase comes closer to the model’s assumptions 
about primary agents since a number of regional institutions, particularly the Council 
of Europe and the European Union, were responsible for the further diffusion of the 
norm across their member states.  
In terms of motives, international legitimacy, reputation and esteem are not the 
only reasons why norm importing states decide to adopt new norms (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998: 898). Like their US counterparts, UK’s norm entrepreneurs were 
driven by a combination of justice-oriented and instrumental concerns linked with 
the prevention of racially motivated violence and with the search of a balancing act 
to mitigate the impact of increasingly restrictive immigration controls.  In the EU 
case, however, the justice-driven arguments were subsumed by economic concerns 
linked to the lack of an anti-discrimination standard across member states and rising 
nationalism in Europe. The discourse employed by the principal agents here did not 
frame the proposal for EU anti-discrimination legislation as socially transformative 
but as a logical next step that builds upon European gender anti-discrimination laws.  
When it comes to the mechanisms that the norm entrepreneurs employ to 
facilitate the cascade in the EU case, the findings support the model’s claim that 
socialisation, demonstration and institutionalisation account for the international 
diffusion of norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1989: 898). In the early part of the 
cascade, it appears that a knowledge transfer took place as the Race Equality 
Directive incorporated the main legal notions found in UK race anti-discrimination 
law. The knowledge transfer, however, was a very different affair compared to the 
transatlantic norm diffusion. It relied exclusively on ‘push’ factors, the committed 
anti-discrimination experts from the Starting Line Group, and lacked a pull factor 
namely the commitment of the EU political elites with the notable exception of the 
European Parliament, which stands in stark contrast to the enthusiastic behaviour of 
UK’s elites. 
In the second half of the cascade when European institutional elites attempted 
to bring their member states to conformity with the new norm, they employed 
socialisation and material leverage to achieve their goal. European institutions did 
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employ socialisation, especially the Council of Europe, whose competency covers 
racial discrimination but whose compliance mechanisms are mostly at the level of 
soft law and are largely underpinned by communicative logic rather than material 
leverage. Such socialisation efforts have had limited impact and it is often difficult to 
detect clear causal links between socialisation and the proliferation of Roma-specific 
policies in targeted states. To this it is important to add the mechanism of 
conditionality, which represents an instrumentalist ‘stick and carrot’ approach to 
compliance with EU norms, and largely accounts for the formal codification of the 
anti-discrimination norm in new EU member states and its formal incorporation into 
formal domestic policies. Besides applying material leverage externally, the EU has 
also used its instrumental leverage to advance the norm internally through the threat 
of sanctions and infringement procedures although it has done so only against the 
Czech Republic. The eventual albeit rather formal compliance of the Czech Republic 
has shown that the logic of consequences has had inconsequential impact on 
domestic internalisation processes. 
Domestic-led versus international-led norm diffusion 
The UK case of norm diffusion provides additional weight to the argument 
that new norms are more likely to displace pre-established national norms if they are 
driven by the domestic political elite of the norm non-compliant state. The analysis 
of the US-UK knowledge transfer highlights the role of government officials in norm 
diffusion and their capacity for social learning, which in this case was further 
facilitated by the fact that the two states are established democracies with a shared 
history. The racial tensions they experienced concurrently were also influential in 
furthering the race legislation agenda of UK’s norm backers and explain their 
imitative behavior in appropriating the norm from the American context.  
The analysis of the Czech case suggests that controversial norms are unlikely 
to reach high domestic salience if they are exclusively promoted by transnational 
norm entrepreneurs. The thesis demonstrates that such norms are most likely to stay 
nominally on a state’s policy agenda while being undermined internally by political 
elites, government institutions and society. The race anti-discrimination norm in 
relation to Roma in the Czech Republic has largely been driven by EU conditionality 
and legally binding ECtHR case law. EU pressure on the Czech political elites to 
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internalise the norm has been unsuccessful as evidenced by the hostility of these 
elites towards the transposition of the Equality Directives into national law, the weak 
institutional structure that monitors norm compliance and the unwillingness of the 
succession of governments to initiate an educational reform in compliance with the 
D.H. verdict.  
Analytical problems: the concepts of norm violator, norm entrepreneur and norm 
threshold 
The construction and diffusion of the race anti-discrimination norm vis-à-vis 
the Romani minority problematizes the distinction the norm life cycle model makes 
between norm entrepreneurs and norm violators. Finnemore and Sikkink 
conceptualize western states and intergovernmental organizations as teachers of 
norms while states that do not adhere to internationally agreed standards of 
appropriate behavior are labeled as target or norm-violating states (Finnemore, 1993 
and Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 900-904). The empirics in this thesis, however, 
show that their distinction is analytically unsustainable. The example of the UK’s 
profiling of Roma asylum seekers and the poor treatment of its indigenous Gypsy 
minority erodes the distinction between norm enterprising and norm violating states 
(O’Nions, 2007: 124-126). This also extends to the majority of west European states 
with France and Italy often cited as the major offenders after having gained notoriety 
for their ethnic profiling, governmentally sanctioned segregation and targeted 
expulsions of Roma migrants (EU Observer, 2008, ERRC, 2011 and Gehring, 2013).  
International organisations do not always take on consistently a norm 
teaching role either. The EU institutions during the 1990s, with the notable exception 
of the European Parliament at the time, were hesitant and unenthusiastic about the 
creation of race directives. Other research that analyses the actions the European 
Commission has undertaken to ensure the compliance of member states with the 
Directive on Free Movement as applied to CEE Roma confirms that categorizing 
international organisations as norm entrepreneurs is problematic (Gehring, 2013). In 
her analysis, Jaqueline Gehring concludes that when it comes to the free movement 
of Roma EU citizens, the European Commission tends to level little criticism at 
member states that violate the directive vis-à-vis the Roma. Even when the 
Commission issues criticisms, it retracts them quickly as the ongoing evictions of 
Roma in France show (ibid, 19). This, Gehring argues, not only undermines the 
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Commission’s “own legitimacy as a protector of European citizenship rights, but 
also denies the reality of discrimination faced by Roma migrants throughout Europe” 
(2013: 19-20). The ECtHR jurisprudence building processes examined in this thesis 
have revealed that a significant number of the Strasbourg judiciary profoundly 
opposed the evidence of systemic ethnic discrimination presented in the D.H. case. 
This placed them in direct opposition to the norm enterprising actions of other 
Council of Europe bodies. To put it differently, the regional diffusion of the racial 
equality norm has faced substantial challenges and resistance, which have come from 
the very institutions and actors within them that according to the norm life cycle 
model should behave as cohesive norm promoters.  
The thesis also suggests that norm thresholds also known as tipping points 
are not a reliable tool for pinpointing the moment at which the norm cascade 
becomes a quasi-automatic process that leads to successful domestic internalisation. 
The Czech and Hungarian cases show that when a new norm reaches the so called 
threshold, the cascade does not take a taken-for-granted quality even though the 
tipping point of the norm was achieved with the passage of the Race Equality 
Directive. The adoption of the directive which contractually bound all member states 
to institutionalise the racial anti-discrimination norm into domestic law, according to 
the norm life cycle model, should have guaranteed an uncontested and swift 
incorporation of the norm into the political order of all EU member states. Instead 
the Czech elites have never accepted the norm while the current Hungarian 
government has subverted the norm by reversing race anti-discrimination laws and 
policies and publicly taking a pro-segregationist stand related to Roma education. 
Norm internalisation  
Problematising agency 
The internalisation phase is the most underdeveloped parts of the norm life 
cycle model because the authors’ privilege the analysis of transnational agency and 
its role in the diffusion of new norms internationally.  The agency of domestic elites 
and the context in which they govern is of little interest to the authors who leave an 
analytical gap between the cascading of the new norm and the point at which the 
norm becomes institutionalised into domestic legislation and the existing 
institutional apparatus (1998: 902-905).  
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The problem with Finnemore and Sikkink’s presentation of the final 
internalisation stage and the wider constructivist literature on transnational 
normative change stems from the featuring of a number of empirical studies that 
trace international norms whose domestic institutionalisation has proceeded in an 
uncontested or modestly challenged manner (Nadelmann, 1990, Finnemore, 1993 
and Price, 1995). The focus of these studies is on the relatively uncontested 
construction of new norms at the supranational level, the primacy of transnational 
agency in norm construction and diffusion, and the relatively straightforward 
adoption of the norms by a large number of states through the signing of 
international conventions. The studies actually say very little about the extent to 
which norms are institutionalised and complied with domestically. Therefore, the 
findings should not be taken as a proof that norm diffusion and internalisation are 
one-way, top-down processes in which domestic political actors exercise little or no 
agency. The other main problem with these studies, which also affects the design of 
the norm life cycle model, is the ‘cherry picking’ of the norms (anti-pirating, anti-
trafficking, prohibition of chemical weapons among others) whose very nature 
makes it easier to advocate for and garner wide international support. Constructivist 
studies have, in general, shied away from examining complex norms like the one 
studied here which relate to national identity and belonging and which typically do 
not have such clearly defined wide appeal. By basing their model on empirics that 
are limited in their scope and lacking in a rigorous analysis of domestic norm 
compliance, Finnemore and Sikkink provide a framework for the study of norms, 
which cannot accommodate instances of norm clashing which occur when new 
standards of behavior contradict historic national attachments to opposing norms. 
The findings from the five cases studied here suggest that the behaviour of 
national political elites is key in determining the success or failure of domestic 
conformity with new norms. The thesis advances the claim that even in situations 
when a new norm becomes codified into regional institutions and legislation and 
national governments agree to recognise the norm, cascading and internalisation can 
be seriously disrupted when national political elites renege on their formal 
commitment. On the other hand, if the domestic elites consider the internalisation of 
the new norm a political necessity and have sufficient ideational commitment, 
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domestic norm embeddedness can take place without the presence of transnational 
norm enterprising actors.  
The historical record also reveals the need for further analysis of the 
interactions between domestic political elites. My research which has taken into 
account and built upon Beth Simmons’ analysis (2009) of the role of the executive 
and the judiciary in treaty compliance, or in this case norm compliance, shows that 
the collaboration of key norm entrepreneurs within the three branches of the 
government matters for norm conformity. The US judiciary played a critical part in 
dismantling the racial equality norm in the First Reconstruction and pioneered its re-
institutionalisation into case law in the Second Reconstruction. In Hungary, the 
legislative branch and to a lesser extent, the judiciary, worked with norm 
entrepreneurs within the socialist-liberal government to spearhead new anti-
discrimination policy and legislative reforms while the post-2010 undoing of the 
checks and balances system has eliminated the existing institutional support for the 
norm. The findings link to and support Beth Simmons’ argument that treaties and the 
norms embedded in them have stronger effect in states with more independent 
judicial systems and thus possess the greatest potential to influence domestic policy 
in these types of domestic systems of government (2009:150). The analysis also 
suggests the need to disaggregate governing structures and the agents in them to 
account with more precision for the specific ways in which actors within the 
different branches interact with one another to appropriate or challenge new rules 
and notions. The account offered here points to the need for further research focusing 
on the relationships between the branches of the government and within the 
individual branches (e.g., bureaucratic agencies, ministries or other parts of the 
governing apparatus) to shed additional light on the behaviours, practices and 
predispositions that lead domestic actors to favor or challenge new norms.  
This thesis distinguishes three possible norm internalisation scenarios 
depending on the behaviour of the ruling elites. First, the new norm is said to be 
permanently internalised in the domestic political order when the norm remains 
institutionalised and upheld despite changes in the state’s government. The US and 
UK cases showcase this permanent internalisation, which should be understood not 
in Finnemore and Sikkink’s sense as a deep and taken-for-granted embeddedness but 
in a more pragmatic sense, which defines internalisation not as absence of 
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contestation but as norm institutionalisation enforcement that endures despite the 
occasional contestation. Incomplete internalisation, evident in the First 
Reconstruction and the Hungarian case, is said to take place when a set of norm 
supportive political elites makes important steps in the norm’s codification and 
promotion but the succeeding set of political elites un-does the previous gains. The 
third scenario, no internalisation, is exemplified by the behaviour of the political 
elites in the Czech case. No internalisation occurs when the domestic elites reject the 
norm from the onset.    
Transnational versus domestic norm entrepreneurship 
As already pointed out in the norm emergence phase when taken together the 
nature of the new norm and the level at which it is created are important in 
determining its domestic institutionalisation. The US and UK cases demonstrate that 
complex norms that raise questions of belonging and citizenship are more likely to 
be permanently institutionalised when advanced by justice-driven domestic elites. 
The Czech case, on the other hand, illustrates that norms imposed from actors at the 
supranational level are unlikely to achieve long-term internalisation when the 
domestic elites’ rationale for compliance is wholly based on instrumental concerns, 
in this case short-term political goals related to EU accession. The other barrier to 
engaging in norm socialisation that stands out in the Czech and post-2010 Hungarian 
cases comes from the elites’ preferences to resolve the ‘Roma issue’ through 
approaches, which are shaped by historical and discursive processes that have 
molded national identity in a way that presents Roma as an internal ‘other’ and 
validate racial inequality. 
The thesis also suggests that non-state domestic norm entrepreneurs can 
influence substantially the behaviour of domestic political elites. The grassroots civil 
rights initiatives organised by activists at immense personal cost in the US and the 
advocacy efforts of the fledging Roma movement in Hungary in the 1990s sped up 
the legislative and policy reforms in the area of race equality. In post-2010 Hungary, 
on the other hand, the Roma movement for civil rights is fraught with divisions 
while in the Czech Republic it is virtually non-existent. My interviews with pro-
Roma and Roma activists suggest widespread passivity and reluctance among 
Romani communities at the grassroots level to oppose discriminatory laws and 
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practices and to demand compliance with existing anti-discrimination laws. In the 
absence of grassroots norm entrepreneurship, international pressure alone has been 
powerless to prevent norm erosion.  
Government setup 
A state’s government structure acts as an intervening variable that deserves 
attention because it can constrain or enhance norm internalisation. The analysis 
shows that an analytical distinction ought to be made between internalisation at the 
national and local level and that the design of the state’s government framework 
(relatively centralised or decentralised) is a factor that facilitates or hinders the 
internalisation of new norms.  
The thesis demonstrated that when national political elites consider norm 
adoption a priority and the government system is (even temporarily) centralised, the 
norm acceptance at the local level is greater. In the US case normative change was 
made possible because the interpretation of the constitutional provisions granted pre-
eminence to federally made decisions. Despite the ordinarily decentralised system 
that gives states significant decision-making power, the thesis has shown that during 
both Reconstructions the national elites used their constitutionally derived powers to 
highly centralise the system in order to enforce the racial equality norm.  Because the 
US Constitution mandates that Congress has the power to call upon the military to 
enforce the Laws of the Union, congressional elites during the First Reconstruction 
period were able to legitimise the establishment of military governments in the 
Southern states, which were accountable to them and which dismantled and rebuilt 
state and local institutions that incorporated the new norm in policy and practice. 
When it comes to the Second Reconstruction, the president acted as the key norm 
entrepreneur. The Constitution gives the presidential office the responsibility to "take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed", which is commonly interpreted as ensuring 
the execution of the law in practice and allows the president wide discretion over 
how to enforce specific laws. In other words, the president had a greater choice of 
opportunities for agency and was able to target the status quo in multiple ways: 
through military enforcement, institution building and restructuring, and laws for 
more robust anti-discrimination regulatory frameworks. 
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  In the UK case, despite the system of devolution, legislating on equality 
matters has been reserved for the UK Parliament while the devolved administrations, 
with the notable exception of Northern Ireland, have been excluded from the law-
making process. The centralisation of the process allowed national elites to engage in 
norm transference and the erection of a new institutional framework of monitoring 
and enforcement equality bodies across the administrations at the same time. In the 
EU case, the primacy of EU law over national law has enabled EU bureaucrats to 
monitor the formal compliance of member states with the timely and adequate 
transposition of the Race Equality Directive into national law. Moreover, the 
organisational set up and governing mechanisms of the EU institutions provide EU 
elites with the power to oblige member states to comply with EU laws through the 
mechanisms of infringement proceedings, litigation and financial sanctions. At the 
same time, it should be emphasised that the supremacy of intergovernmental 
organisations over national elites is of a rather formalistic nature and can mean very 
little in cases in which the domestic elites oppose the new norm. This happens 
because the political and legal power supranational institutions have over national 
elites is not comparable to the powers national elites have over regional and local 
authorities in a domestic centralised system due to their more limited enforcement 
and supervisory powers and the wide discretion national elites are granted in 
fulfilling the mandates of European institutions.  
The pre-2010 Hungarian case also showed that when political elites who 
display norm commitment act within a decentralised government system, local norm 
conformity is negligible. The post-2010 Hungarian and Czech cases demonstrated 
that the government setup is irrelevant when national political elites do not embrace 
the new norm while a centralised system run by hostile national elites can expedite 
the civic death of new norms. The Hungarian decentralised municipal system until 
2010 had a constraining role on the norm enterprising national elites. The thesis 
showed that the successive centre-left Hungarian governments throughout the 2000s, 
similarly to the Radical Republicans, displayed strong commitment to the 
institutionalisation of the racial equality norm into legislation and national policy and 
to ensuring the political representation of the Romani minority within governing 
structures.  However, the extensive legislative and policy reforms at the national 
level especially in the area of educational desegregation were routinely contested by 
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municipal actors, who had authority over schools and whose unwillingness to 
implement desegregation policies was largely motivated by the limited domestic 
salience, or legitimacy, of the norm in society, making school desegregation a 
particularly damaging issue in the context of local electoral politics. In fact, the 
findings pointed out that in certain areas segregationist and discriminatory practices 
at the local level increased and intensified as the municipal authorities came up with 
especially detrimental ideas to circumvent the new laws and policies. These 
developments suggest that although key the norm entrepreneurship of domestic elites 
is not a sufficient condition for norm internalisation. The coming to power of PM 
Orbán’s right-wing government started a dramatic restructuring of the governance 
system, which has been described as Orbán’s “obsession with centralisation” and has 
sped up the demise of the racial equality norm by displacing it from the domestic 
public domain (Kornai, 2015). 
In the Czech Republic the government system does not act as an intervening 
variable because of the anti-norm stand of the successive national governments that 
openly embraced opposing norms. The existence of a host of domestic institutions, 
which have been historically developed to support segregationist practices the most 
notable example being the extensive and well-funded system of special education 
which enjoys significant popular support, is an additional factor that prohibits 
normative progress. The current government structure that contains powerful 
institutions upholding contravening old norms along with the newly created weak 
anti-discrimination bodies has resulted in an institutional environment that is 
impervious to reforms and would be difficult to dismantle even if a new norm 
enterprising elite comes to power. 
The setup of the domestic judicial system also influences norm 
institutinalisation. The thesis upholds several of Beth Simmons’ clams (2009) in 
regards to the role of the judiciary in norm compliance. Several features of common 
law systems increase the possibility for deeper norm institutionalisation if the 
judiciary is sympathetic to the new human rights norm: the greater structural 
independence of the judiciary where judges can act as independent policy-makers, 
the competence of courts to hold governments accountable for violations of 
constitutional or other treaty-based provisions, and the role of precedent which 
facilitates the deeper embeddedness of norms in local jurisprudences (Simmons, 
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2009: 75).  In civil law systems the judiciary tends to have little or no power to 
review government action and the constitutionality of government policies (ibid). In 
the absence of precedent, judges in civil law systems have no independent authority 
to create new rules and alter existing ones. Unlike the US judiciary, the Supreme 
Courts of the Czech Republic and Hungary are unable to produce high impact 
judgments even though strategic litigation on behalf of Roma children in the area of 
education has proliferated in the past decade especially in Hungary. The domestic 
judiciary in the two states is limited by the civil law system under which it operates 
and which precludes it from issuing broadly formulated verdicts with national 
significance. This is particularly noticeable in the Hungarian case, where despite 
multiple lawsuits in which the domestic courts found violation of the anti-
discrimination principle in the educational system, the judgments have had limited 
impact. The impact is insubstantial because the court decisions are applicable only to 
the individual case and their enforcement has varied as it is dependent on the 
political will of the local authorities. This again underscores the importance of the 
setup of domestic structures, their scope of powers and degree of structural 
independence when it comes to norm internalisation. 
Going beyond conventional constructivism: implications for further research 
 This thesis set out to provide a critical assessment of Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s model of normative change by tracing the evolution of the racial anti-
discrimination norm. Employing an institutional and policy-oriented analysis I re-
examined and challenged the design of the norm life cycle model, the key actors, 
their motivations and the main mechanisms that elicit normative change. Staying 
within the confines of conventional constructivism I sought to develop further the 
relationship between agency and structure at the domestic level. In this section I 
address the limitations conventional constructivism faces when applied to complex 
norms that are central to identity and national belonging. These norms do not lend 
themselves easily to studies premised upon models of causality and quantification. 
Accordingly, they act as ‘control tests’ for the norm life cycle model and its 
limitations.  
To recapitulate, Fimmemore and Sikkink (1998) draw on soft-positivist 
methods to create a model in which ideational variables are presented as causing the 
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genesis and evolution of international norms. The choice of research design indicates 
a confluence between conventional constructivism and realist approaches, where 
constructivists take the inability of realists to explain certain phenomena as the 
starting point for showing the causal or semi-causal significance of ideational factors 
such as norms, values and beliefs on state behavior (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 194). 
The conventional constructivist approach chosen by Finnemore and Sikkink contains 
inherent limitations that prevent its ability to engage critically with conceptions of 
norms that are linked to identity and citizenship. The reason for this has to do with 
the type of epistemology that conventional constructivist scholars adopt. Unlike 
post-positivist approaches, traditional constructivist epistemology embraces 
subjective conceptions of norms and sees normative change in terms of behaviors 
and actions that need to be explained rather than as a concept which is inherently 
contested and political. Because of the chosen analytical framework, epistemology 
and commonly used methodology of process tracing, conventional constructivism, 
unlike most other deepening approaches, does not allow the exploration of the 
relationship between norm presentations and deep-seated identities. 
Critical constructivist and post-structuralist approaches that take a more 
discursive approach to norms and identity could usefully deepen the present 
research. Critical constructivism which uses linguistic analysis would be able to shed 
light on how the racial anti-discrimination norm becomes legitimated or invalidated 
through specific discursively constituted constructions that follow a specific set of 
rule-bound games that re-orient the constitution of identities and political interests 
and thus determine the policies that should be adopted (Fierke, 1999 and 2000). 
Post-structuralist linguistic approaches which emphasise the social power of 
language (Hook, 1984 and 1985) open up the possibility to conceptualise the anti-
discrimination norm as a product of political practices, which is discursively 
constituted and has no materiality of its own outside its discursive representation 
(Shapiro, 1981and Dillon, 1990). The discursive method enables the examination of 
the nation state and national identity as being produced and re-produced through the 
construction of internal ‘Others’ who are located in a variety of sites including 
ethnicity and race (Campbell, 1990: 270). Analysing political discourse in light of 
the need for societal cohesion could explain better the contested nature and the 
framing and re-framing of the anti-discrimination norm in relation to the different 
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minority groups in this thesis. Political discourse could conceivably challenge the 
norm’s conceptual stability presenting it as something which changes according to 
transformations in understandings of national identity and the function minority 
groups perform within these understandings. Since critical constructivism analyses 
the linkages between the historic and discursive constitution of identities, it would 
help to explain shifts in understandings of national belonging as both a discursive 
practice and the outcome of major historic transformations. An examination of the 
very nature of the racial anti-discrimination norm through a study of the 
performative function the norm serves in shaping national identity in the five case 
studies could deepen the constructivist understanding of norm development. 
Alternatively, such research could contest the very idea of norm evolution if it could 
sufficiently problematise the conceptual stability of the racial anti-discrimination 
norm by arguing that the norm has no existence outside of the political discourse and 
practices that produce and re-produce its meaning according to temporary political 
aims. 
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